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Public response to risk is socially shaped in a way that often over- or under-estimates expert 
risk assessments. One of the main theoretical tools to examine public risk perception is the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF). This framework proposes a mechanism 
through which risk responses arise from interactions among various social actors, but past 
empirical work has been mainly concerned with correlations between structural variables 
rather than the mechanism of amplification and the process over time by which it develops. 
And more importantly, there has been quite limited modelling of risk amplification to date. 
This study aims to discover a way of formalising social risk amplification, to find out what are 
the necessary assumptions for modelling risk amplification, and to work out what 
consequences this modelling would predict. It is an attempt to model collective response to 
risks that are significant at a societal level but which materialise in a distributed way across a 
population. The natural heterogeneity of individual risk perceivers, the emergence of 
behaviour through interactions of social actors, and the complex feedback loops linking risk 
perception with risk related behaviour point to using an agent-based model as a modelling 
medium. 
The study is developed in the context of product contamination scandals such as the recent 
cases in China of contaminated milk products. One of the important features of contamination 
crises is that product recall has become an increasingly inevitable part and is often a key 
element in risk communication during such crises. Yet recalls send ambiguous signals about 
the misconduct of the organization in question: they clearly indicate some kind of failure, and 
possibly negligence, in the product that are associated with a risk of significant harm; but they 
also suggest that the organization is concerned with consumers’ welfare.  
The model that was developed is based on the principle that risk perceivers have to 
assimilate risk through the risk beliefs of others, their direct experience of a risk, and 
communications about the risk from organizations (including their product recall decisions) 
and the media. And it is based on the principle that, as well as discovering the nature of a risk, 
risk perceivers also make judgments about wrongfulness (which Freudenburg called recreancy) 
– and this also shapes the strength of risk responses. 
The model is partially calibrated with a consumer survey carried out in the context of a 
Chinese milk contamination scandal that took place in recent years. Simulation results from 
the model show that public risk perception grows progressively toward an exogenous peak 
before it immediately decays, and that there is a relatively high residue of concern after the 
crisis is resolved. The objectivity of media coverage appears to be inversely related to risk 
amplification: a media that simply follows public opinion is associated more strongly with 
exaggerated risk perceptions than an objective one. A sensitivity analysis indicates that the 
 
 
initial conditions, objective risk level, duration of contamination, and variation of recreancy 
perception are the most significant influences on the degree of social amplification. This 
knowledge helps prioritize data collection for future research and identify important aspects 
that particularly require managerial attention. 
The main contribution of this study is to develop a process of modelling social risk 
amplification that consists of three steps of increasing contextualisation. The first step 
involves a basic model that captures social risk amplification as a general theory relative to all 
kinds of risk event. The second step contextualises this model specifically for product recall 
crises. It involves extracting agent decision rules from the literature on product recall, based 
on statistical associations found in empirical work on recall crises. And the third step 
contextualises the model for a specific population. It involves calibrating the relative 
importance of different information sources for the heterogeneous agent population using a 
survey of Chinese consumers responding to a milk contamination crisis. One important insight 
from the process of modelling risk amplification is that SARF is not sufficient for modelling 
particular crises. It seems essential that modelling of SARF should involve a clearly defined 
context in which risk responses arise. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an introduction to this study in five aspects – the research problem that it 
tackles, the theoretical approach that it is based on, the context in which it is conducted, the 
objective that it attempts to achieve, and the layout of the thesis. 
1.1 Research problem 
Risk perception appears to hold a central position in the social and organizational agenda and 
is crucial for the understanding of social processing of uncertainty (Rogers, 1997). 
Management and communication of risks have become a dominant concern of many 
organizations, government agencies, and scientific research groups in modern society. It has 
long been accepted that public perceptions of risk are socially shaped (Muter et al., 2013; 
Scherer and Cho, 2003). Specifically, how people perceive and respond to risks is a reflection 
of social context they find themselves in (Sjöberg, 2000). An individual’s reaction to risk is 
often accompanied by communicating with others, processing related risk information, and 
modifying risk behaviour accordingly. Thus the judgments that people make about risks or 
risk events are more a question of social interaction and observation than of merely 
anticipated physical consequences (McComas, 2003; Mitchell, 1995).  
Importantly, collective response to risks is not always accurate with respect to the objective 
level or expertly-estimated level of risk but deviates considerably from it (Kasperson and 
Kasperson, 1996; Liu et al., 1998; Loewenstein and Mather, 1990). There is often a dramatic 
divergence between expert assessment of risk and public perceptions of risk, as seen in such 
cases as SARS in Hong Kong (Lau et al., 2003) and genetically modified foods in the UK 
(Frewer et al., 2002). The divergence produces social reactions that result in negative public 
attitudes toward risks or technologies, societal costs, and economic losses, which create, as 
Busby and Onggo (2013) have pointed out, ‘an obstacle both to managing risks specifically 
and to introducing new technology more generally’. For example, according to Siu and Wong 
(2004), the SARS outbreak severely affected tourism, travel, and retail sales in Hong Kong, 
with visitor arrivals dropping by 63% (around 850,000) and retail sales falling by 14% 
(around HK$2 billion). It becomes essential, therefore, to understand the question of how 
people collectively perceive potential danger and form risk responses.  
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1.2 Theoretical foundation 
One of the main approaches for explaining public risk perception is the social amplification of 
risk framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988). SARF aims to explain how risks or risk 
events that are considered minor by technical experts produce strong public concern and 
substantial social and economic consequences. A risk event is portrayed through risk signals 
that interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that can 
heighten or downplay public perceptions of risk and related risk behaviour. The notion is that 
risk signals are created, transferred, and interpreted by a variety of social actors that are seen 
as ‘amplification stations’, such as individuals, news media, social groups, government 
agencies, scientific institutions, and so on. The term ‘amplification stations’ were proposed in 
the original article of SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988) to represent social actors that experience 
a risk event and generate, transmit, and process information about the risk. Amplification here 
refers to a difference between subjective and objective assessments of risk and includes both 
overestimation and underestimation of risks. Risks will become amplified if the subjective 
risk beliefs of the public are higher than the objective risk but attenuated otherwise. 
The social processing of risk signals is accompanied by behavioural responses that are 
likely to evoke secondary impacts, such as loss of trust in institutions, loss of sales, demand 
for regulatory constraints, litigation, changes in physical risk, community alienation, and 
stigmatization of product, that spread far beyond the initial impact of risk events (Kasperson, 
2012; Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992). 
In accordance with SARF, social experience of risk is not merely an experience of health 
and safety impacts, but rather the result of the process by which individuals and social groups 
learn to analyse the nature and effects of risky events by gathering and processing relevant 
risk information from the physical world and the social world (Burns et al., 1993; Kasperson 
and Kasperson, 1996). The concept of social risk amplification provides a theoretical base for 
explaining individuals’ perceptions of risk as well as an analytic framework for exploring the 
social processes by which risk responses are made. 
There has been a large amount of empirical work around the idea of risk amplification. 
However, as detailed in the Literature Survey (Chapter 2), almost all past empirical work on 
social risk amplification has been concerned with the correlations of structural variables in 
risk amplification rather than the mechanism that produces risk amplification. And more 
importantly, there has been quite limited modelling of risk amplification to date. Examples 
seen in the literature have used both system dynamics (Burns and Slovic, 2007; Busby and 
Onggo, 2013) and agent-based models (Busby et al., 2016; Onggo et al., 2014) to explore the 
mechanisms of risk amplification. Their primary concern has been how social communication 
influences the formation of risk beliefs. This concern has meant that other factors shaping risk 
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responses have received little attention. One is organizational misconduct, which is termed 
‘recreancy’ and defined as the belief that the producer has betrayed the public trust and fails to 
fulfill its obligations (Freudenburg, 1993). Freudenburg (2003) has argued that recreancy is 
probably the most important contributor to social risk amplification. This combines with but 
does not replace direct experience in the formation of risk responses. Direct experience 
obviously serves as a source of information by providing feedback on the nature and 
controllability of hazardous events (Kasperson, 2012; Kasperson et al., 1988). But as Rogers 
(1997) pointed out, although direct experience can lead to learned perception and is an 
important basis of public risk estimates, it may be very limited in many contexts for many of 
the more contentious, societal-level risks. 
1.3 Research context 
Product contamination crises have been one of the most pressing problems faced by 
organizations (Siomkos and Kurzbard, 1994). They are seen as well-publicized occurrences 
wherein products are found to be contaminated with a biological, chemical, or physical agent 
and could cause adverse health effects. Factors such as the increasing complexity of products, 
customers being more demanding (Dawar and Pillutla, 2000; Laufer and Coombs, 2006), and 
increasingly advanced and, at the same time, vulnerable technology (Standop, 2006) have 
made contamination incidents even more frequent. Moreover, as indicated by such cases as 
the milk contamination incident in Oahu, Hawaii, in 1982 (Liu et al., 1998) and contaminated 
pet food in the United States (Feng et al., 2010), product contamination incidents often 
dominate media space and elicit extensive public concern, creating great challenges for the 
organizations’ handling of associated risks.  
To find an appropriate case that can be used as a reference for this study, three cases that 
occurred in China in recent years are outlined in the Research Context (Chapter 3) – the 2008 
Chinese milk scandal, the Nongfu Spring water event, and the ‘gutter oil’ scandal. These cases 
all involved a well-defined contaminated product, an intense social reaction, and multiple 
types of actors (e.g. firms, government, and the public) engaged in risk communication 
processes. In one of the three cases – the Sanlu milk scandal – there was a single producer 
who made decisions about whether, when, and how to implement recalls of defective products. 
Product recalls have become a prevalent phenomenon (Copeland et al., 2004; Germann et al., 
2014) and have been recognized as a top priority for dealing with contamination crises (Hora 
et al., 2011; Magno, 2012). They introduce a clear organizational activity that poses two 
contrary effects on consumer perceptions of risk: product recalls are a primary source of 
information regarding potential risks that consumers are facing, while they are also 
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demonstrating that the producer is seeking to solve the problems and to protect consumers 
from being harmed by products in question. As a consequence, the context for this study is a 
specific product contamination crisis in which the organization involved makes a product 
recall, with the Sanlu milk scandal as the prototype case.  
1.4 Research objective 
The objective of this research is to investigate the process of modelling risk amplification. 
This includes: 
1) identifying the key elements of SARF that need to be incorporated in a model of risk 
amplification mechanisms; 
2) identifying the main assumptions that need to be made in the construction of this model; 
3) determining what kind of decisions are required when the model is applied to product 
contamination crises; 
4) finding a suitable process of calibration; 
5) assessing what insights can be gained from simulating the model and performing 
sensitivity analysis on the results. 
The inherent heterogeneity of individual risk perceivers (Sjöberg, 2000), the emergence of 
behaviour through interactions of social actors (Binder et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013), and 
the complex feedback loops linking risk perception with risk related behaviour (Burns and 
Slovic, 2007; Busby and Onggo, 2013; Busby et al., 2016) point to using an agent-based 
model as a modelling medium. As discussed earlier, such a model is developed in the context 
of product contamination scandals such as the recent cases in China of contaminated milk 
products.  
In the model there are a relatively large number of public agents (typically 1,000), a single 
producer agent, and a media agent. The conceptualisation of an individual agent forming risk 
perceptions during a recall event is composed of three primary elements. The model separates 
individuals’ responses into a risk discovery element that integrates prior beliefs, beliefs of 
social neighbours, direct experience, and producer announcements and a recreancy judgment 
element that is assessed by the timing and voluntariness of recalls. It is also an important step 
to combine narrowcast and broadcast information channels among a population of public 
actors interacting in a fixed social network. Public agents use very simple linear rules to 
update their risk beliefs. The model is partially calibrated by a consumer survey to achieve a 
certain level of micro-validity and to further contextualise social risk amplification.  
The intended contributions of the work mainly lie in two aspects. One is to develop a 
process of modelling social risk amplification through three main stages of increasing 
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contextualisation – involving the extraction of agent decision rules from the literature and 
calibrating agent priorities from a survey. The second is to show with the model which are the 
aspects to which risk amplification is most sensitive. The main practical value of the study is 
to show policymakers and risk managers who need to deal with public risk responses how to 
reason about the problem of how such responses are formed. Perhaps most significantly, the 
model helps managers reason about the effects of early or late product recalls, and helps them 
deal with the dilemma that product recalls can be both harmful and beneficial to a producer’s 
reputation. And thinking about the role of the media as leaders or followers of public 
responses has been shown to make an important difference. 
1.5 Layout of thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews the literature on 
social risk amplification to describe the main theoretical and empirical work that has emerged 
from SARF. Chapter 3 briefly depicts and compares three product related crises that arose in 
China in recent years, justifying the choice of one of them as the reference context in which 
the model is built. In Chapter 4 the design of this study is presented including the research 
questions to answer, reasons for using agent-based modelling as a medium, and the procedure 
for conducting empirical work to support calibration of the model. Then Chapter 5 deals with 
the development of the agent model and shows the results of simulating the model in a 
perfectly mixed population and in a small-world network, respectively. Chapter 6 calibrates 
the relative importance of different sources of risk information for public agents using a 
consumer survey of Chinese people responding to a milk contamination crisis. Chapter 7 
evaluates the uncertainty in the model through sensitivity analysis and assesses the model’s 
micro- and macro-validity. A general discussion is given in Chapter 8 to illuminate how the 
model proposed in this study helps us better understand SARF, the balance between generality 
and contextualisation represented in the model, and how the model addresses the research 
questions. The thesis concludes with a statement of the intended contributions and an 
indication of the study’s limitations as well as of directions for future work. 
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2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
This survey attempts to organize, describe, and evaluate the current literature on social risk 
amplification. The findings will be used in Chapter 5 for the development of decision rules 
behind social risk amplification in the conceptual agent model. This review is structured as 
follows. The first section deals with theoretical background of risk amplification. The second 
section outlines and critically comments on empirical work in terms of actors (media and non-
media actors), contributory effects, contexts, and methodologies. The third section surveys the 
existing modelling of social risk amplification. This review ends with a brief discussion and 
conclusion. 
2.1 Theoretical background of risk amplification 
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988) was originally 
proposed to portray why and how certain risks attract public concern and become either 
heightened (through an amplification process) or lessened (through an attenuation process). In 
other words, SARF is regarded as an integrative framework that can be used to conceptualise 
and understand the dynamic complexity of risk perception within a social system (Duckett and 
Busby, 2013; Renn et al., 1992). SARF draws upon the notions that there is a serious 
disjuncture between expert assessment of risk and public perceptions of risk, and that an 
adequate conceptual framework is essential to provide guidelines on how to model and 
measure the functional relationships among various factors related to specific risk events 
(Kasperson et al., 1988).  
The metaphor of amplification explicitly comes from classical communication theory and 
signifies the process of amplifying or attenuating risk signals through dissemination of 
information between transmitters and receivers that act as amplification stations such as 
individuals, social groups, institutions, and media outlets (Binder et al., 2011; Kasperson, 
2012; Kasperson et al., 1988). In practice, distortion of risk signals occurs during both 
transmission and reception. Risk information is filtered and interpreted by various individual 
and social amplification stations that tend to heighten or weaken the salience of certain 
information in accordance with their own attitudes, values and beliefs. The behavioural and 
communicative responses of social actors are often drivers of secondary impacts that in turn 
trigger another stage of amplification to produce tertiary impacts. These ‘ripple effects’ 
suggest that amplification can ‘extend the temporal, sectoral, and geographical scales of 
impacts’ (Kasperson, 2012). 
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According to SARF, the social amplification of risk is the ‘the phenomenon by which 
information processes, institutional structures, social-group behaviour, and individual 
responses shape the social experience of risk, thereby contributing to risk consequences 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). Risk amplification occurs at multiple stages, including dissemination 
of risk information and related exaggeration, underestimation or otherwise distortion of risk 
perception, as well as subsequent societal response mechanisms. It should be noted that direct 
experience can sometimes serve as a risk amplifier or attenuator by providing feedback on the 
nature and controllability of hazardous events in reality. But to a large extent, awareness and 
knowledge of a risk is not acquired through direct experience. Specifically, mass media, 
interpersonal communication, and social interaction play pivotal roles in not only transmitting 
risk information but also framing and interpreting risk issues (Chung, 2011; Kasperson and 
Kasperson, 1996; Smith et al., 2013).  
In particular, the media that are usually represented by television, newspaper, radio, and 
increasingly, the Internet, occupy a vitally important and often conflicting role in shaping 
public perceptions, attitudes, and reactions to risk. Extensive media coverage on controversial 
natural, social, or technological risks can evoke strong social attention or public concern 
(Frewer et al., 2002; Koné and Mullet, 1994). It is generally held that media coverage is the 
mirror of risk perception, since the media are likely to allocate coverage disproportionately to 
rare or dramatic risks or risk events (Combs and Slovic, 1979; Kasperson et al., 1988). But 
this is not necessarily the whole story especially when potential contributors to risk perception 
are taken into account in the particular context to which the risk is specifically sensitive.  
Interpersonal communication, which involves the linkage with friends, neighbours, 
colleagues, and relatives, can also act as an agent of risk amplification in the way that people 
tend to neglect risk issues in isolation from views of their peers and share preference points or 
seemingly biased opinions with each other (Kasperson, 2012; Kasperson et al., 1988; 
Stanciugelu, 2013).  
With respect to social interaction, risk perceptions and risk-related responses are situated 
within a broader context where most risks are conceptualised, measured, and manipulated by 
social groups and institutions. The behaviour and interactions of institutions and organizations 
largely reflect their rules, functions, interests, and expectations that affect their predispositions 
in terms of risk interpretation and risk control (Renn et al., 1992).  
In addition to individual and social stations, the symbolic connotations of risk information 
such as language, images, videos, and signs are also responsible for risk amplification, 
because specific concepts or terms used in risk communication may mean quite different 
things to various individuals and social groups (Kasperson et al., 1988; Petts et al., 2000). In 
other words, the same story with the same information can be told in different ways, so such 
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symbolic connotations may entail the tendency to intensify or downplay related risks or risk 
events. 
There have been some criticisms of SARF, although it has become a standard lens that is 
widely used by researchers, risk managers, and policymakers. Rayner (1988) argued that the 
metaphor of amplification assumes risk signals to exist externally and objectively. Rayner 
(1988) held that risks do not exist outside the social system but relate closely to social actors 
that contribute and are subject to social processes. Correspondingly, risks are not ‘things’ 
independent of perceivers, but complex relationships of human and nonhuman components. 
Rip (1988) similarly stated that ‘a hazard signal is not just information-to-be-processed, but 
includes a (subculturally determined) action precept, or just a general call for action without 
prescribing any yet’. Rip’s criticism is also that analysis and evaluation of effects of social 
responses are markedly absent in SARF, and that the discussion concentrates on the individual 
in light of information communication and response mechanism and neglects the processes of 
social aggregation.  
The starting point of SARF is that there is a divergence between expert assessment and lay 
risk judgments. But Duckett and Busby (2013) argued that the authors of SARF do not 
explicitly point out whether expert assessment denotes a baseline risk from which social 
amplification is regarded as an unfavourable distortion. SARF fails to address the idea that 
‘commonsense judgments about other people’s risk behaviour often involve attributions of 
disproportionality’ (Duckett and Busby, 2013). Thus risk issues that seem overblown for one 
group are generally not being exaggerated by other groups. As Duckett and Busby (2013) 
suggested, additional layers of complexity exist among experts and the lay public. Besides, 
competing discourses are involved in the debates about the proportionality of risk response. 
Thus it is difficult and challenging to make objective comparison between expert risk 
assessments and lay judgments. Yet, in spite of the above critique, SARF has proved and 
continues to be successful and influential as an integrative and heuristic framework in the risk 
management arena. 
2.2 Empirical evidence of risk amplification 
In this section the issue of empirical evidence is divided into four parts – the actors involved 
in risk amplification processes, the contributory effects shaping risk perception, the contexts 
of risk events dealt with in empirical work, and the methodologies by which risk amplification 
has been examined. 
 9 
2.2.1 The actors in risk amplification 
There are two types of actor clearly differentiated in the literature: media and non-media (e.g. 
the public, government, NGO, organizations, etc.). This section reviews how the two types of 
actors contribute to social risk amplification, respectively. 
Media in risk amplification 
It has been argued that a number of attributes of information about a risk event are responsible 
for social risk amplification (Kasperson et al., 1988). The news media, serving as an important 
channel of information flow, have received extensive scientific attention for their critical role 
in communicating risk and shaping public risk perception.  
Current empirical work has paid close attention to the effect of media coverage on public 
perceptions of risk. It is noted that negative media coverage and positive media coverage 
produce asymmetrical effects on perceived risk for milk contamination in Oahu, Hawaii (Liu 
et al., 1998). Negative media coverage has immediate effects on individual behavioural 
responses due to consumers’ dislike of adverse health effects, while positive news reports do 
not have a quick impact because it takes some time for consumers to slowly adjust their 
perceptions to their perceived risks before the contamination is revealed. 
Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) pointed out that the news media generally cover risks 
selectively. For example, the media tends to downplay commonplace but more serious risks 
yet emphasize those that are rare or dramatic. However, in some countries, the media actively 
pursues aggressive risk intensification or risk attenuation for the interest of social institutions 
or governmental agencies. In China, for example, the news media have to accept the 
Communist Party’s guiding ideology and comply with the Party’s press policies, and the 
media have to design their coverage to support the Party’s guidance in political and social life 
(Zhao, 1998).  
Frewer et al. (2002) examined how media reporting about the risks associated with 
genetically modified foods affects public attitudes toward the technology, and concluded that 
there was consistency between the pattern of reporting and the changes in risk perception. In 
other words, individuals who perceived media reports as more alarming showed greater 
increases in risk perceptions compared to those who were less alarmed by the reports.  
In terms of media use, a sociological survey on earthquake risk perception of residents in 
Bucharest city reveals that television remains the main source of information in case of 
disasters or accidents (Stanciugelu, 2013). According to an empirical study on citizen 
engagement with wildlife risk (Hart et al., 2011), in comparison to newspapers, television 
news plays a larger role in influencing the risk perception of the threat that wildlife poses to 
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humans, since television is more likely to intensify perceived risk of wildlife by presenting 
vivid images, dramatic plots, and negative emotional content. By contrast, Yeo et al. (2014) 
noted that television news, newspaper stories, and online media coverage could mediate risk 
perception toward nuclear power within the American public before and after the Fukushima 
Daiichi disaster in Japan. Individuals who paid comparably higher level of attention to news 
saw larger decrease in risk perceptions after the disaster and vice versa.  
Media use also played a vital role in determining the risk evaluations of ideological groups. 
For example, the less attention conservatives paid to media the smaller drops in risk 
perception they experienced (Yeo et al., 2014). Moreover, Chung (2011) has investigated the 
dynamic process of risk amplification in the Internet environment through an examination of 
public concern for environmental risk associated with a tunnel construction. It is suggested 
that the intensity of public concern does not necessarily correspond with the amount of press 
coverage or the number of news articles. What can be concluded from this position is that the 
public is quite active in appreciating risk-related information, in responding to media 
reporting, and in becoming involved in the adjustment process of their perceptions (Chung, 
2011). In the same way, an empirical study that puts emphasis on wildfire risk perceptions 
among homeowners residing in a wildland-urban interface demonstrates that information 
provided by the media is not significantly correlated with risk perception (Smith et al., 2013). 
This result could probably be explained by the location of the study, where wildfire programs 
are actively implemented. 
As discussed above, the media can either make risks seem disproportionately large or 
oversimplify the complexity of the issues. But this is not always the case. A study on the 
Canadian case of BSE in Alberta suggests that media coverage led to neither an exaggeration 
nor moderation of risk associated with BSE by providing accurate depictions of possible 
economic and health risks brought by BSE and vCJD (Boyd and Jardine, 2011). In a nut shell, 
the mass media plays multiple and sometimes conflicting roles in the risk debate (Kasperson 
and Kasperson, 1996). It not only conveys risk information to the public, but serves as an 
amplifier, an attenuator, or an impersonal narrator of risk events. Thus, as existing literature 
indicates, the media may impose positive, negative, or even no impact on perceived risk 
within the public. This variation may partly lie in the fact that different risk events occur in 
different places with distinctive cultural and social contexts. Under certain circumstances, 
local context plays a prominent role in the amplification or attenuation of the risk (Boyd and 
Jardine, 2011; Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009; Masuda and Garvin, 2006; Smith et al., 2013). It is 
reasonable to infer that the same risk event that occurs in different regions can produce 
different assertions pertaining to the relationship between risk perception and media coverage.  
In practice, there is basically no literature evaluating the influence of social risk 
amplification on mass media. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that social amplification 
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associated with environmental, technological, and social risks can spawn considerable effects 
at the level of risk management, such as new regulations and policy decisions, and proactive 
risk communication strategies. These effects may restrict or enable what the media does 
(follow the pace of risk experts or regulatory agencies, or actively anchor public opinion), 
where the media obtains risk information (for example from whistleblowers or experts), what 
the media presents (accurate information or distorted portrayal), and what language of risk the 
media uses (the extent of dramatization and the symbolic connotations of information). 
Moreover, if the media notices that the risk of a hazardous event is socially amplified, in most 
cases it would frequently publish news stories referring to the event in order to cater to the 
interest of regulators and the public. This situation will probably increase individuals’ ability 
to recall the risk and heighten their perception of the likelihood of the hazard occurring, 
resulting in a reinforcing feedback loop of risk amplification. How risk amplification affects 
media is quite important for modelling the role of media in shaping public understanding of 
risks or risk events and merits further investigation. 
Non-media actors in risk amplification 
The media, in isolation, is unlikely to account for risk amplification (Chung, 2011; Frewer et 
al., 2002). The argument that risk perception is a mirror of media coverage cannot be always 
justified (Renn et al., 1992), because there are other non-media agents within the social 
amplification of risk framework that can affect public concern. For instance, the public, 
government agencies, commercial organizations, and NGO (non-governmental organisation) 
might operate as amplification stations to exert a strong influence on risk perception. 
Interpersonal communication has received relatively little attention in the research on risk 
amplification. Binder et al. (2011) investigated the influence of interpersonal discussion on 
individual perceptions of risks on the basis of a public opinion survey of residents living in 
potential locations for a new biological research facility in the United States. The results 
showed that discussion frequency functioned as both an amplifier and an attenuator of risk 
judgments in relation to the facility, with a small positive influence on supporters and a 
significant negative influence on opponents. Researchers also investigated the potential 
influence of public meetings on risk perception by examining individuals’ predisposition 
toward a local environmental hazard. The findings suggested that attendees perceived greater 
risks than did nonattendees, and that risk perception increased with the number of meetings 
attended (McComas, 2003). Moreover, individuals’ online posts and comments to certain risk 
could generate amplifying ripples of public concern (Chung, 2011). 
The interaction between the public and the expert groups is also a contributory factor to 
risk amplification. In the case of fishing and fish consumption, the public exhibited 
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attenuation of risks from fishing even if they were in the face of consumption warnings – the 
risks the public perceived were much lower than the risk estimates of the scientists and 
regulators (Burger, 2000). Mixed and conflicting messages concerning fish consumption and 
fishing, and economic benefits from fishing for both the public and governmental agencies 
enabled the public to discount the warnings, thereby fostering the deamplification (i.e. 
attenuation) of risk.     
Arguably, the interactive dynamics between the public and elements in the social networks 
play a role in influencing the general public’s perception of risk. The Canadian public showed 
attenuated perception of risk after BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy), a fatal, 
transmissible neurodegenerative disease that affects the central nervous system of cattle, was 
detected in Canada, primarily due to the relatively infrequent media reporting of BSE 
compared to concurrent news stories of other events such as SARS, WNV (West Nile virus), 
and U.S.-Iraq war (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009). By contrast, Boyd and Jardine (2011) 
concluded that the risk of BSE in Canada was neither socially heightened nor attenuated 
through the social process. Local and social context gave rise to a public understanding of 
BSE related risk that indicated actual health and economic outcomes. This disparity between 
these two studies may be attributable to the fact that the former focused solely on the 
comparison of press coverage of BSE in Canada and other countries, while the latter 
incorporated various elements (e.g. media, cultural context, and trust) into its analytical 
structure. 
Under some circumstances, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and scientific groups 
play a key role in attracting extensive public attention. In a debate between Greenpeace (the 
international non-governmental organisation) and Shell (multinational oil company) over a 
deep-sea disposal of the Brent Spar oil rig, Greenpeace carefully constructed and successfully 
diffused three potent risk signals including the toxic Spar, the reckless, polluting giant-Shell, 
and the moral sanctity of the deep ocean (Bakir, 2005). Greenpeace’s direct action triggered a 
broad range of amplification stations including various media, governmental and non-
governmental sectors, individuals, and subsidiaries of Shell, together with Shell’s inadequate 
response, resulting in socially amplified risk of deep-sea disposal. Similarly, 
environmentalists portrayed the risk of a high-speed railway tunnel construction project via 
four risk signals (i.e. endangered species, the moral sanctity of nature, political distrust, and 
Jiyul and salamander-oneness) (Chung, 2011). They emphasized the negative impacts of the 
tunnel construction on the mountain ecosystem. The first signal addressed the seriousness of 
risks that would be caused by the construction and made the construction begin to attract 
nationwide attention including considerable media coverage and a special review committee 
organized by the President. The second signal strengthened the first one in that Friends of 
Salamander, an environmental organization, filed a lawsuit accusing the construction authority 
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of neglecting the role of salamanders as a symbol representing endangered species in that area, 
which aroused public concern and triggered legal and social controversies. The third signal 
placed a political burden on the President by way of connecting environmental protection with 
public trust in political leaders. As for the last signal, Jiyul, a leading activist in the fight 
against the tunnel construction, conducted a hunger strike lasting 100 days, which magnified 
public concern for the issue. These signals suggested an amplification process in which public 
concern spread out from local to national levels and perception of risk associated with the 
tunnel construction was heightened progressively with the sequential order of four risk signals. 
Experts are also key actors in putting risk issues on the road to amplification or attenuation. 
Scientists at the Ramazzini Foundation over-stated their research result that aspartame, an 
artificial sweetener can cause cancer to human beings (Lofstedt, 2008). The Ramazzini 
research group generated great publicity and made aspartame an amplifiable topic mainly 
through active manipulation of press coverage, and ripple effects produced in this process 
prolonged the controversy unexpectedly. Among expert groups, general practitioners (GPs) 
are also thought to have a role in the social amplification process. According to Raude et al. 
(2004), French GPs’ risk perception related to BSE tended to be amplified in their practice 
and to be attenuated in their own private circle. In other words, they were risk amplifiers for 
their patients and risk attenuators for members of their family. Furthermore, GPs were more 
proactive in advising their patients than they were to their family, given that precautionary 
advice provided by GPs to their patients was slightly more correlated to risk estimates, 
whereas their reported behaviours toward family members were better related to the degree of 
their expressed concern about BSE linked risks. This discrepancy can be explained from two 
aspects. First, the data that were collected for the study indicated reported, not observed, 
behaviours of GPs. Therefore, there was a good chance that respondents over-reported 
recommendations made to their patients and underreported those provided to family members. 
Second, as Kasperson (1992) argued, ‘Individuals in groups and institutions do not react 
merely in their roles as private persons, but rather according to the role specification 
associated with their positions. Amplification may therefore differ among individuals in their 
roles as private citizens and in their roles as employees or member of social groups or 
organizations’. Thus, GPs acted more ‘scientifically’ with their patients and more ‘parentally’ 
with their family. 
Given the diversity of findings about SARF, it is important to bear in mind that the 
selection and the representativeness of samples, the data collection methods, and the focal 
points of the research will affect the outcome to some degree. In some cases, the sampling of 
respondents and risk events is highly specific or selective (Burns et al., 1993; Busby and 
Duckett, 2012; Chung, 2011; McComas, 2003; Renn et al., 1992). A considerable number of 
studies rely on cross-sectional data, which allows researchers to explore associations among 
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various variables, but not necessarily the causality of observed phenomena (Binder et al., 
2011; Loewenstein and Mather, 1990; Smith et al., 2013; Yeo et al., 2014). The analytic focus 
of one study usually far outweighs potential concerns about other research questions, so some 
critical features of the phenomena may not be taken into account when researchers are 
committed to look at a single issue at a single point (Binder et al., 2011), making it unlikely it 
can examine other important hypotheses (Burns et al., 1993).     
2.2.2 Contributory effects 
Research on risk amplification provides evidence that multiple sources of information and 
interactions affect the way individuals think about, and respond to, risks. Apart from media 
and non-media actors, other factors can also serve to trigger public attention to a particular 
risk and increase risk perceptions.  
Kasperson (2012) pointed out that social trust is an important element of the dynamics of 
social amplification. Some research results provide support for the notion that trust in how 
regulatory institutions cope with a risk event influences risk perceptions. Boyd and Jardine 
(2011) showed that the general public indicated a high level of trust in government after BSE 
was detected in Canada. This trust was fostered by Canadian news media, which provided 
accurate depictions of risks associated with BSE and enhanced the public’s confidence in the 
safety of beef products. This was one of the major factors that affected the general public’s 
perceptions and contributed to the lack of amplification or attenuation of BSE related risks. 
But unlike the viewpoint of Boyd and Jardine (2011), the research by Frewer et al. (2002) 
proved that the media had no impact on individuals’ trust in risk regulators with regard to the 
risks of GM food in the United Kingdom. A potential explanation is that trust in institutions 
was too low to decline further; in other words, a “floor effect” occurred. Trust and perceived 
risk independently influenced people’s attitudes toward GM food. Higher levels of trust in 
regulators were interrelated with more risks and negative effects perceived by the lay public. 
Vila and Font (2008) found that loss of trust in the media in UK society made people more 
critical about information on genetically modified (GM) foods, impairing the role that the 
media played in shaping public risk perception. However, no conclusive evidence has been 
found that there is a direct cause-and-effect relationship between media specific biases and 
distrust in the media. Therefore, trust in the media does not appear to be an influencing factor 
of risk perception of GM food. 
Some scholars have explored how place attachment affects the social construction of risks 
and drawn some interesting conclusions. A case study examined the controversy over the 
Alberta’s Industrial Heartland (AIH) proposal that aimed at attracting investment by 
establishing large-scale petrochemical industry (Masuda and Garvin, 2006). The analysis 
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illustrated that risk perceptions were shaped by place-bound attachment as well as complex 
cultural worldviews regarding how people were affiliated to place. Individuals (mainly 
residents) who had a strong sense of belonging and strong emotional attachment to local 
community saw industrial encroachment possibly brought by the AIH proposal as a threat to 
their livelihoods. They regarded the region as a safe place to live and thereby perceived high 
risks surrounding the AIH proposal. Individuals (mainly non-residents, such as officials and 
industrial representatives) who acted to promote the AIH proposal believed that the region 
was suitable for industry and industrial development that would serve the interests of all 
residents. They viewed industrial development as an opportunity to boost the local economy 
(for example, create job opportunities and business spinoffs) and discounted the intrinsic 
dangers and uncertainties associated with the AIH proposal. Similarly, Cantrill (2011) 
presented the sense of self-in-place framework in the context of wildlife conservation, and 
suggested that place attachment to the environment could engender an amplification of the 
perceived impacts of conservation initiatives designed to protect and restore wildlife 
populations. A sense of self-in-place is used to clarify the relationship between identity and 
place, and a person’s sense of self-in-place refers to two overlapping sets of cognitions 
(Cantrill and Senecah, 2001). One of these components deals with the connection between 
people and geographic venues (i.e., specific locations), and another involves an embedding of 
one’s identity in larger, more general environment that emphasizes individual perceptions of 
and interaction with surroundings. In wildlife management context, for long-term residents of 
a target region, the sense of self-in-place bestowed a premium upon the use of landscape for 
social activities and outweighed the value of ecosystem services provided by biodiversity. 
Therefore, the public were likely to perceive wildlife conservation practice as threats to their 
long-standing lifestyles, resulting in heightened perceptions of risk about conservation 
projects. 
It has also been found that exposure to risk is a fairly good predictor for individual 
responses to hazardous events (Renn et al., 1992). Data analysis indicated that exposure to 
risk was strongly related to perceived risk of hazards, and was more influential in shaping 
people’s perceptions than were actual casualties or magnitude of property damage. As a 
consequence, an exposure of many people that brings about minor injuries or only a small 
number of casualties is more influential in shaping risk perception than that of a few people 
leading to several casualties (Renn et al., 1992).  
Existing empirical work shows that information sources and social interaction could affect 
wildfire risk perceptions among homeowners living in a wildland-urban interface (WUI) 
(Smith et al., 2013). Residents who received information from expert source (local volunteer 
fire departments and state and federal forest service representatives) and nonexpert source 
(friends, family, and community groups) exhibited higher levels of perceived probability of a 
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wildfire, while those who had not received wildfire information from any source were likely 
to attenuate the probability that a wildfire would occur. Among a variety of interactions 
between community members, homeowners and their neighbours, and other social contacts, 
talking with neighbours about wildfire exerted the strongest positive impact on perceived 
probability of experiencing a fire, followed by attending a fire-specific event. 
There are other theories that can help broaden the understanding of the mechanism by 
which amplification or attenuation occurs in the social arena. Of special significance are 
social resonance theory and common pool theory. Renn (2011) has applied these two 
analytical concepts to investigate the mechanism of amplification and attenuation in the 
climate change debate. Resonance theory states that subsections of society provide vital 
services to society as a whole through four major subsystems: economy, politics, the social 
sphere, and the cultural sphere (Parsons, 1951). Communication within a system is generally 
correlated to the resonance medium that it deals with. Communication between systems 
depends on successful transformation of messages from one dominant resonance medium to 
another. Resonance reflects the extent to which a sense of common understanding or concern 
is produced in the communication process within a system or between different systems (Renn, 
2011). With respect to the threat of climate change, the impacts of global climate change 
resonate with concerns of each subsystem of society and urge these subsystems to work on 
solutions in terms of their own function. Resonance makes climate change a top issue in 
societal debates, attracting extensive public attention and intensifying the perception of risks 
of climate change. 
Common pool resources are considered as open access resources for each individual 
(person or state), but unlimited access can cause overuse of resources (Paterson, 2009). It is 
argued that behaviour is not only partially driven by attitudes and motivations but also by 
social feedback such as someone else’s comments on one’s contribution. Moreover, common 
pool resources introduce free riders who take advantage of resources without paying the price. 
In the context of climate change, neither states nor individual persons have an incentive for 
taking proactive actions when they perceive others using resources without constraints or 
perceive the effectiveness of their actions as marginal (Renn, 2011). Furthermore, free riders 
may obtain benefits at the cost of those who take effective actions. This dilemma makes actors 
downplay the significance of their actions and leads to an attenuation of the climate change 
risks. 
2.2.3 The different contexts in risk amplification 
Existing empirical work on social risk amplification focuses on hazard events that occur in a 
wide range of contexts. Basically, these risk events can be classified from two dimensions: 
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risk bearer and risk agent, as shown in Table 2.1. Risk bearers refer to human and 
environment. Risk agents include natural risk, technological risk, and social risk. Specifically, 
natural risk involves tunnel construction (Chung, 2011), waste landfill (McComas, 2003), 
wildfire risk (Smith et al., 2013), deep-sea disposal of an oil rig (Bakir, 2005), oil spills 
(Leschine, 2002), wildlife conservation (Cantrill, 2011; Hart et al., 2011), chemical accidents 
(Souza Porto and Freitas, 1996), industrial heartland amendment (Masuda and Garvin, 2006), 
fishing and fish consumption (Burger, 2000), and earthquake (Stanciugelu, 2013). 
Technological risk refers to site-selection of a biological research facility (Binder et al., 2011), 
site-selection of nuclear weapons facilities (Metz, 1996), nuclear power risk (Yeo et al., 2014), 
oil spills (Leschine, 2002), and genetically modified foods (Frewer et al., 2002; Vila and Font, 
2008). And social risk concerns MMR (measles, mumps and rubella) vaccination (Petts and 
Niemeyer, 2004), an oral contraceptive pill scare (Barnett and Breakwell, 2003), aspartame 
scare (Lofstedt, 2008), BSE (Boyd and Jardine, 2011; Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009; Raude et al., 
2004), and zoonotic diseases (Busby and Duckett, 2012). Based on SARF, these studies 
largely review the dynamic process in which risks are either amplified or attenuated by 
different groups, and the divergence between expert judgment and the lay public’s beliefs 
about the magnitude and the controllability of risks. 
 
Table 2.1 Classification of risk events in two dimensions 
Risk bearer 
Risk agent 
Natural risk Technological risk Social risk 
Human 
Earthquake Nuclear power risk MMR vaccination 
Chemical accidents Genetically modified foods Aspartame scare 
Industrial heartland 
amendment 
Site-selection of weapon facilities 
An oral contraceptive 
pill scare  
Fishing and fishing 
consumption 





Oil spills Oil spills  
Wildfire risk Nuclear power risk  
Waste landfill Genetically modified foods  
Tunnel construction   
Wildlife conservation   




The way by which risks are distorted is significantly different across different risk contexts. 
Some studies provided excellent examples of how risks were misinterpreted on account of 
particular scenarios. In so far as site selection of a biological research facility was concerned, 
residents in five potential communities for a new biological research facility were actively 
encouraged to express their thoughts and participate in decision-making process (Binder et al., 
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2011), and this provided an ideal context for examining the role that interpersonal discussion 
played in influencing individual judgments of risks. As another example, an eco-industrial 
development proposal in Alberta, Canada (Masuda and Garvin, 2006) brought industrial risks 
into public view and clashed with residents’ sentiments that the target region was a safe place 
to live, making place attachment the primary influencing factor for risk amplification. With 
respect to other risks, especially natural disasters such as earthquake (Stanciugelu, 2013) and 
some threats to life such as BSE (Boyd and Jardine, 2011; Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009) and 
genetically modified foods (Frewer et al., 2002; Vila and Font, 2008), media coverage was the 
most influential on people’s overall evaluation of risks and therefore received widespread 
attention. 
In principle, there are two possible explanations for why risk amplification varies so much 
between particular contexts. First, as risks are situated within the social experiences and 
interactions between individuals and social groups (Scherer and Cho, 2003), the social context 
in which risks are embedded and the ways in which risks are communicated contribute to 
shaping risk perceptions, leading to unique findings about patterns of risk amplification from 
risk to risk. According to SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988), the social, institutional, and cultural 
contexts in which the risk information is appreciated and diffused endow the information with 
specific meanings and values that only make sense within the socio-cultural contexts. Thus, 
how the general public or social groups interpret and react to information about risks or risk 
events depends largely on the roles they occupy, the experience they have, the beliefs or rules 
they comply with, and the extent to which their judgments are affected by various social 
stations in the particular social settings in which risks or risk events occur. 
Second, risk debates of different domains involve fundamentally different agents that act as 
risk amplifiers or attenuators. For example, environmental risks are probably of particular 
interest of environmental organizations, governmental agencies, social activists, NGO (non-
governmental organisation) as well as the media, and human diseases associated with 
vaccination, medication and food consumption are more likely to be the top concern of GPs, 
the department of health, scientific institutions, and also the media. The degree and the pattern 
of influence imposed by the agents on public risk perception might be distinctive in terms of 
different risks, given that their stance on the risk issue depends on their social status in that 
event. Take the media for example, media coverage may be the major information source 
available for the lay public in certain risk events, so the media bears principle responsibility of 
facilitating risk amplification or attenuation, while for some other risk events, the frequency 
and content of media reporting depend on what the media passively receives from experts or 
regulatory institutions, which suggests a diminished role for the media in shaping risk 
perception.  
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A role is also played by whether risks are seen as natural or man-made. It may be that 
natural processes cannot be improved by cautious and proactive actions, so once a natural 
accident occurs, people conclude it is in fact inevitable (Leschine, 2002), while people usually 
believe that manmade damage could have been avoided by more prudent behaviour, or by 
better knowledge and experience about the risk (Schmidt, 2004). At present, there is actually 
no strong evidence to support the hypothesis that people are more apt to amplify human 
caused risks, but this is definitely an important question that merits comprehensive 
investigation in future research. 
Finally, there is an obvious difference in the risks of accidental or chance hazards and those 
of deliberate harm like terrorism. Terrorism is a criminal act that produces widespread fear 
and panic among the public beyond the immediate victims and has become increasingly 
common throughout the world. The general public, victims, the government, the media, and 
other organizations are normally involved in terrorism, and their responses are broad in scope. 
There have been some studies on risk perceptions about terrorism (Lee and Lemyre, 2009; 
Lemyre et al., 2006; Lerner et al., 2003; Rogers et al., 2007; Sönmez and Graefe, 1998), but 
few within the social amplification of risk framework.  
2.2.4 The different methodologies by which risk amplification has 
been studied 
In general, there are two main methodologies applied to empirical work on social risk 
amplification: case study and survey. Table 2.2 shows the two methodologies in terms of data 
collection method and data analysis procedure. 
 
Table 2.2 Methodologies used in empirical work 
 Methodology 




Interview (3) Face to face survey (3) 
Media coverage (3) Online survey (1) 
Group discussion (1) Telephone survey (3) 
Quasi-experimental design (1) Mail survey (2) 
Focus groups and interviews (1) Mail survey and online survey (1) 
Data from past and ongoing 
work (1) 
Focus group interview (1) 
Media coverage and secondary 
data from surveys (1) 
Media coverage (2) 




Media content analysis (4) 
 
Ordinary least-squares (3) 
Linear probability model (1) 
Structural equation model (1) 
One-way analysis of variance Partial least squares (1) 
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(1) Covariance structure analysis (3) 
Principal components analysis (2) 
Media content analysis (2) 
              Note: figures in brackets indicate the number of articles using that method. 
Case study 
Most case studies are qualitative in essence, applying SARF to analyse the reaction mode of 
different social stations by means of interviews (Barnett and Breakwell, 2003; Lofstedt, 2008; 
Masuda and Garvin, 2006), group discussions (Petts and Niemeyer, 2004), media content 
analysis (Barnett and Breakwell, 2003; Chung, 2011; Lofstedt, 2008), focus groups and 
individual interviews (Busby and Duckett, 2012), and media content analysis and secondary 
data from surveys (Vila and Font, 2008). For example, Chung (2011) used the volume of 
readers’ comments on online newspaper articles and the number of visits to message board 
posts as indexes to demonstrate the level of public concern for environmental risks from a 
high-speed railway tunnel construction project in South Korea. Petts and Niemeyer (2004) 
employed two-phase interactive discussion groups (at the first meeting groups examined 
preferred sources of health information, and at the second meeting groups focused on 
perceptions of the information) to observe lay talk about risk issues of MMR (measles, 
mumps, and rubella) and to explore how experience, mediated knowledge, and social context 
influence public perceptions of risk. A study on risk perception of eating fish derived data 
from four published studies and one ongoing study and conducted a meta-analysis to gather 
in-depth information (Burger, 2000). Vila and Font (2008) used both media coverage and data 
from Eurobarometer surveys to examine the relationships between the content and intensity of 
press media and risk perceptions of new genetically modified (GM) foods between 1999 and 
2004 in Spain and the United Kingdom. These qualitative studies have suggested how 
practical knowledge, experience, and personal context of individuals affect their attitudes 
toward a risk issue, and how particular actors such as scientists, environmentalists, experts, 
governmental agencies, and NGO take advantage of mass media to voice their opinions and to 
affect the public’s perceptions of risk.  
Quantitative case studies on risk amplification have been quite limited to date. In an 
embedded case study, a quasi-experimental design was adopted to capture the effects of public 
meeting attendance on risk perceptions at three data collection points, with questionnaires 
mailed to attendee and nonattendee samples (McComas, 2003). Survey questions were 
analysed using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the relationship between 
attendance at public meetings and tendency to amplify or attenuate risk.  
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Survey 
The survey strategy has also gained broad popularity in the field of risk research, and the 
forms of survey have been wide-ranging: face to face survey (Burns et al., 1993; Frewer et al., 
2002; Renn et al., 1992), online survey (Yeo et al., 2014), telephone survey (Boyd and Jardine, 
2011; Hart et al., 2011; Stanciugelu, 2013), mail survey (Binder et al., 2011; Raude et al., 
2004), and an exception of combining both mail survey and online survey (Smith et al., 2013). 
As expected, questionnaire was the most widely used approach to collect data by survey 
strategy, but focus group interview (Petts et al., 2000), where standard questions are asked of 
all interviewees (Saunders et al., 2003), and content analysis of media reporting related to 
risky subjects (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009; Petts et al., 2000), also fell into this strategy.  
Data collection sometimes needs to rely on not simply one method, but a series of methods, 
especially for some of the more complicated studies aimed at shedding new light on the causal 
relationships among various dimensions of a risk event. For example, both Renn et al. (1992) 
and Burns et al. (1993) adopted a mixture of public survey, expert rating, individual rating, 
news coverage search, and iterative Delphi procedure to gather data regarding five dimensions 
that were believed to contribute to risk amplification: physical consequence, risk perceptions, 
media coverage, public responses, and societal impacts. Since each dimension was measured 
by different variables, different approaches were required to operationalize them. More 
specifically, physical consequences were estimated by expert rating, risk perceptions and risk 
responses by surveying university students and individual rating, media coverage by keyword 
search, and societal impacts by Delphi panel. The use of multiple, but independent methods to 
obtain data provides more perspectives on the research problems being investigated and 
improves the credibility and generalizability of results (Smith et al., 2012).  
In survey research on SARF, selected variables were generally measured by asking 
respondents (individuals or experts) to rate corresponding questions on different scales. The 
correlations between risk perception and influencing factors, which were the purpose of 
almost all quantitative studies, were statistically tested through regression analysis at large. In 
particular, these factors include the volume and content of media reporting (Frewer et al., 
2002; Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009), cultural and social context and media coverage (Boyd and 
Jardine, 2011), interpersonal discussion (Binder et al., 2011), environmental values and media 
use (Hart et al., 2011), and social interaction, personal characteristics, and information sources 
(Smith et al., 2013). And the regression methods include hierarchical ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) (Binder et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013; Yeo et al., 2014), linear probability models 
(Boyd and Jardine, 2011), structural equation modelling (SEM) (Hart et al., 2011), partial 
least squares (PLS) (Burns et al., 1993), and covariance structure analysis (Burns et al., 1993; 
Frewer et al., 2002; Renn et al., 1992).  
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Generally speaking, selection of statistical tools is subject to what particular results are 
expected to get out of the analytic framework. Specifically, OLS was used to regress risk 
perceptions against expected correlates, such as demographic differences, information sources, 
social interactions, personal characteristics, benefit perception, predispositions, and news 
media attention, so as to determine their explanatory power to risk perceptions. It is worth 
mentioning that two studies performed principal components analysis (PCA) to create 
subscales of variables indicating the changes in risk perception and facilitate subsequent 
analyses. For example, Frewer et al. (2002) extracted three subscales (risks and negative 
effects, trust and choice, and benefits) from 53 attitude items, with each subscale composed of 
representative items. Smith et al. (2013) used PCA to compress variables into perceived 
probability and perceived consequence based on the hypothesis that social amplification has 
different impacts on these two dimensions of risk perception.  
Summary 
As suggested above, empirical work on risk amplification has presented comprehensive 
evidence that risk perceptions are often distorted by comparison with expert judgments, and 
that public response is usually stimulated and modified to an unexpected degree, because a 
number of influencing factors including social stations and other factors exaggerate or weaken 
public concern for risk. These distortions, to some extent, reflect the influence of interpersonal 
communication on the individual level and the nature of social interaction on the social level.  
By and large these studies seek to identify the causal relationships and fundamental laws 
that can interpret regularities in risk amplification, but they fail to probe into the mechanism 
for amplifying or attenuating risk, which is normally considered the core of risk amplification 
and also essential for modelling risk amplification. They are mostly concerned with what 
factors are correlated with amplification, rather than with the processes that produce 
amplification. Another limitation is that little effort has been made to explore variations in 
public behaviours especially across different regions or risk contexts. The effort involved in 
investigating risk amplification in any particular context makes it hard to carry out 
comparative studies across different contexts, so it can be unclear what is general and what is 
particular in each study. 
2.3 Modelling of risk amplification 
So far there have been very few papers on modelling of risk amplification, and they have 
employed both system dynamics and agent-based models. For example, Burns and Slovic 
(2007) developed a system dynamics model of amplified perceptions of risk of terrorism to 
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capture factors critical to forecasting public response to a terrorist attack. The diffusion of fear 
within a community was modelled and simulated in the context of three hypothetical disaster 
scenarios (anthrax attack, bomb blast, and propane tank explosion) to illustrate how risk 
perceptions and behavioural responses shifted with factors such as characteristics of 
hazardous events, media coverage, word of mouth, and community intervention. Busby and 
Onggo (2013) developed a system dynamics model to examine whether risk perceptions of 
different social actors would diverge in the context of zoonotic disease outbreaks. Their model 
was based on the notion that social risk amplification is a subjective attribution and 
incorporated three attributional elements: confusion, distrust, and perceptions of the 
significance of behaviour change. Both Busby et al. (2016) and Onggo et al. (2014) have used 
an agent-based model to explore the mechanisms of social risk amplification. Busby et al.’s 
(2016) model focused in particular on some central characteristics of risk responses: the way 
actors anticipate each other’s biases, the way actors change their beliefs as the prevalence of a 
risk perception varies, and the way risk communications are fashioned on the basis of 
responses to previous communications. Onggo et al. (2014) modelled both narrowcast 
communication through social networks and broadcast communication through media to look 
at how they contribute to the formation of public risk perception. In addition, Bleda and 
Shackley (2012) used simulation modelling as an analytical tool for appreciating the 
formation of perceptions of risk associated with BSE. They modelled two types of risk 
amplification: amplification caused by media coverage and amplification caused by other 
forms of social communication such as the communication in the social networks and the 
official public communication of new scientific discoveries. 
It is evident that these studies help achieve a better understanding of the dynamics of public 
perceptions of risk and provide useful implications for risk managers and policymakers. More 
importantly, they are also trying to work out the mechanism of social risk amplification based 
on indications from prior empirical work. However, there have also been some basic 
limitations of this modelling. To begin with, it is difficult to have access to plausible data of 
some critical variables in the model (Busby and Onggo, 2013). This is the case in the work of 
Bleda and Shackley (2012), Busby and Onggo (2013), and Busby et al. (2016). Second, all 
these studies, as Busby and Onggo (2013) pointed out, ‘concentrate specifically on the risk 
amplification phenomenon to the exclusion of the many other processes that, in any real 
situation, risk amplification is connected with’. A lot more empirical evidence or potentially 
important factors needed to be incorporated into the model based on corresponding 
assumptions about risk amplification. Third, many of the nonlinear relationships between 
model variables are drawn upon subjective judgments (Burns and Slovic, 2007). A more 
objective evaluation with reliable data would probably provide valuable new insight into the 
phenomenon. 
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There seem to be two main reasons why more progress has not been made in modelling 
SARF. First, the definition of risk amplification is still vague. It is normally assumed that risk 
amplification should be a gap between different risk judgments, but there is considerable 
controversy about what gap social risk amplification refers to. Is it the gap between expert and 
public assessment of risk, or between objective (real) and subjective (perceived) risk? It seems 
hard to determine the baseline risk and the deviation of risk perception due to ambiguous 
definition of social risk amplification, making it more complex and debatable to model risk 
amplification.  
Second, data required for modelling is often difficult to collect. Given that social risk 
amplification involves internal feedback loops linking risk responses with behaviours that in 
turn modify risk perception, system dynamics is deemed a natural choice to show the 
dynamics and reflective nature of social behaviour following a risk event. Nevertheless, 
system dynamics relies heavily on quantitative or qualitative data to establish and simulate 
feedback models, and it draws upon a much broader set of data than do traditional statistical 
analytic tools (Luna-Reyes and Andersen, 2003).  
2.4 Conclusions 
This survey leads to several points that can be drawn from the social risk amplification 
literature. 
First, although there have been some criticisms of SARF, such criticisms have not stopped 
SARF being an influential framework employed by academics, risk managers, and 
policymakers. The original article (Kasperson et al., 1988) explicitly pointed out that ‘there is 
no such thing as “true” (absolute) and “distorted” (socially determined) risk’. The authors 
acknowledge that amplification is exclusively linked to negative impacts, and the degree of 
amplification or attenuation influences the extent to which the ripple effects are created by 
social responses (Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996). The relationship between physical 
consequences of risk events, press coverage, public responses, individual layperson 
perceptions, and societal impacts is still ambiguous, even conflicting across studies (Busby 
and Duckett, 2012). But this problem does not undermine the basic role of SARF to provide a 
general terminology and framework for social risk responses that will need adapting to 
particular contexts. The notion that there is a risk that becomes distorted socially makes SARF 
attractive at both theoretical and practical level (Duckett and Busby, 2013; Renn et al., 1992). 
Second, the media plays multiple and sometimes conflicting roles in the risk debate 
(Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996). It is not always the case that the media either makes risks 
seem disproportionately large or oversimplifies the complexity of risks. The literature 
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indicates that the media can serve as an amplifier, an attenuator, or an impersonal narrator of 
risk (Boyd and Jardine, 2011). To some extent, this may be explained by the specific social 
and cultural context in which risks or risk events occur. As far as non-media actors (for 
example experts, NGO, and scientific institutions) are concerned, the ways by which they 
trigger public concern and shape risk perception are significantly different. In certain 
circumstances, factors such as trust, place attachment, information sources, and social 
interaction play a role in accounting for exaggerated or diminished perceptions of risk. 
Third, risks of different contexts become amplified or attenuated in markedly different 
ways. One reason lies in the social context in which risks are embedded and the way in which 
risk information is transmitted. Another reason is that agents entering into different contexts 
are apparently different and tend to act on their own positions and interests in accordance with 
the particular context. 
Fourth, the methods used in empirical studies are wide-ranging, and generally these studies 
have been concerned with the causal relationships between elements within the social 
amplification of risk framework. The findings suggest predictors of behavioural intentions of 
individuals but say little about the dynamics underlying the risk amplification process in 
various situations. 
Fifth, the modelling of risk amplification has been quite limited to date, because the 
definition of risk amplification is far from clear and there is a lack of access to necessary data. 
But correspondingly these are also reasons to do much more modelling. The vagueness about 
definition is something that models force us to resolve, and the process of modelling helps us 
realise where definitions and specifications of amplification mechanisms are vague. And the 
absence of data may only become apparent when building models reveals a need for data that 
we do not have.  
Sixth, the question about which risks are more likely to be amplified by the general public 
is currently unknown. It seems that events caused by nature such as earthquake and wildfire 
risk are more acceptable than those by human such as environmental risk, technological risk, 
and threats to human life. Until now, there is actually no strong evidence to support the 
hypothesis that people are more apt to amplify human caused risks, but this is definitely an 
important question that merits investigation in future research. In addition, empirical evidence 
presented in the literature demonstrates that SARF is applicable to a broad range of risk events, 
but there may be certain risks of other domains that have not been probed into by scholars, 
such as counterfeiting and terrorism. 
Finally, the role that organizational decision making plays in shaping risk perception 
deserves attention. It has been demonstrated that perceived managerial incompetence 
influence public risk perception to a greater extent than does the number of casualties (Burns 
et al., 1993). Although traditional use of SARF generally examines risk amplification at the 
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social level, decision making of the organization involved in a risk event is relatively 
downplayed, or even neglected. For example, within studies on risks such as BSE, aspartame 
scare, contraceptive pill scare, and genetically modified foods, there are almost no discussions 
about the reaction of the organizations, how they make decisions to affect public perception, 
and how they interact with the public and the media.  
The aim of this study is to explore some of these issues in the context of product recall. In 
particular, the aim is to develop a more precise understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
SARF through modelling. This also forces us to define what we mean by ‘amplification’, and 
it forces us to think about what aspects of the amplification process are general and what are 
contextual. As a model of product recall, it will also require a specification of what actions an 
organization takes and how these are responded to by public consumers. And it will enable the 
exploration of the effects of the media adopting different roles during a risk event. 
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3 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Product contamination events vary from one case to another in terms of risk agent, actors 
involved, management strategies, societal risk responses, and potential consequences. In order 
to better understand risk perceptions around product contamination crises, it is essential to 
select a specific case that captures a typical social process of risk amplification as a reference 
case for this study. The purpose of this chapter is to look at a context within which the 
problem situation resides, and the model is subsequently developed with this context in mind.  
This chapter presents three product harm crises in China that had triggered extensive public 
concern – the 2008 Chinese milk scandal, the Nongfu Spring water event, and the ‘gutter oil’ 
scandal. China represents an interesting setting for a risk amplification study because it is a 
country in which there is still strong state control over organizations, and particularly over the 
dissemination of news about organizations, misconduct and hazardous events. Yet it is also a 
country in which there is a growing consumer culture and increasing expectations about high 
product quality and safety. There are other product contamination scandals that had sparked 
fears among consumers, besides the three considered in this chapter, but are not considered 
here, such as toxic bean sprouts (bean sprouts tainted with illegal additives such as urea, 
enrofloxacin, antibiotics, and 6-benzyladenine) (Global Times, 2011a), ‘cadmium rice’ (rice 
contaminated with heavy metals including cadmium) (Tatlow, 2013), glow-in-the-dark pork 
(pork contaminated by phosphorescent bacteria) (Lodish, 2011), leather milk (milk tainted 
with hydrolyzed leather protein) (Foster, 2011), and so on. Those scandals arose in certain 
areas in China and did not evolve into nationwide crises. In contrast, the three events covered 
in this chapter had a much larger sphere of influence, involved relatively clear interactions 
between different actors, and caused much stronger social reactions. In Chapter 5 where the 
model development is described, it will be apparent that the first of these events is the 
prototype case for the agent model in this study. However, describing all three cases helps to 
bring out what is common and what is different between different product contamination 
crises, and it helps clarify the reasons for choosing one of the cases as the prototype for the 
modelling. The point of ABM is to model dynamics over time, so it becomes important to 
show the chronology of actual cases. The descriptions of a particular risk event provide a 
broad idea of how the event progressed and do not cover all the details presented in the 
chronology. 
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3.1 2008 Chinese milk scandal 
In September 2008, an adulterated milk scandal was unfolded in China. It was discovered that 
Sanlu Group, a major player in the dairy industry in China, was adding melamine to 
artificially enhance the protein readings in baby milk powder (Xinhua News Agency, 2008a). 
Melamine is a colourless crystalline chemical used in making plastics. It could cause infants 
to develop kidney stones and other renal and urinary failure. The chemical was also found in 
baby formula products produced by 21 other companies (Yardley and Barboza, 2008). By 
November 2008, China reported an estimated 300,000 victims (Branigan, 2008), with six 
infants dying from kidney stones and other kidney damage and about 54,000 babies 
hospitalised (McDonald, 2008). The melamine milk crisis was called by the World Health 
Organization one of the largest food safety events it had to deal with in recent years (Schlein, 
2008). 
New Zealand dairy cooperative Fonterra, which owned a 43% share in Sanlu, said it was 
alerted to melamine contamination on 2 August (Ramzy and Yang, 2008). Fonterra 
immediately urged a full public recall of the milk powder, but Chinese authorities refused. On 
11 September, Sanlu launched a recall of all of its milk powder products made before 6 
August (Ramzy and Yang, 2008; Xinhua News Agency, 2008b). And the following day, on 
12 September, China’s Ministry of Health announced a nationwide investigation into the milk 
scandal. On 15 September, the company issued a public apology for the tainted milk powder 
(Li, 2008). During the crisis, Sanlu attempted to cover up the contamination. A memo leaked 
by a Sanlu staff member on 12 September said that Sanlu paid Baidu, China’s leading search 
engine, 3 million yuan ($640,000) for screening all negative news from search results 
(Welford, 2008).  
Ever since the tainted milk affair broke, the central government had ordered the media not 
to report any negative news disturbing the Beijing Olympics (Morillon, 2008; Spencer and 
Foster, 2008). Censorship was imposed to suppress bad news about the contaminated milk 
scandal – the media was ordered to adhere to the official line provided by state news 
organizations such as Xinhua News Agency and the People’s Daily (Mooney, 2008). 
Moreover, blogs were blocked, and sensitive subjects and keywords related to the milk 
scandal were forbidden on the Internet (Morillon, 2008). Jiang Weisuo, who exposed milk 
contamination in 2006, died from knife wounds on 12 November 2012 (Zhuang, 2012). 
The situation that China is averse to negative news of any sort had not changed much over 
the course of this incident. The central government’s continued involvement in the flow of 
information was one of the main reasons why many consumers were ill-informed about the 
causes and severity of the contamination as well as the extent of recalls (Chen, 2009; Morillon, 
2008; Yardley and Barboza, 2008). The milk crisis caused anger and resentment towards milk 
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producers and sparked serious concern and panic among the population. Consumers had 
severely lost confidence and trust in the dairy industry and in the supervision of food safety in 
China, and thus their demand for locally produced infant formula was greatly lessened 
(Financial Times, 2008; Hatton, 2013). Most consumers have lost trust in local brands and 
have been seeking to purchase baby milk powder imported from other countries and regions 
such as New Zealand (Tahana, 2008) and Hong Kong (Jacob, 2013; Pomfret, 2011; So, 2008). 
Moreover, at least 25 countries imposed specific bans on Chinese dairy products because of 
the melamine contamination (The New York Times, 2008).  
Table 3.1 provides the chronology of the Sanlu milk contamination case.  
 
Table 3.1 Chronology of Sanlu milk scandal 
Date Progress 
01/08/2008 
Tests showed that 15 out of 16 batches of Sanlu baby formula contained potentially 
poisonous levels of melamine. 
The chairman of Sanlu, Tian Wenhua, ordered a cover-up of the contamination. 
02/08/2008 Fonterra was alerted to melamine contamination. 
9/09/2008 
New Zealand Embassy in Beijing informed the Chinese government of the crisis. 
News reports about the contamination began circulating in China. 
10/09/2008 The scandal broke internationally by Reuters. 
11/09/2008 
Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post published a report stating that fourteen infants 
were diagnosed with kidney stones after consuming Sanlu milk powder.  
Sanlu announced a nationwide recall of its baby milk powder. 
12/09/2008 
Sanlu Group admitted that its powdered milk was tainted with melamine. 
China’s Ministry of Health launched a nationwide investigation into melamine 
contamination. 
13/09/2008 
Sanlu halted production. 
Nineteen people were arrested in connection with the tainted milk scandal. 
15/09/2008 
Two babies had died from contaminated milk. 
Sanlu issued a public apology for the tainted baby milk powder. 
16/09/2008 
Powdered milk from 22 Chinese companies was found to be melamine-
contaminated. Sanlu recorded the highest levels of contamination among all the 
samples tested. 
19/09/2008 
Melamine was found in liquid milk from three well-known companies: Mengniu, 
Yili, and Bright Dairy. Mengniu recalled all its products. 
23/09/2008 
About 54,000 children were sickened and four had died.  
A number of countries had imposed blanket bans on Chinese milk products. 
24/09/2008 
Fonterra announced that it had written down the carrying value of its investment in 
Sanlu by 70 per cent. 
25/09/2008 The European Union banned imports of baby food containing Chinese milk. 
9/10/2008 
Chinese officials insisted that the melamine contamination had been “accidental”. 
China’s Ministry of Health and four other government agencies issued a joint 
statement that set the legally acceptable level of melamine at 1ppm (1mg/kg) for 
infant formula and 2.5ppm for other dairy products. 
1/12/2008 
China’s Ministry of Health revised the number of victims to nearly 300,000 with 
51,900 hospitalised. 
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25/12/2008 Shijiazhuang court accepted a creditor’s bankruptcy petition against Sanlu. 
02/01/2009 
A website created by individuals protesting against Sanlu was blocked by Chinese 
authorities. 
22/01/2009 
The Intermediate People’s Court in Shijiazhuang sentenced Tian Wenhua, 
chairman of Sanlu, to life in prison. 
   Sources: Branigan, 2008; BBC News, 2010; Chen, 2009; Li, 2008; Morillon, 2008; Ramzy and Yang,   
   2008; Reuters, 2008; Smith and Waldmeir, 2008; Spencer and Foster, 2008; Welford, 2008; Xinhua   
   News Agency, 2008a; Xinhua News Agency, 2008b; Yardley and Barboza, 2008 
      
Figure 3.1 shows a Google Trends plot of this crisis. This indicates the relative volume of 
uses of the search term ‘Chinese milk scandal’ over the relevant period. It shows a very large 
peak shortly after the crisis first broke, and a continuing much lower level of concern after this 
point. This continuing level of concern fluctuates quite sharply and goes to zero at some point. 
A series of specific, independent events are marked on the plot and listed below it, but these 
events do not necessarily coincide with particular features on the plot and are shown just to 
indicate points of development in the crisis. As suggested by SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988), 
significant crises are not just single events, but involve substantial ‘ripple’ events that follow 
directly or indirectly from some initial risk event. This plot is produced by Google Trends 
based on a specific search term (i.e. Chinese milk scandal), so there is no particular reason for 
labelling the events from H to A. 
 
 
A: Fonterra moves to curb China baby milk scandal  
B: Tainted milk scandal spreads to U.S. candy  
C: Chinese parents seek damages over milk scandal  
D: First civil lawsuit starts in China milk scandal  
E: Two executed for roles in tainted milk scandal 
F: China court upholds five sentences in milk scandal 
G: Two sentenced to death over China melamine milk scandal  
H: China milk scandal hits Japan firm, Taiwan 
Source: Google Trends (2014). Search term: Chinese milk scandal. Available at: 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=chinese%20milk%20scandal [Accessed 6 December 2014]. 
Figure 3.1 Google Trends of Chinese milk scandal 
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3.2 Nongfu Spring water event 
The issues centred on product quality and production standard of bottled water produced by 
Nongfu Spring, one of China’s largest bottled water suppliers. Consumer complaints about 
quality problems had been reported since March 2013 – when unidentified substances were 
found in the bottled water (Xinhua News Agency, 2013). The media raised the question of 
pollution in the water source. However, Nongfu Spring argued that the garbage near the water 
source had no impact on water quality and emphasized that temperature changes sometimes 
produced mineral salts in the bottled water (Global Times, 2013).  
On 10 April 2013, the Beijing Times accused the company of intentionally adopting the 
water quality standards set by Zhejiang province that did not meet the national standards 
(Wang, 2013). Zhong Shanshan, chairman of Nongfu Spring, stated at a press conference that 
the criteria the company complied with was higher than the national levels, while the Beijing 
Times insisted reports about the water quality had been ‘factual’ and ‘well-grounded’ (Xinhua 
News Agency, 2013). Beijing quality watchdogs started an investigation into quality standard 
of Nongfu Spring water and temporarily suspended its production of barrelled drinking water 
in Beijing (Shanghai Daily, 2013). In the campaign the Beijing Times published 76 articles on 
67 pages over 28 consecutive days criticising the water quality of Nongfu Spring (Global 
Times, 2013). In early May the company sued the Beijing Times over defamation, claiming 
that its reputation had been seriously damaged and demanding 200 million yuan (US$32.8 
million) in compensation (Lu, 2013). At the same time, the newspaper launched a countersuit 
and demanded a public apology and symbolic compensation of 1 yuan from Nongfu Spring. 
An online survey on East Money website showed that 69% of respondents believed that the 
standards Nongfu Spring followed was below the national tap water standards, and that 86.9% 
of respondents would be reluctant to buy the company’s bottled water.  
The chronology of the Nongfu Spring quality crisis is given in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Chronology of Nongfu Spring water event 
Date Progress 
08/03/2013 
A customer complained about unidentified black substances in the bottled 
water produced by Nongfu Spring. 
11/03/2013 Another customer made a complaint about red flotage in Nongfu Spring water. 
15/03/2013 
Nongfu Spring responded that the substances found in the bottled water were 
precipitation of mineral elements. 
25/03/2013 
A media report released that Nongfu Spring water intake was covered with all 
kinds of floating garbage. 
12/04/2013 
The Beijing Times accused Nongfu Spring of adopting a standard set by 
Zhejiang province that was below the national water quality standard. 
 32 
15/04/2013 
Nongfu Spring claimed that its quality indexes in a number of elements were 
stricter than the national levels. 
20/04/2013 
Beijing quality watchdogs started an investigation into Nongfu Spring and 
temporarily suspended its production of 19-liter barrels in Beijing. 
04/05/2013 
Nongfu Spring filed a lawsuit over the defamation of the Beijing Times. The 
Beijing Times launched a countersuit. 
06/05/2013 
Zhong Shanshan, chairman of Nongfu Spring, stated at a press conference that 
the company’s products met or even exceeded the national standards.  
04/11/2013 
Nongfu Spring submitted a petition to the National Office Against 
Pornographic and Illegal Publications to hit back the ‘false’ reports of the 
Beijing Times. 
       Sources: Global Times, 2013; Lu, 2013; Shanghai Daily, 2013; Wang, 2013; Wang and Yan, 
       2013; Xinhua News Agency, 2013 
          
The Google Trends plot is shown in Figure 3.2. This shows search volume using the term 
‘Nongfu Spring water’. As with the Sanlu case, there is a strong early peak, followed by a 
fluctuating residual volume of concern. But there is a small peak before the strong early peak, 
indicating that the social amplification process is somewhat different. The earliest events in 
the crisis suggested some problem, but they did not immediately suggest a major problem. 
This arose shortly afterwards. 
 
 
A: Beijing court hears Nongfu Spring defamation suit 
B: Nongfu Spring to sue the Beijing Times over quality claims  
C: Nongfu Spring to sue C’estbon over quality claims 
D: Coca-Cola accuses Nongfu Spring of copying its design 
E: ‘It never happened’ says Nongfu Spring in response to worm egg charges 
F: ‘It never happened’ says Nongfu Spring in response to arsenic charges  
Source: Google Trends (2014). Search term: Nongfu Spring water. Available at: 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=nongfu%20spring%20water [Accessed 6 December 2014]. 
Figure 3.2 Google Trends of Nongfu Spring water event 
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3.3 Gutter oil scandal 
‘Gutter oil’ is a term used in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao to describe 
illicit cooking oil that is produced by refining waste oil collected from restaurant fryers, sewer 
drains, grease traps, and slaughterhouse waste (Fisher, 2013). Gutter oil contains several 
carcinogens and can cause severe diarrhea and abdominal pain (Ramzy, 2011). Long-term 
consumption of food prepared with gutter oil can lead to stomach and liver cancer and 
developmental disabilities in newborns and children (Global Times, 2011b). This section first 
describes the gutter oil scandals in mainland China and Taiwan and then makes a comparison 
between the cases arising in the two different areas. 
Gutter oil scandal in mainland China 
In mainland China, gutter oil is produced by workshops and small factories and is mainly 
distributed to street vendors and hole-in-the-wall restaurants that rely on the use of gutter oil 
to reduce expenses and to gain higher profit margins (Astley, 2012). The gutter oil scandal 
was first reported in 2000, when it was discovered that a street vendor was selling oil recycled 
from restaurant garbage disposals (He and Liu, 2011). It did not draw public attention as the 
authorities asserted that it was an ‘isolated incident’. On 17 March 2010, a professor at Wuhan 
Polytechnic University, He Dongping, claimed that recycled cooking oil had become widely 
used in Wuhan, and that China consumed 2 to 3 million tons of gutter oil annually (Barboza, 
2010), which shocked Chinese consumers and worsened the public’s confidence in food 
safety in China. However, under tremendous pressure from governmental officials, Professor 
He Dongping held a press conference on 19 March and denied his estimation about the 
amount of gutter oil consumed by Chinese people every year (Li, 2010). Nonetheless, 
domestic media continued reporting about the widespread use of illegal cooking oil. Soon 
after, China’s State Food and Drug Administration issued a nationwide emergence notice 
requiring an investigation of the sources of cooking oil (Barboza, 2010), confirming the 
presence of gutter oil in the country. On 19 September 2011, a Chinese journalist reporting on 
the illegal cooking oil scandal was stabbed more than 10 times to death (Goodman, 2011). 
The government had launched a number of nationwide campaigns to eradicate the 
production and sale of gutter oil. In July 2010, for example, the State Council ordered a ban 
on use of refined restaurant waste in the catering industry (Associated Press, 2010). In a 
nationwide crackdown carried out in September 2011 the Ministry of Public Security broke up 
a massive criminal network of illegal cooking oil spanning 14 provinces, demolished 6 
factories and sale terminals, seized 100 tons of gutter oil, and detained 32 people allegedly 
involved in the scandal (BBC News, 2011; Li, 2011; Lu and Wu, 2014). Thirteen 
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underground workshops across four provinces were smashed, more than 3,200 tonnes of 
cooking oil made from waste oil were seized, and more than 100 suspects were arrested in 
March 2012 (Astley, 2012). Another crackdown in April 2013 uncovered a gutter oil 
production and marketing chain expanding across 13 cities and involving more than 100 
people making and selling recycled cooking oil (Fisher, 2013). The Chinese government had 
also established a series of regulations and laws to strengthen the supervision of gutter oil (Li 
et al., 2016; Lu and Wu, 2014), such as the act ‘Strengthening the Prohibition of Gutter Oil in 
the Catering Industry’ implemented in March 2010, the ‘A Pilot Program of Organizing the 
City’s Food Waste Resource Utilization and Innocuous Treatment’ released in May 2010, and 
the ‘Strict Punishment for Gutter Oil Crimes’ published in January 2012. 
Table 3.3 shows the chronology of the gutter oil scandal in mainland China. 
 
Table 3.3 Chronology of gutter oil scandal in mainland China 
Date Progress 
17/03/2010 
A professor at Wuhan Polytechnic University, He Dongping, confirmed the 
widespread use of gutter oil in Wuhan and stated that in China 2 to 3 million tons of 
gutter oil returned back to dinner tables every year. 
19/03/2010 
Professor He Dongping retracted his statement that China consumed 2 to 3 million 
tons of gutter oil annually. 
20/03/2010 
China’s State Food and Drug Administration issued a nationwide emergency notice 
requesting health officials at all levels to investigate the sources of cooking oil. 
18/03/2010 
The act ‘Strengthening the Prohibition of Gutter Oil in the Catering Industry’ came 
into force. 
04/05/2010 
The Chinese government released ‘A Pilot Program of Organizing the City’s Food 
Waste Resource Utilization and Innocuous Treatment’. 
19/07/2010 
The State Council of China ordered to crack down on ‘refined restaurant waste 
finding its way back to dinner tables through illegal channels’. 
20/07/2010 Professor He Dongping refused to discuss his findings about gutter oil with media. 
22/08/2011 The ‘Food Safety Operating Specification in the Catering Industry’ was executed. 
13/09/2011 
The Ministry of Public Security announced the arrest of 32 suspects making and 
selling potentially harmful oil in 14 provinces, with 100 tons of toxic oil seized and 
6 underground factories smashed. 
19/09/2011 
A Chinese journalist, Li Xiang, who covered the dirty business of gutter oil, was 
stabbed to death on the way home in the city of Luoyang. 
21/03/2012 
Chinese authorities confiscated more than 3,200 tonnes of gutter oil, shut down 13 
underground workshops across four provinces, and captured more than 100 suspects. 
09/01/2012 The ‘Strict Punishment for Gutter Oil Crimes’ was published. 
04/2013 
Chinese authorities struck down a gutter oil production ring across 13 cities, arrested 
more than 100 criminal suspects, and seized 3,200 tons of illegal cooking oil. 
02/05/2013 
The ‘Interpretation of Applicable Law on Handling Cases of Food Safety Crimes’ 
was implemented. 
  Sources: Associated Press, 2010; Astley, 2012; Barboza, 2010; BBC News, 2011; Fisher, 2013; 
  Goodman, 2011; Li, 2010; Li, 2011; Li et al., 2016; Lu and Wu, 2014 
 35 
Gutter oil scandal in Taiwan 
The gutter oil scandal in Taiwan refers to a series of gutter oil incidents.  
The first case came to light in 2014, when Chang Guann Co., a well-known cooking oil 
manufacturer, was found to be producing contaminated cooking oil by mixing normal cooking 
oil with recycled oil, grease traps, and leather cleaner, and the problematic oil was branded as 
Chuan Tung Fragrant Lard Oil (Yen, 2014a). The company purchased 243 tonnes of recycled 
waste oil that were disguised as lard oil from an unlicensed factory and produced a total of 
780 tonnes of edible lard oil, which was sold to overseas markets, such as Hong Kong, Brazil, 
France, mainland China, Macau, New Zealand and so on, and to a great number of food 
companies, night markets, restaurants, bakeries, schools, and military compounds in 22 cities 
and counties in Taiwan (Chung and Yan, 2014; Shih, 2014). More than 1,000 food companies 
had been affected by the scandal including Starbucks, 7-Eleven, Wei Chuan Corp. – one of the 
biggest food manufacturers in Taiwan, and other large food companies (FlorCruz, 2014; Li, 
2014). 
The chairman of Chang Guann, Yeh Wen-hsiang, made a public apology on 4 September. 
On the same day, Taiwan’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) demanded Chang Guann 
recall the tainted oil by 1 March 2015 (Yen, 2014a). In addition, on 11 September the FDA 
ordered that 24 oil products made with lard oil supplied by Chang Guann be recalled, as 
investigation revealed that the company imported 87.72 tonnes of lard oil meant for animal 
feed from Hong Kong to produce cooking oil (Taipei Times, 2014a). Hong Kong issued a 
massive recall and banned all 25 lard and lard products imported from Chang Guann on 14 
September (Sung, 2014). 
Table 3.4 provides the chronology of the first gutter oil scandal in Taiwan. 
 
Table 3.4 Chronology of the first gutter oil scandal in Taiwan 
Date Progress 
01/09/2014 
Chang Guann Co., a well-known Taiwanese cooking oil manufacturer, was caught 
producing tainted cooking oil by mixing lard oil with drainage oil recycled by an 
unlicensed factory.  
The company purchased 243 tonnes of gutter oil to produce 780 tonnes of edible lard 
oil, which was sold to overseas markets and 22 cities and counties in Taiwan. 
04/09/2014 
The chairman of Chang Guann, Yeh Wen-hsiang, apologized to the public. 
Taiwan’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ordered the company to recall the 
contaminated oil by 1 March 2015. 
It was discovered that one of the biggest food manufacturers in Taiwan, Wei Chuan 
Corp., had used the problematic oil. 
05/09/2014 
Premier Jiang Yi-huah ordered that all food and oil products manufactured by 235 
food companies using tainted lard oil bought from Chang Guann be removed from 
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shelves by 7 September 2014. 
11/09/2014 
Taiwan’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA) demanded that 24 Chang Guann oil 
products be recalled, because investigators found that the company imported 87.72 
tonnes of lard oil intended for animal use from Hong Kong and allegedly used them 
to make edible lard oil. 
13/09/2014 
The chairman of Chang Guann, Yeh Wen-hsiang, was detained on suspicion of 
fraud. 
14/09/2014 
Hong Kong food authorities recalled and banned 25 lard and lard products imported 
from Chang Guann. 
24/07/2015 The chairman of Chang Guann, Yeh Wen-hsiang, was sentenced to 20 years in jail. 
  Sources: Chung and Yan, 2014; Shih, 2014; Sung, 2014; Taipei Times, 2014a; Yen, 2014a 
 
The second case in the string of scandals occurred just a month after revelations of Chang 
Guann’s practice of using gutter oil in its products, when investigators found in October that 
Taiwanese food giant Ting Hsin International Group was blending animal feed oil with 
cooking oil and then selling the tainted cooking oil for human consumption (Chung, 2014). 
The tainted oil was mainly distributed in Taiwan markets (Reuters, 2014), triggering 
widespread outrage in Taiwan. In response, the Taiwan public called for a boycott of all Ting 
Hsin’s products across the island (Taipei Times, 2014b). Consumers in mainland China and 
Hong Kong also blacklisted the company. On 11 October, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) ordered a mass recall of 54 Ting Hsin lard products (Daily Mail, 2014; Hsu, 2014). 
That same day, senior Ting Hsin executive Wei Ying-chung apologized to the public at a 
news conference (Chang, 2014). Eight business executives had been arrested in connection 
with the scandal by 14 October (Chung, 2014). Ting Hsin stated later on 16 October that it 
would leave Taiwan’s oil market and donate NT$3 billion ($100 million) for addressing food 
safety issues in Taiwan (Yen, 2014b). 
Chronology of the second gutter oil scandal in Taiwan is given in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Chronology of the second gutter oil scandal in Taiwan 
Date Progress 
09/10/2014 
Prosecutors launched an investigation into a large food company Ting Hsin 
International Group over mixing animal feed oil with cooking oil. 
Wei Ying-chung resigned as chairman of three Ting Hsin subsidiaries. 
10/10/2014 Consumer groups in Taiwan urged the public to boycott Ting Hsin’s products. 
11/10/2014 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ordered a recall of 54 Ting Hsin lard 
products tainted with animal feed oil the company procured from Vietnam. 
Wei Ying-chung held a news conference to apologize to the public. 
14/10/2014 Eight Ting Hsin-linked executives had been arrested.  
16/10/2014 
Ting Hsin announced that it would leave Taiwan’s oil market and donate NT$3 
billion ($100 million) to the government to set up a food safety fund. 
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17/10/2014 The Changhua District Court granted a request to detain Wei Ying-chung. 
27/11/2015 The Changhua District Court found Wei Ying-chung not guilty. 
25/03/2016 
The Taipei District Court found Wei Ying-chung guilty of deceiving consumers 
and violating food safety laws and gave him a 4-year sentence. 
    Sources: Chang, 2014; Chiao, 2015; Chung, 2014; Daily Mail, 2014; Hsu, 2014; Pan, 2016; Taipei 
    Times, 2014b; Yen, 2014b       
                    
The third case involved the owner of Beei Hae Edible Co. and Hsieh Ching Corp., Lu 
Ching-hsieh, who bought animal beef tallow and vegetable oil intended for animal feed from a 
trading company called Jin Hong and allegedly used the ingredients to manufacture cooking 
oil (Central News Agency, 2014a). The companies imported a total of 1,427 tons of non-
edible oil (Taiwan News, 2014). A portion of the substandard oil was distributed to more than 
110 Taiwanese downstream buyers and two Hong Kong-based firms (Chou, 2016). The 
remaining 582 tons of non-edible oil were mixed with animal feed oil to produce tainted lard 
oil, which was sold for human consumption. Both the owner and his wife were taken into 
custody at the end of October 2014. On 3 November, the FDA ordered to remove all oil 
products made by Beei Hae and Hsieh Ching from shelves (Central News Agency, 2014b). 
Table 3.6 demonstrates the chronology of the third gutter oil scandal in Taiwan. 
 
Table 3.6 Chronology of the third gutter oil scandal in Taiwan 
Date Progress 
15/10/2014 
The oil products made by Beei Hae Edible Co. and Hsieh Ching Corp. were found 
to contain animal feed oil. 
18/10/2014 
Prosecutors won the court’s approval to detain Lu Ching-hsieh, the owner of Beei 
Hae Edible Co. and Hsieh Ching Corp. 
27/10/2014 
The Tainan District Prosecutors Office (TNDPO) asked health officials to remove 
products containing oil from Beei Hae and Hsieh-ching. 
30/10/2014 
Detention of Lu Ching-hsieh’s wife, Lu Huang Li-hua, who was the nominal head 
of the two companies, was approved by the court. 
03/11/2014 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) ordered to take all oil products 
manufactured by the two companies off shelves in Taiwan. 
29/06/2016 
The Taiwan District Court sentenced Lu Ching-hsieh to four years and six months 
in prison, while his wife Lu Huang Li-hua was sentenced to four years.  
Their companies were fined a total of NT$9 million. 
    Sources: Central News Agency, 2014a; Central News Agency, 2014b; Chou, 2016; Taiwan News, 
    2014 
 
This section makes no attempt to draw conclusions from the depictions of the three Taiwan 
gutter oil scandals as the main purpose is to compare the mainland China gutter oil scandal 
with the Taiwan scandals.  
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 Comparison of gutter oil scandals 
There are some similarities as well as differences between the gutter oil scandal in mainland 
China and those in Taiwan. What they had in common were: 
1) they all entailed strong public risk responses, 
2) they all involved sustained and intense engagements of the government in tackling the 
problem, 
3) they all involved a chain of suppliers and distributors contributing to the widespread use 
of gutter oil. 
Their differences were mainly manifest in the following four aspects: 
1) the mainland China scandal involved many low-end restaurants, underground workshops, 
and small factories, which were not serious contributors to the risk communication process, 
while Taiwan scandals all involved well-established companies, which played significant 
roles in shaping public perceptions of risk, 
2) the Taiwan gutter oil incidents all involved well-defined oil products, while illegal 
cooking oil in mainland China had no brand name or was falsely labelled, 
3) societal risk responses in Taiwan were more detectable than in mainland China as both 
the products and producers were clearly defined, 
4) in mainland China gutter oil and related products were not recalled by producers but 
seized by the authorities, while in Taiwan producers implemented recalls of tainted oil and oil 
products. 
These differences largely reflect how the nature of risk events can vary with the social 
context in which risk events are situated. They also indicate how important social interactions 
and clear organizational activities are for exploring the mechanism of social risk amplification 
in the context of product contamination crises. 
Figure 3.3 shows the Google Trends plot of gutter oil scandals. This illustrates the volume 
of search using the term ‘gutter oil scandal’. Unlike the Sanlu case and the Nonfu Spring 
water case, there is a strong late peak after a fluctuating low level of concern, and a relatively 
high level of concern after this point. The strong residual concern is a reflection of large ripple 
effects produced by the crisis. The significance of the additional symbol over point H on the 
plot provided by Google is unknown. 
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A: Taiwan oil supplier fined $1.6m over ‘gutter oil’ 
B: Singapore National Environment Agency (NEA) looking into gutter oil extraction incident 
C: Shandong court sentences man to death for making and selling ‘gutter oil’ 
D: Gutter oil to be used as auto fuel 
E: Chopped liver, gutter oil and China’s private borrowers 
F: Gutter oil to be exported for jet fuel 
G: Beijing may use cameras to monitor gutter oil 
H: 52 held in China over ‘gutter oil’ 
I: Police in China seize 100 tons of ‘gutter oil’ 
Source: Google Trends (2014). Search term: gutter oil scandal. Available at: 
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=gutter%20oil%20scandal [Accessed 6 December 2014]. 
Figure 3.3 Google Trends of gutter oil scandal 
3.4 Summary 
The aspects that the three cases had in common were: 
1) they all involved a well-defined product that could lead to serious health problems, 
2) they all received widespread publicity during the times of crisis, and media played a 
crucial role in affecting public perceptions of associated risks, 
3) they all had the government as an important amplification station, 
4) they all caused a loss of public trust in the government and in the relevant industries.  
The commonalities seem to make each of the cases an appropriate candidate for the context in 
which the mechanism of social risk amplification can be investigated.  
However, the differences between them show clearly which case is the best choice. First, 
no product recalls were made during Nongfu Spring water event, while there were recalls of 
products made from recycled oil in the gutter oil scandal and recalls of tainted baby milk in 
the Sanlu case. As product recall process is considered as a significant amplifier of risk in 
product related crises and a critical component of the model, Nongfu Spring water event is 
excluded.  
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Second, in the mainland China gutter oil case many small organizations served as risk 
agents, such as small factories and industrial oil refiners, whereas the milk scandal involved 
one big company, i.e. the Sanlu Group, who made decisions about whether, when, and how to 
conduct the recall. It may be difficult to determine how the public interact with organizational 
decision making when a number of organizations are responsible for managing the risk. 
Involving a single company can provide a good reference for the way in which organizational 
communication contributes to risk estimates of the public in a recall event.  
Third, both the Sanlu case and the Taiwan gutter oil scandals involved one main well-
known producer, but the former saw much stronger risk responses than the latter. Because 
response mechanism is the core of SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988), it is natural to choose the 
case with more intense public reactions.  
As a result, the Sanlu milk contamination event is eventually chosen for the model. It is the 
case in which there was a clear recall event as well as a strong social risk response, and the 
one that has been most reported in the literature. The main features that are going to be 
relevant for the modelling include a single producer issuing a product recall, recreancy, and 
media communication. There are some reasons why ‘government’ is not considered as an 
actor in the model described in Chapter 5, however. First, it is unclear how the government 
and producer interact, especially given the relative secretiveness of government operations in 
China. Second, it is much more complex to capture in a model how people judge the 
competence of the government compared with that of the producer – this is because the 
government plays multiple or unclear roles, such as protecting the public, supporting an 
industry, supporting exports, and so on. Third, in China it is much harder for people to 
comment on the conduct of government compared with commenting on the conduct of 
companies. People are often afraid to criticise government, specifically.  
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter is composed of two parts. The first part presents the research questions and 
objectives of this study. The second part centres on process and methods of modelling. 
Themes in this section include 1) choice of agent-based modelling that describes the nature 
and application of agent-based modelling as well as justification and problems in the use of 
agent-based modelling, 2) overall process of modelling undertaken in this study, and 3) 
validation procedures that are necessary and feasible for the study. 
Figure 4.1 presents the flow of this study that goes from research questions to modelling 
and to model validation. The lines with arrows indicate the formalisation process and model 
validation process, and those without arrows show how research questions are answered and 
how validation is achieved. 
 
Literature survey on 
SARF and product recall
General mechanisms 
behind SARF
Model calibration by a 
survey







Simulation of the agent 
model
Time series of risk perception 
from empirical studies and 




Figure 4.1 Flow of study 
4.1 Research questions and objectives 
Drawing on SARF, this study attempts to make a commitment to the mechanism explaining 
how social actors interact with each other to shape collective risk response during a product 
recall crisis. It particularly concentrates on the interaction between an organization’s decision 
making and the public response during such a crisis. The primary concern is the public’s 
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perception of the risks that it bears, and how this perception develops in a context of this kind. 
Given these considerations, the main research questions are: 
1) how can we formalise social amplification of risk in the context of a product recall event? 
2) what can we learn from the formalisation? 
There are some subsidiary research questions: 
1) how can the process of forming risk responses be modelled? 
2) what kind of empirical data does the modelling need? 
The main research objectives are: 
1) to build an agent-based modelling of social risk amplification in the context of a product 
contamination crisis, 
2) to carry out empirical work to help calibrate the model, 
3) to assess the outcomes of simulating the model, and to assess what contributions the 
work makes to the literature on social risk amplification. 
4.2 Process and methods of modelling 
4.2.1 Choice of agent-based modelling 
Nature and application of agent-based modelling 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a modelling and simulation technique that allows 
examination of how collective patterns emerge as a result of interactions among multiple 
agents within an environment (Farmer and Foley, 2009; Macal and North, 2014). A typical 
agent-based model consists of three elements – agents, agent relationships, and agents’ 
environment (Macal and North, 2014). In ABM an agent is a simplified, abstract version of 
actors in a system, which could be individuals, organizations, and even nation states. Agents 
are autonomous and make independent decisions in response to stimuli that arise in their 
environments. They are identifiable and discrete in the sense that they possess a set of 
attributes and rules that govern their behaviours, decision-making capability, and interactions 
with other agents (Macal and North, 2009).  
Agents in agent-based models typically exhibit some form of bounded rationality (Epstein, 
1999; Kimbrough and Murphy, 2013). Agents do not act with complete information or infinite 
computational capacities. Instead, they make use of their decision rules under limited time, 
knowledge, and computing power (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996). And the heuristics 
agents adopt to interact locally are boundedly rational as they can lead to biased choices 
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(Conlisk, 1996). Agent relationships concern the specific topology depicting social 
interactions among agents – how agents are connected to, and interact with, other agents.  
ABM has gained popularity in many fields of study (Heath et al., 2009) and has been 
commonly used to theorize about system behaviour and to capture the dynamic process within 
a system. It best fits modelling and simulation of systems involving multiple interacting 
autonomous entities. In essence, ABM is an instrument to build a bridge between agent 
behaviours and interactions at the micro-level and global consequences emerging through 
interactions at the macro-level (Smith and Conrey, 2007). Macy and Willer (2002) pointed out 
that ‘ABMs provide theoretical leverage where the global patterns of interest are more than 
the aggregation of individual attributes’. 
Miller (2015) elaborated on the nature and purpose of agent-based modelling from a critical 
realist perspective. Critical realism, on the one hand, holds a realist ontology that a 
phenomenon can exist independently of people’s knowledge of it (Fleetwood, 2005). On the 
other hand, it recognizes a fallibilist epistemology that human knowledge is socially produced 
(Miller and Tsang, 2011) and therefore not a complete or objective understanding of a 
phenomenon such as a contaminated product. In particular, critical realists explain a 
phenomenon in terms of its mechanisms. Agent-based modelling corresponds well with the 
critical realist principles in the sense that it is a phenomenon-centred approach (Miller, 2015) 
and especially helpful to address ‘backward’ problems – exploring mechanisms lying behind a 
phenomenon of interest (Macy and Willer, 2002; Smith and Conrey, 2007). A recent example 
of how such an exploration can take place is provided by Liu and Brooks (2016) who propose 
the implementation of several competing models of herding behaviour in financial markets. 
Modelling SARF is exactly a problem of this kind as it is a process of identifying the 
mechanism of how agent behaviours and interactions give rise to the phenomenon of social 
risk amplification rather than a process of exploring the implications of a mechanism that is 
already known before doing the modelling. Furthermore, it is argued that agent-based 
modelling of organizational phenomena primarily requires a transformation from correlations 
among variables to process conceptualisations (Miller, 2015). This is compatible with the 
conclusions drawn from past empirical work on SARF (Chapter 2) that statistical associations 
among variables can show little evidence for real mechanisms of risk amplification, and that 
identifying the mechanisms demands an explanation of the empirical phenomenon as 
emerging from interactions of underlying processes. 
Critical realists also claim that simplification is necessary for the modelling of the 
phenomenon in order to maintain core assumptions and to make the underlying mechanisms 
more transparent. This also supports agent-based modellers’ practices. Smith and Conrey 
(2007) argued that ‘an ABM is a representation of a theory about social behaviour, not a 
representation of some slice of complicated social reality’. Adding theoretical components or 
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processes that are not essential or conceptually critical can not only obscure fundamental 
aspects of the phenomenon but also undermine the explanatory power of the model to theorize 
about the phenomenon under investigation (Weirich, 2011). And it is simply unrealistic to 
cover all features of the target phenomenon in an agent model. What’s more, simple models 
can generate complex consequences as a result of agent interactions (Axelrod, 1997; Gilbert 
and Terna, 2000). As the goal of modelling SARF in the context of a product recall crisis is to 
understand the fundamental process that gives rise to social amplification of risk, it is not 
important to represent all the details of such a crisis but to capture effects that are crucial for 
the phenomenon. 
A critical realist perspective on the application of agent-based modelling is that ABM is 
well-suited for interactively complex epistemologically-emergent phenomena in which 
emergent outcomes cannot be obtained by adding up the behaviours of all components (Miller, 
2015). In other words, ABM can be most effectively applied to moderately complex contexts 
that are not too simple or extremely complex. They are the kind of contexts that are, as Miller 
(2015) has suggested, ‘beyond the grasp of unaided human cognition but amenable to 
parsimonious specification’. The SARF context seems to satisfy this boundary as social risk 
amplification involves relatively complicated interactions and processes that one is unable to 
evaluate accurately through intuition but can be analysed through an appropriate model and 
simulation of such a model.  
It appears that there is close relevance of critical realism to agent-based modelling of social 
risk amplification in terms of mechanism, simplification of assumptions, and complexity of 
context. Renn et al. (1992) argued against a purely subjectivist view of risk amplification, and 
critical realism seems to fit their argument quite well. To the extent that critical realism also 
supports the use of agent modelling, agent modelling looks like an appropriate tool to explore 
SARF. 
Justification and problems in using agent-based modelling 
The justifications for using agent-based modelling specifically in this study are as follows.  
First, the social amplification of risk framework (Kasperson et al., 1988) emphasizes that 
signals about risks or risk events are conveyed and processed by a variety of autonomous 
actors seen as ‘amplification stations’ that are self-directed in making risk decisions in the 
communication process. Messages spread between actors through an environment in which 
they are located and by which they are affected. The possibility of using system dynamics 
model is also considered. System dynamics models describe dynamic behaviour of a system 
in terms of associations between variables rather than actors involved in the system. This is 
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obviously far from modelling SARF, which requires a focus on actors responsible for the 
underlying processes of risk amplification. The possibility is therefore ruled out. 
Second, empirical studies on SARF (for example, Binder et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013) 
and risk perception (for example, Muter et al., 2013; Scherer and Cho, 2003), as well as 
empirical work in such domains as medicine (for example, Bernardi, 2002; Smith, 2006) and 
psychology (for example Knoll et al., 2015), have highlighted the importance of social 
interactions in shaping individuals’ perceptions of risk. Social interactions exert contagion 
effects on risk perceptions in ways that facilitate exchange of risk information and 
engagement in risk related behaviour. Hence, actors’ risk responses are interdependent – each 
actor’s risk perception depends on not only its own estimates of risk but also the responses of 
other actors. Thus, social networks serve as important channels through which actions among 
actors take place. On the one hand, social networks shape actor interactions as they provide 
pathways of creating social ties among actors. On the other hand, they are shaped by actor 
actions as the formation of social networks relates to the rules of how actors interact with each 
other.  
Third, as Busby et al. (2016) have suggested, nonlinearities are critical to the emergence of 
risk amplification. Some modelling of social risk amplification (Bleda and Shackley, 2012; 
Burns and Slovic, 2007; Busby and Onggo, 2013; Busby et al., 2016; Onggo et al., 2014) has 
shown how complex are the feedback loops between risk communication, risk perceptions, 
and behavioural responses and how the feedback effects can contribute to heightened risk in 
excess of what one might expect. Agent modelling naturally produces such nonlinearities as a 
result of the network-based interactions of agents over time.  
Fourth, in a risk event actors are heterogeneous in attributes and risk responses. Both 
theoretical (Slovic et al., 1982) and empirical (for example, Chauvin et al., 2007; Marris et al., 
1997; Sjöberg, 2000) work has identified the existence of individual heterogeneity in risk 
issues. Agent models, precisely because the basic unit of the model is the agent, allow a 
natural and logical representation of this heterogeneity. As Rahmandad and Sterman (2008) 
pointed out, ‘AB models can readily include heterogeneity in individual attributes and in the 
network structure of their interactions’. 
There are also problems in the use of agent-based modelling. As mentioned earlier, it is 
impossible to incorporate every detail regarding the phenomenon of social risk amplification 
in an agent model. Epstein (1999) noted that ‘The agent-based approach forces on us the 
interpretation of society as a computational device, and this immediately raises foundational 
specters of computational intractability and undecidability’. As a result, the explanation of 
risk amplification that the model offers is partial to the extent that the model inevitably 
simplifies assumptions by eliminating nonessential and inaccessible aspects. Weirich (2011) 
said that a simulation model is ‘a component of an imaginary complete world’. It imitates how 
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a natural system produces a phenomenon of interest, but it does not necessarily aim to provide 
an accurate representation of the phenomenon. The agent-based computational modelling, as 
Busby et al. (2016) argued, ‘represents a reasonable direction for representing amplification 
more precisely, and working out the consequences of such a representation’. 
4.2.2 Overall process of modelling 
The process of modelling risk amplification in this thesis is essentially a process of increasing 
contextualisation of risk amplification. It goes from a model based on general ideas of SARF 
to a model also incorporating decision rules derived from literature on the specific type of 
crisis (in this case, product recall) to a model also calibrated from a consumer survey. To be 
more specific, the modelling starts by drawing upon theoretical and empirical work on SARF 
to figure out general mechanisms underlying social risk amplification. The purpose of this 
step is to build a model in which no assumptions are made about a context. In the next step the 
model introduces variables that are contextual to a specific domain of organizational crisis (i.e. 
product recall). It does this by drawing on empirical associations found in such a context, and 
translating these into agent rules. The last step involves calibration of the agent model by 
using a survey to find empirical values for the priorities found in the agent rules – in this case 
priorities that evaluate the relative importance of different sources of risk information. This 
makes the model specific to a particular population experiencing a particular organizational 
crisis.  
The details of each of these three main steps are contained in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The 
important point is that SARF, as a general framework, cannot be a sufficient basis for any 
model for some actual situation. It has to be augmented by knowledge of the type of situation 
in question, and then by knowledge of how the population in question responds in that type of 
situation. 
4.2.3 Validation procedures 
There are two stages of validation for agent-based models: micro-validation and macro-
validation (Midgley et al., 2007; Moss and Edmonds, 2005). The first stage refers to the 
micro-validation of behaviour of individual agents, and the second stage the macro-validation 
of aggregate behaviour resulting from agent interactions in the model. The ABM literature has 
shown that micro-validation is commonly conducted (for example, Bulleit and Drewek, 2011; 
Ghorbani et al., 2015; Leykum et al., 2012), and that approaches used for such validation is 
relatively extensive, such as model building (for example, Dubois et al., 2013; Fonseca et al., 
2015) and model parameterization (for example, Arciero et al., 2009; Zechman, 2011). 
 47 
Validating agent-based models at the macro-level has been a long-standing obstacle for 
researchers mainly due to the lack of adequate data. Nonetheless, methods including 
sensitivity analysis (for example, Fonoberova et al., 2013; Kimbrough and Murphy, 2013; 
Nagarajan et al., 2012) and comparison of model output with plausible data (for example, 
Christensen and Sasaki, 2008; Liu and Wu, 2016) have been widely used in ABM-based 
studies to obtain a certain level of assurance in the model. 
In regard to validation of the agent model in this thesis, the planned procedure is micro-
validating the model through the contextualisation process mentioned above, sensitivity 
analysis, and macro-validating the model by comparison with literature showing time series 
over crises. The procedures and outcomes will be described in detail in Chapter 7. But the 
basic logic is as follows: 
1) The micro-validation involves associating each aspect of the model, particularly the 
agent decision rules, with claims in the literature, mostly having at least some empirical basis. 
2) The sensitivity analysis involves identifying how the primary outcome – the degree of 
difference between public risk perception and the expert risk assessment – varies as the main 
model parameters vary, and assessing the significance of this. 
3) The macro-validation involves comparing traces of the primary outcome with some 
measure or proxy for the same outcome in empirical studies of past crises, in an attempt to 
show at least that the model is consistent with behaviour in those crises. 
As will be described, the macro-validation process is very limited in what it achieved, 




5 AGENT-BASED MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
This chapter demonstrates the development of the agent-based models and the results of 
simulating the models. It is composed of two sections in accordance with the kind of model 
developed, as shown in Figure 5.1. The first section describes the process of building an agent 
model with a perfectly mixed population and presents results of simulating the model. The 
second section deals with an agent model with agents interacting in a small-world network 
and simulation results of such a model. The simulation results for each of the two cases are 
given over a series of stages as the model is developed with increasing complexity. 
 
A perfect mixing model Simulation results








Figure 5.1 Structure of Chapter 5 Agent-based Modelling and Simulation 
5.1 Conceptual model underlying both agent models 
In accordance with the incremental development principle of agent-based modelling, this 
model is built up in simple steps. As shown in the conceptual model in Figure 5.2, an 
individual agent’s risk perceptions are shaped by two essential processes: 1) the discovery of a 
danger and the processing of information indicating the scale of this danger; and 2) the 
formation of a perception of recreancy or misconduct. The discovery process draws 
information from that agent’s prior beliefs, from the beliefs of others that it interacts with, 
from any direct experience (for example illness following ingestion of a contaminated food 
product), and from a producer’s recall. The recreancy process involves assessing the timing 
and voluntariness of the recall process. The justification for these specific variables is given, 
in detail, below in Section 5.2. In any specific, real case there may be many more 
considerations that influence the recreancy process, but at a minimum, for a recall crisis, it 
should involve timing and voluntariness of the product recall. These influences then combine 














Figure 5.2 Conceptual model of a social agent developing a risk perception to a product recall 
 
This conceptual model does not specify the nature of the population and how interactions 
within this population are selected. 
5.2 A perfect mixing model 
5.2.1 Model development 
5.2.1.1 Basic model 
According to SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988), communication is at the heart of social 
amplification of risk. Communicating with others is one common channel through which 
individuals are exposed to information about risks or risk events. Interpersonal contacts 
provide a pathway for individuals to create, exchange, and reframe risk information. 
Moreover, interpersonal communication has received relatively little emphasis in research on 
social risk amplification, and its effect on public risk perception remains somewhat in 
question. 
In the basic model there are N  agents who interact with randomly chosen peers in a 
perfectly mixed population. Perfect mixing means that any agent can interact with any other 
agent. Individuals’ risk beliefs are heterogeneous. In the absence of any information about an 
agent population’s initial beliefs, at the start each agent i  is endowed with a risk belief 
   0 0,ib t I  , which is sampled from a uniform distribution. This means that there is no 
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bias towards any particular initial belief. What is meant by a ‘risk belief’  ib t  is a subjective 
probability that indicates how likely the agent i  thinks the outcome in question is. The 
outcome in question, for the purpose of the model in the product contamination context, is a 
harmful contamination. In other words,  ib t  represents an agent i ’s belief of the proportion 
of products being contaminated, or of the probability that it will experience the contamination 
if it consumes the product (which is the same). Agents’ risk beliefs have no effect on their 
consumption behaviour. This may or may not be a realistic assumption, depending on how 
easy it is for consumers to substitute for this product, and how serious the health 
consequences are. In the calibrating survey, the example is of liquid milk products, and for 
some people this might be much more substitutable than for others depending on their 
circumstances.  
In every period of the model, an agent i  is randomly selected for activation, with an equal 
probability 1 N  of each agent being selected. Activating only one agent in every period 
makes it possible to look at every change in the model and to verify the model is working as 
expected. Activating all agents still creates the need to randomise the order in which they are 
activated and ends up with a sequential activation. Also, it is perhaps unrealistic that every 
agent will be active with the same frequency anyway, and activating one agent per tick, with 
replacement (i.e. an agent that has been activated at the previous tick has an equal probability 
of activation at the next tick) means there is a random distribution of activation frequencies 
over the population. Agents mix with each other in some random way, such that an activated 
agent i  interacts with K neighbours with risk belief   1, 2 , ,njb t j K  that are picked at 
random. An agent i  updates its risk belief based on its prior belief and mean risk belief of 
neighbours, that is: 
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In the absence of further information, the contributions to the new risk perception are 
equally weighted, but this weighting, as is described in Chapter 6, will eventually be 
calibrated from a consumer survey. 
5.2.1.2 Adding contamination 
This stage introduces an objective product contamination event that lasts for quite some time. 
A contamination level  C t  expresses the probability that any activated individual will 
directly experience a harm caused by the product. In the context of the model, this probability 
is equal to the actual proportion of contaminated products. Therefore, the contamination level 
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expresses an objective probability that can be compared with the subjective probability 
estimates represented by the agents’ risk beliefs. Contamination level is set as a constant in the 
model, and its value is very small prior to and after the contamination incident and high 
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                                     (5.2) 
where  lowC t  represents the contamination level before and after crisis and  highC t  the 
contamination level during crisis, and startT  signifies the time when the crisis starts and endT  
the time when the crisis ends. It is assumed that when the contamination level drops at the end 
of the contamination period, the probability of a consumer experiencing a contaminated 
product drops at the same time. This assumes that consumers consume the product and know 
if it is contaminated as soon as they buy a product: they do not store it before consumption. 
Direct experience can contribute to formation of risk responses (Masuda and Garvin, 2006; 
Petts and Niemeyer, 2004), because it helps enhance individuals’ knowledge about a risk 
event and leads to learned perceptions of risk. Direct experience with risk events can serve as 
either a risk amplifier or attenuator. On the one hand, it can reinforce the memorability and 
imaginability of hazardous events, thereby exaggerating perceived risks. On the other hand, it 
also enables individuals to recall the nature and controllability of the events, encouraging 
active actions for avoiding related risks. Rogers (1997) pointed out that perceived risk is likely 
to adjust dynamically to personal experience of risky events. Consequently, in the model 
direct experience is treated as an important information source.  
In the model after a product contamination incident is revealed, individuals either have 
direct experience with the specific risk or they do not. They are assumed to consume the 
product once, when active, and this product will be contaminated with a probability  C t . 
Direct experience,    0,1ie t  , is binary and therefore has a strong effect on risk perception. 
Agents do not have memory of having had a contamination experience, so  ie t  does not 
represent an agent’s past experience but the current, direct experience of consuming the 
contaminated product. Its prior belief retains the effect of an earlier experience, but it does not 
remember it directly. For the sake of simplicity, randomise agents’ experience  ie t  using a 
random number    0,1im t  , such that   1ie t   if    im t C t  but 0 otherwise. Direct 
experience is now added to the decision rule: 






i i nj i
nj
b t b t b t e t
K 
 
    
 
                                    (5.3) 
 52 
5.2.1.3 Adding product recall 
To date, the SARF literature has provided little evidence on the ways in which risks can be 
amplified by the very organizations having responsibilities to handle them. The main 
exception to this is the work of Freudenburg (2003) who has suggested that the perception of 
organizational functioning can have a great influence on perceptions of real risks. He used the 
term ‘recreancy’ to denote the failure of an organization to meet its obligations. In particular, 
product recall is one of the most common responses from the company involved (for example, 
Choi and Chung, 2013; De Matos and Rossi, 2007; Souiden and Pons, 2009) and of the most 
important sources of negative publicity that can significantly raise public concern (for 
example, Desai and Patel, 2014; Korkofingas and Ang, 2011; Magno, 2012; Souiden and 
Pons, 2009). However, there has been little work on how product recalls contribute to the 
process of risk amplification in risk events. How risk is socially amplified and how public risk 
perception evolves over time in a recall event is still a crucial topic to be addressed. 
This stage of model development introduces product recall to look at how individuals 
perceive the risk of products in question and how they make a decision about actions to take 
upon hearing news of a product recall. The product recall literature was reviewed to extract 
decision rules relating to consumer responses to recalls. As demonstrated by Chattoe-Brown 
(2014), agent-based modelling provides a way of integrating different kinds of research data, 
and for this study the aim was to draw on various pieces of empirical research in the recall 
literature. The recall literature survey is not presented in this thesis, because this study does 
not contribute to the recall literature but is used in contextualising risk amplification down to a 
specific domain of crisis, in this case product recall. The extraction of decision rules for the 
agent model was carried out as follows: 
1) From each empirical study of product recall, identify the causes (independent variables) 
and effects (dependent variables) underlying agent (e.g. consumer, organization, and media) 
behaviour. 
2) Translate these aggregate, statistical relationships into condition-action decision rules, 
mapping causes into condition codes and effects into action codes. The complete result of this 
exercise is tabulated in detail in Appendix A.  
3) For condition codes, use a threshold to represent the magnitude of numerical variables 
(e.g. if the condition is ‘consumers perceive high risk for the defective product’, then the 
condition code is ‘Perceived Risk > HR ’), and use “True” or “False” to denote the value of 
Boolean variables (e.g. if the condition is ‘the company issues a product recall’, then the 
condition code is ‘Recall = True’).  
4) For action codes, a multiplication function is adopted to combine the effects of multiple 
independent variables on one dependent variable. For example, if the description is ‘If 
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consumers are highly involved with recalled products and perceive the CEO’s apology speech 
as truly sincere, then an apology has more positive effects on consumer attitudes’, then the 
condition codes will be written as ‘Involvement > HI  and Sincerity (Apology) > HS ’, and the 
action code will be expressed as ‘Attitude t  = Attitude 1t  + c  × Involvement × Sincerity 
(Apology)’ with some constant c . 
5) Classify decision rules in terms of dependent variables, i.e. effects, to facilitate further 
selection. The decision rules can be classified into four categories generally: organizational 
reputation, risk perception, brand attitude, and purchase intention. 
6) Specify the variables that are significant to consumers’ perceptions of risk in the 
particular context being modelled. For example, product involvement significantly affects 
consumers’ judgment of risk associated with a questionable product (Choi and Lin, 2009a; De 
Matos and Rossi, 2007), but it is not considered in the milk contamination context model. This 
is because product involvement is measured by many indicators with respect to consumers’ 
inherent needs, values, and interests (Zaichkowsky, 1985), and incorporating this variable in 
the model will add excessive complexity to the model. 
Based on the agent rules extracted from the recall literature, recall information, recall 
timing, and recall voluntariness are chosen as critical elements influencing consumer reaction 
to recall events. This justifies part of the conceptual model presented in Figure 5.2. Thus there 
are two main aspects to the effect of a product recall on public perceptions: 1) it provides 
information that the product is defective, which combines with the three sources of 
information already described to determine public risk beliefs; 2) it increases or decreases the 
public’s trust in the company – depending on its timing, and whether it is voluntary. This is 
shown in the conceptual model in Figure 5.2. 
The second effect, on recreancy, will be dealt with in the next section. For the first, 
information effect, the model assumes a single producer agent. The producer issues a recall 
message during the time between contamination release and contamination termination, but 
does not withdraw the product, and therefore consumers can continue to experience a 
contamination event. Note that the contamination level  highC t  stays constant when a recall 
is in force, which means that the recall does not affect the proportion of products that are 
contaminated. This represents a situation in which the producer simply makes an 
announcement of recall and contaminated products are still on sale and a situation in which 
producer behaviour has no impact on the likelihood of consumers experiencing contamination. 
It obviously differs from a more realistic situation in which a recall is associated with product 
withdrawal that can affect contamination level over time. The delay between recall 
announcement and recall action is assumed to be zero for the sake of convenience. The recall 
announcement  a t  is either 0 (no announcement) or 1 (announcement). The recall is issued 
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with a probability equal to the contamination risk  C t  at any given time. This means the 
recall timing is random but the most likely delay is 1 tick only and the delay is distributed as 
an exponential distribution. There is likely to be some, small delay between the sudden 
contamination increase and the recall. After a recall announcement has been made, the recall, 
   0,1r t  , stays in force until the contamination level falls to its original, very low level, 
that is,   0r t   until   1a t  , then   1r t   until endt T , and then   0r t  . The public’s 
risk belief decision rule now also incorporates recall information (simply a binary value): 
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These four factors including an agent’s prior belief, neighbours’ perception, direct 
experience, and product recall information is described in summary as the ‘discovery’ 
component of the conceptual model (see Figure 5.2).
 
5.2.1.4 Adding recreancy 
The second effect of product recall relates to trust and recreancy. Recreancy was defined by 
Freudenburg (1993) as the belief that the producer has betrayed the public trust and fails to 
fulfil its obligations. Freudenburg (2003) showed that recreancy was one of the most 
important influences on social risk amplification.  
As indicated above, there are two aspects drawn from the recall literature that appear 
relevant to recreancy. An early, voluntary product recall indicates that a firm is acting in a 
socially responsible way, and a late, forced recall indicates the opposite. Hence, recreancy is 
influenced by the timing of the recall – the time between the first signal of product defect and 
the recall of the product from the market. It is also influenced by its voluntariness: if the 
producer is forced by the authorities to recall the products, recreancy will be higher than if 
not. So only if the recall is broadcast before the consumer believes the risk has increased and 
is voluntary, perceived recreancy will be low and this will reduce risk perceptions. 
Specifically, immediate action without delay, or voluntary product recalls, is seen by 
consumers as responsible business behaviour, while the delay of the recall, or involuntary 
product recalls, can be perceived by consumers as due to the indifference of the company 
(Magno, 2012). As a consequence, consumers’ subsequent risk perceptions will be a function 
of their recreancy belief: if recreancy is high, risk perception will be higher, and vice versa. 
Each agent expresses a recreancy belief    0 0,iR t I   from the start. With no recall in 
force, the recreancy perceived by an agent will be increased by some increment D , if and 
when its risk perception  1ib t   equals or increases above some threshold B , but stay 
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unchanged otherwise. In this condition the agent has determined there is a risk and yet heard 
no recall. And each agent only increases its recreancy belief once, because recreancy primarily 
concerns finding out an organization has failed to fulfil its obligations and ordinarily this only 
occurs once, even if the emotion consequences recur many times (Freudenburg, 1993). The 
updating rule for recreancy  iR t  is thus: 
 
     
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(5.5)                      
where   1a tT   denotes the time when a recall announcement is made and endT  the time when 
the crisis ends. This can only happen once for each consumer, so D  can only be added once.  
When a recall is in force, consumers update their recreancy beliefs only if they get 
activated in this period. In this process recreancy also alters only once. To make sure that 
recreancy is altered only once, introduce another variable  ih t  to denote whether an agent 



















                                       (5.6) 
Also, there is a binary variable,    0,1v t  , which denotes that the recall is voluntary 
(   1v t  ) or involuntary (   0v t  ). The associated decision rule is that if a recall is forced 
(   0v t  ) and an agent hears the recall (   1ih t  ), then recreancy  iR t  is increased by some 
increment E , and that if a recall is made voluntarily (   1v t  ) and an agent hears the recall 
(   1ih t  ), then recreancy  iR t  is reduced by the same amount: 
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where   1 enda tT t T   . As  v t  is fixed for any instance of the model, this is a model 
parameter. 
Combine the risk perception emerging from the discovery process outlined in equation (5.4) 
with that shaped by recreancy in an extended decision rule: 
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where   and   are the weight given to ‘event discovery’ and ‘recreancy’, 0 1  , 0 1  , 
and 1   . 
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5.2.1.5 Adding broadcast media 
As also shown in the conceptual model, agents update their beliefs in the light of interaction 
with news media. SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988) has recognized the importance of media to 
how society processes risk messages. As one of the most important communication channels 
the news media make decisions on what information to convey, what audience to cover, what 
story elements to emphasize, and how to articulate a risk issue. Empirical findings have 
shown that the variations in public risk perception generally accord with the patterns of media 
coverage including communication mechanism (Lewis and Tyshenko, 2009), nature of risk 
information (Frewer et al., 2002; Liu et al., 1998), and amount of press coverage 
(Loewenstein and Mather, 1990; Renn et al., 1992; Yeo et al., 2014). In addition, the media is 
likely to manipulate messages selectively to raise public concern over a risk issue, directing 
public attention toward rare or dramatic risk problems and away from those that are more 
commonplace but more serious (Boyd and Jardine, 2011; Burgess, 2012; Hill, 2001; 
Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996; Lofstedt, 2008). 
Some studies (Bakir, 2005; Boyd and Jardine, 2011; Leschine, 2002) have indicated that 
the media can play multiple roles in risk debates, either a disseminator of expert-sourced, 
objective risk information or a watchdog of carefully constructed risk information, to the 
public. Onggo et al. (2014) have proposed three different roles that media can assume: it can 
lead public opinion and communicate an objective level of risk (an objective leader), it can 
follow public opinion by communicating the current, average public opinion (a public 
follower), or it can be a mixed leader-follower.  
In the model the media agent becomes active at the start of contamination. This is not to 
say that prior to the revelation of contamination the media does not affect perceived risk 
within the public at all, but that the information on potential risk has not attracted much media 
and public attention to provoke extensive concern. This situation occurred in the 2008 Chinese 
milk scandal. A handful of parents had publicly questioned the quality of Sanlu’s milk powder 
and made complaints to the regulators about kidney disease that their babies suffered 
(Associated Press, 2008; Fairclough, 2008; Gong and Liu, 2008). Their stories were picked up 
by a few media outlets yet unfortunately the warning signals were ignored by the regulators 
and the public. Afterwards the media disclosed the identification of kidney ailments among 
babies and contamination of baby milk powder with melamine by investigators and thus 
triggered strong public concern as well as public aversion to Sanlu milk products. Therefore, 
in the agent model media reporting about product contamination before its widespread 
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Then integrate the effect of media communication to the decision rule in equation (5.8) to 
form the final decision rule in the model: 
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where  ,  , and   are the weight given to ‘event discovery’, ‘recreancy’ and the perception 
expressed in the ‘media’, 0 1  , 0 1  , 0 1  , and 1     . 
5.2.2 Simulation results  
The simulation experiments are conducted using Repast Simphony. The agent model runs 
over a series of 20,000 periods with 1,000 public agents, a single producer agent, and a single 
media agent. Table 5.1 lists the input parameters and values used in the simulation. Some of 
these are social constants – parameters that would be expected to characterize an agent society. 
Ideally the values of these could be verified empirically, although in practice it seems very 
unlikely empirical information is actually available. Some of the parameters, however, define 
specific situations – for example, the high and low contamination levels. The value of these 
parameters is defined by the specific situation that the modeller wants to simulate. So the 
basis of these values is the modeller’s view of a typical, representative or simply interesting 
situation. 
 
Table 5.1 Input parameters and values used in the simulation of a perfect mixing model 
Input parameter Value Description 
Maximum initial condition I  10-4 Defines initial risk and recreancy belief 
Number of neighbours K  4 
Number of neighbours in a perfectly mixed 
population 
Low contamination level  lowC t  10-4 Level before and after crisis 
High contamination level  highC t  0.2 Level during the crisis 
Contamination start period startT  2000 Time when the crisis starts 
Contamination end period endT  5999 Time when the crisis ends 
Risk perception threshold B  0.15 Defines when a recall increases recreancy 
Recreancy increment D  0.25 
Amount by which a recall increases 
recreancy 
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Recall voluntariness  v t   0,1  Whether recall is voluntary or involuntary 
Recreancy variation E  0.35 
Amount by which recall voluntariness 
changes recreancy 
Weight of ‘event discovery’   0.85 
Weight given to ‘event discovery’ in the 
partial model with recreancy 
Weight of ‘event discovery’   0.65 
Weight given to ‘event discovery’ in the full 
model 
Weight of ‘recreancy’   0.05 
Weight given to ‘recreancy’ in the full 
model 
 
Figures 5.3 through 5.18 present the traces of agent risk perception in a single run that 
correspond to the stages by which the perfect mixing model is developed. Outcome variables 
are mean public risk perception over agents and over time and mean risk amplification (the 
gap between the objective risk and public risk perception) over agents and over time. 
Simulation result based on equation (5.1) is not presented as the basic decision rule simply 
produces convergence on the mean of the initial beliefs.  
First stage: public response to experienced contamination in a perfectly 
mixed population 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the evolution of individual risk perceptions in a single run with a 
contamination incident introduced (equation (5.3)). Before contamination occurs, public risk 
perception stays at a very low level. And during contamination it surges to a relatively high 
level and produces exogenous peaks that reflect the changes in risk magnitude. This assumes 
that direct experience is an important foundation of perception and plays a critical role in 
shaping subjective risk estimates of public actors, and that the risk perceived by consumers 
varies with the information available to them. In addition, the results evidently demonstrate 
that the exogenous peaks occur around the time period when the contamination incident is 
coming to an end – in this case because the growth of risk perception has not stopped by the 
time the contamination ceases, there is a turning point when the ceasing occurs. The turning 
point is quite sharp, so the growth in risk perception is still positive just before the turning 
point, but the growth clearly declines as the incident progresses. It is also essentially 
monotonic: there are no transient reversals in the growth until the main turning point is 
reached. Hence, public risk response to external influence appears somewhat predictable, 
given knowledge of the model parameters.  
Figure 5.3 shows risk attenuation rather than risk amplification – by the end of the growth 
phase, the risk perception (in terms of subjective probability of contamination) is still less than 
the objective risk (the actual contamination probability). But it is hard to say whether this is 
the case for all levels of contamination, so two extreme values are examined, as shown in 
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Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. Risk amplification occurs if the contamination level is very low 
(Figure 5.4), and risk also becomes attenuated if the contamination level is very high (Figure 
5.5). This indicates that risk amplification only occurs if the contamination level is below a 
certain threshold. The fluctuation of standard deviation in Figure 5.4 suggests that low 
contamination raises the disagreement among individuals’ responses to the contamination 
crisis. Furthermore, it has been observed that a former model with longer period of 
contamination generates risk amplification with lower amplification threshold. In Chapter 7 
both the contamination level and contamination duration are parameterised to inspect the 
sensitivity of the model to these parameters.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a perfect mixing model with contamination





Figure 5.4 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a perfect mixing model with contamination 
  0.001highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.5 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a perfect mixing model with contamination 
  0.9highC t   
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Second stage: addition of a product recall event in a perfectly mixed 
population 
Figure 5.6 demonstrates the trace of agent risk perception in a single run when product recall 
is also considered as an exogenous effect (equation (5.4)). It shows that publicity of product 
recall triggers a very strong growth of risk perception – this is as expected from the model as 
recall is assumed to associate with a significant effect on risk perception. More importantly, 
there is a considerable discrepancy between mean public risk perception and the 
contamination level – there is evidently risk amplification. In the model the consumers’ 
decision rule gives a value to the recall element of 0 or 1, not the objective contamination 
probability. Therefore, the public estimate of the risk can become amplified above the 
objective level.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a perfect mixing model with recall 
(  2003 1a t   ) 
 
Figure 5.7 presents the comparison between model with contamination (Figure 5.3 on the 
left) and model with product recall (Figure 5.6 on the right). After contamination is removed, 
the decline rate is much faster in Figure 5.6 than in Figure 5.3. This is because the absence of 





Figure 5.7 Comparison between model with contamination (Figure 5.3 on the left) and model with 
recall (Figure 5.6 on the right) 
Third stage: addition of recreancy in a perfectly mixed population 
Figure 5.8 shows the trace of public risk perception and recreancy belief in a single run with a 
voluntary recall (equation (5.8) with   1v t  ). Comparison between model with recall (Figure 
5.6 on the left) and model with voluntary recall (Figure 5.8 on the right) is presented in Figure 
5.9. A t -test indicates that there is a significant difference between Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.8 
in peak mean risk perception (  950.297 428.738t df  
 
and 0.001p  ) and residual mean 
risk perception (  611.801 4,668.792t df    and 0.001p  ) across 500 runs with a 
significance level of 0.05. Compared with Figure 5.6, Figure 5.8 exhibits a relatively slow 
growth followed by a relatively slow decay, and there is a lower degree of risk amplification. 
This is because voluntary recall decreases agents’ recreancy belief in the producer and thus 
positively affects their risk beliefs. In other words, the indirect effect (i.e. recreancy) of a 
voluntary recall can somewhat diminish its direct effect (i.e. product recall information) and 
thus lessens consumers’ perceptions of risk.  
In particular, in Figure 5.8 recreancy belief surges to a high level after the recall is 
completed and then becomes level. In the model when there is no recall in force, an agent will 
increase its recreancy belief by some amount if the risk it perceives is above some threshold 
(which is set as 0.15) and keep its recreancy belief unchanged otherwise. Therefore, recreancy 
belief continues to increase as risk perception stays above the threshold and becomes 
stabilised when risk perception falls below the threshold. And the constant high level of 
recreancy is the reason why risk perception stabilises at a higher level in Figure 5.8 than in 
Figure 5.6.   
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Figure 5.8 Trace of public risk perception and recreancy belief in a single run of a perfect mixing model 
with recall timing and voluntary recall (  2005 1a t   ,   1v t  ) 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Comparison between model with recall (Figure 5.6 on the left) and model with voluntary 
recall (Figure 5.8 on the right) 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the trace of mean risk belief and recreancy belief over time with an 
involuntary recall (equation (5.8) with   0v t  ). Comparison between model with recall 
(Figure 5.6) and model with involuntary recall (Figure 5.10) is given in Figure 5.11. Figure 
5.6 and Figure 5.10 are statistically different in peak risk perception 
(  965.768 132.019t df    and 0.001p  ) and residual risk perception 
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(  522.098 5,276.382t df    and 0.001p  ) over 500 runs with a significance level of 0.05. 
Figure 5.11 demonstrates that involuntary recall generates a lower level of risk amplification 
and a much higher residue of concern. This is what the modeller expects based on the decision 
rule. The explanation for the lower amplification is that, involuntary recall increases recreancy 
belief, but risk perceived from recreancy is much lower than that from recall information, so 
involuntariness to some extent reduces the amplification effect of recall information and leads 
to a lower degree of amplification. There is no recall after the crisis, so recreancy belief 
continues to increase until risk perception drops to a certain threshold, resulting in a higher 
residual risk perception after the crisis. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Trace of public risk perception and recreancy belief in a single run of a perfect mixing 




Figure 5.11 Comparison between model with recall (Figure 5.6 on the left) and model with involuntary 
recall (Figure 5.10 on the right) 
 
Figure 5.12 shows the comparison between model with voluntary recall (Figure 5.8 on the 
left) and model with involuntary recall (Figure 5.10 on the right). There is a statistically 
significant difference between them in terms of peak mean risk perception 
(  996.147 326.958t df    and 0.001p  ), peak mean recreancy belief 
(  684.217 2,894.413t df    and 0.001p  ), and post-crisis risk perception 
(  692.890 2,846.114t df    and 0.001p  ) over 500 runs with a significance level of 0.05. 
This is in line with the decision rules in the model. During the crisis an agent increases its 
recreancy belief when the producer implements an involuntary recall and decreases its 
recreancy belief when a recall is made voluntarily. The magnitude of risk amplification is 
therefore higher in Figure 5.10 than in Figure 5.8. Also, Figure 5.10 displays a higher 
stabilised risk perception and recreancy belief after the crisis. This is mainly due to the reason 
that in an involuntary recall event it takes a longer time to reduce agent risk beliefs to the 
threshold that defines when a recall increases recreancy, leading to a higher recreancy belief 
and residual risk perception. In reality, when an involuntary recall comes into force, 
consumers tend to feel that the company is not socially responsible in dealing with the crisis, 






Figure 5.12 Comparison between model with voluntary recall (Figure 5.8 on the left) and model with 
involuntary recall (Figure 5.10 on the right) 
Fourth stage: addition of media in a perfectly mixed population 
The effects of roles that the media assumes on public perceived risk are examined in the light 
of voluntary recall and involuntary recall. Figure 5.13 demonstrates the trace of individual 
agent beliefs when the producer makes a recall voluntarily and the media acts as an objective 
leader, a mixed leader-follower, and a public follower, respectively (equation (5.10) with 
  1v t  ). Risk amplification – that is, a collective perception that exceeds the objective risk 
level – occurs regardless of the role that media assumes. The objectivity of media coverage 
appears to be inversely related to risk amplification: a media that simply follows public 
opinion is associated more strongly with exaggerated risk perceptions than an objective one. 
Another insight is that for all of the three roles of media, risk amplification seems to decrease 
with the contamination level. Particularly, risk amplification will increase significantly if the 
contamination level is very low (Figure 5.14) and decease considerably if the contamination 
level is very high (Figure 5.15). Sensitivity analysis presented in Chapter 7 explores how 
contamination level affects peak risk amplification. 
It is significant that when the crisis finishes, and, the contamination has fallen to its original 
level, when the media is a public follower the public risk perception remains very high – it is 
not corrected by the reduction in objective risk. So risk amplification and the role of media are 
important not just at the start of a crisis but at the end. It will be hard for crisis managers to 






Figure 5.13 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with voluntary 
recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) and contamination   0.2highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.14 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with voluntary 
recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) and contamination   0.05highC t   
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Figure 5.15 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with voluntary 
recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) and contamination   0.95highC t   
 
Figure 5.16 shows that if the producer issues a recall involuntarily, risks will be intensified 
regardless of the role of media (equation (5.10) with   0v t  ). Both risk amplification and 
residual risk perception are higher than in the case where a recall is made voluntarily. There is 
an inverse relationship between the objectivity of media coverage and risk amplification. 
Figure 5.16, Figure 5.17, and Figure 5.18 show that social risk amplification decreases with 
the level of contamination. 
The model does not explore possibilities in which the media leads public opinion, but leads 
it with a belief that is different from the objective level of risk. A theory that claims the media 
will communicate exaggerated stories in order to sell more newspapers or TV viewing might 






Figure 5.16 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) and contamination   0.2highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.17 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) and contamination   0.05highC t   
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Figure 5.18 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full perfect mixing model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) and contamination   0.95highC t   
5.3 A small-world network model 
In this model public agents communicate with each other within a small-world network 
borrowed from Watts and Strogatz (1998). This is based on the same conceptual model in 
Figure 5.2, but unlike the perfect mixing model, agents only interact with the other agents to 
which they are connected in this pre-determined network. Each agent is initially connected to 
its K  nearest neighbours in a regular lattice, and each link is randomly rewired with a 
probability P . For the purpose of this model, of a single event, the network is fixed. Table 5.2 
gives the input parameters and values used for simulating such a model.  
 
Table 5.2 Input parameters and values used in the simulation of a small-world network model 
Input parameter Value Description 
Maximum initial condition I  10-4 Defines initial risk and recreancy belief 
Number of neighbours K  4 Number of neighbours in initial lattice 
Rewiring probability P  0.5 Probability of reconnecting a lattice edge 
Low contamination level  lowC t  10-4 Level before and after crisis 
High contamination level  highC t  0.2 Level during the crisis 
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Contamination start period startT  2000 Time when the crisis starts 
Contamination end period endT  5999 Time when the crisis ends 
Risk perception threshold B  0.15 Defines when a recall increases recreancy 
Recreancy increment D  0.25 
Amount by which a recall increases 
recreancy 
Recall voluntariness  v t   0,1  Whether recall is voluntary or involuntary 
Recreancy variation E  0.35 
Amount by which recall voluntariness 
changes recreancy 
Weight of ‘event discovery’   0.85 
Weight given to ‘event discovery’ in the 
partial model with recreancy 
Weight of ‘event discovery’   0.65 
Weight given to ‘event discovery’ in the full 
model 
Weight of ‘recreancy’   0.05 
Weight given to ‘recreancy’ in the full 
model 
 
Figures 5.19 through 5.30 show the traces of individual agent beliefs in a single run 
following the stages of building the model. 
First stage: public response to experienced contamination in a small-
world network 
Figure 5.19 shows the trace of public risk perception in a small-world network model with a 
contamination event (equation (5.3)). Like the perfect mixing model (see Figure 5.3), 
contamination does not lead to amplification of risk – there is a certain level of risk 
attenuation, and risk perception peaks around the termination of contamination. But the small-
world network model produces lower peaks in risk perception compared with the perfect 
mixing model. This indicates that spread of risk information in a small-world network could 
to some extent reduce public risk estimates in a context in which only social interaction and 
direct experience contribute to belief update. 
Different contamination levels are examined to look at how peak mean risk perception 
varies with contamination level, as shown in Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21. Figure 5.19, 5.20, 
and 5.21 demonstrate that high contamination level associates with a relatively rapid increase 
of risk perception. It seems that the degree of risk amplification decreases with the level of 
contamination. Comparison of the three figures in standard deviation suggests that 
disagreement in risk beliefs among individuals is more likely to emerge when contamination 
stays at a lower level during the crisis. This is because a low contamination level is 
accompanied by a low probability of an agent experiencing the harm and a limited access of 
an agent to related risk information. Moussaïd (2013) pointed out that individuals express 
extreme opinions when they are less informed of associated risks. They tend to absorb 
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messages that agree with their own perceptions and neglect those that strongly disagree with 
their current views. 
 
 
Figure 5.19 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a small-world network model with 




Figure 5.20 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a small-world network model with 
contamination   0.001highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.21 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a small-world network model with 
contamination   0.9highC t   
 74 
 Second stage: addition of a product recall event in a small-world 
network 
Figure 5.22 shows the mean risk belief in a single run of the small-world network model with 
product recall (equation (5.4)). As is evident from the figure, there is a sharp increase, 
followed by a relatively rapid relaxation, of collective risk response. Agents perceive danger 
associated with the product from the recall information and their estimates of risk increase, 
giving rise to amplification of the risk. The relatively large magnitude of risk amplification is 
because the model assumes that the risk agents perceive from product recall is 1 when they 
hear the recall. In reality, the risk probably falls on a continuous scale and is heterogeneous 
across the population.  
 
 
Figure 5.22 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a small-world network model with recall 
(  2003 1a t   ) 
Third stage: addition of recreancy in a small-world network 
As shown in Figure 5.23 (equation (5.8) with   1v t  ) and Figure 5.24 (equation (5.8) with 
  0v t  ), voluntary and involuntary recalls produce basically the same qualitative pattern of 
collective risk response, but an involuntary recall brings about a relatively higher level of risk 
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amplification during the crisis as well as a higher residue of concern after the crisis than a 
voluntary recall. There is little difference between them and figures (Figure 5.8 and Figure 
5.10) produced by the perfect mixing model, so analysis of the simulation results are not 
presented here.  
The existing simulation results cannot be used to explore the influence of recall timing on 
risk perception, since they are just generated from a single run of the model. Multiple 
replications are carried out in Chapter 7 to investigate the effect of relevant parameters on 
social risk amplification. 
 
 
Figure 5.23 Trace of public risk perception and recreancy belief in a single run of a small-world 





Figure 5.24 Trace of public risk perception and recreancy belief in a single run of a small-world 
network model with recall timing and involuntary recall (  2001 1a t   ,   0v t  )  
Fourth stage: addition of media in a small-world network 
Figure 5.25 shows the trace of agent risk beliefs when the media assumes three different roles 
in a voluntary recall crisis (equation (5.10) with   1v t  ). The results demonstrate that risk 
amplification occurs regardless of the role that the media is undertaking. The objectivity of 
media coverage is inversely related to the amplification of risk. After the crisis is solved, 
public risk perception falls to a stable level after a certain period of time. The objectivity of 
media communicated risk is inversely related to the time taken to reach the stable point and 
the level of stabilised risk perception: the more objective the media coverage, the less time it 
takes to stabilise, and the lower the residue of concern. It is important that risk managers pay 
special attention to residual risk perception if the media is a strong follower of public opinion.  
Figure 5.26 and Figure 5.27 depict the traces of public risk perception at different 
contamination levels. It appears that the contamination level is inversely related to the 
discrepancy between public risk perception and the objective risk. The three figures exhibit 
approximately, but not exactly, smooth standard deviation after the crisis finishes, suggesting 
that individual risk perceptions become homogeneous in the long run. Compared with the 
perfect mixing model (Figure 5.13, Figure 5.14, and Figure 5.15), the small-world network 
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model exhibits a slightly lower degree of risk amplification. This indicates that social ties 
associated with a network can mitigate the negative influence of product recall on public risk 
perception (i.e. product recall increases public risk perception) to a very small extent. 
 
 
Figure 5.25 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 




Figure 5.26 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 
voluntary recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) and contamination   0.05highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.27 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 
voluntary recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) and contamination   0.95highC t   
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Figure 5.28 demonstrates that public risk perception is exaggerated to a higher degree 
during and after the crisis in the context of involuntary recall irrespective of the role of media 
(equation (5.10) with   0v t  ). Particularly, given the difference between these traces and 
those shown in Figure 5.24, media reporting appears to moderately alleviate the negative 
impact of an involuntary recall on public risk perception. Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.30 show an 
inverse relationship between risk amplification and contamination level. 
Interestingly, the transition from a perfect mixing model to a small-world social network 
makes relatively little difference. It makes no difference qualitatively to the shape of the risk 
response, and only a small quantitative difference to the degree of the response. In the next 
chapter, where an attempt is made to calibrate the model from a survey of a real population, 
the difference made by the calibration step is also examined. 
 
 
Figure 5.28 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 




Figure 5.29 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) and contamination   0.05highC t   
 
 
Figure 5.30 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a full small-world network model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) and contamination   0.95highC t    
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6 CALIBRATING SURVEY 
This chapter concerns calibrating the agent model using a consumer survey and the outcome 
the resulting model produces. It includes eight sections. The first section explains the aims of 
the survey – related to the micro-validity of the model. The second section describes design of 
the survey including the context in which the survey is conducted and structure of the survey. 
Sampling method and administration of the survey are dealt with in the third section, followed 
by a brief description of pilot test of the questionnaire in the fourth section. The fifth section 
describes characteristics of survey respondents. The sixth section presents survey results in 
terms of information sources and relative importance. The process of calibrating the model 
through the survey is depicted in the seventh section. Results of simulating the calibrated 
model follow. 
6.1 Aims of the survey 
The aim of the survey is to provide a certain level of calibration for the agent-based model. It 
performs part of what is often referred to as ‘micro-validation’ (Moss and Edmonds, 2005) by 
ensuring elements in the model correspond to empirically determined values. For this model, 
the micro-validation has two main elements: 1) assessing the information sources that people 
consult when forming risk perceptions; 2) assessing the relative importance they give to these 
sources in their decision rules. This produces empirical distributions over the weights people 
attach to the different sources, from which the parameters in the decision rules shown in 
Section 5.2.1 can be sampled in the agent model. 
The uncalibrated model in Chapter 5 was based on assigning arbitrary weights to all 
sources for all agents. Within the risk discovery component of the model, these weights were 
simply made equal. The calibrating survey allows us to sample weights given to the different 
sources from a distribution of weights collected from a real sample of people making 
judgments about a particular situation. 
6.2 Design of the survey 
6.2.1 Context  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Sanlu milk scandal evolved into a nationwide dairy industry 
crisis and has been China’s biggest food crisis struck to date. The incident caused several 
babies’ death and ended up with thousands of babies being hospitalized. Chen (2009) argued 
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that the Sanlu milk powder scandal fell into one type of systemic risks, which, as Hennessy et 
al. (2003) have suggested, refers to “the risk that a system fails to perform because of the 
ways in which its various components interact”. Asymmetric information and delayed risk 
communication among various social actors (e.g. consumers, mass media, Sanlu Group, the 
government, etc.) led to coordination failure (Chen, 2009), which is a marked feature of the 
case. When the recall of Sanlu milk powder in question was released, a great number of 
consumers had been experiencing panic and anger.  
To some degree, the Sanlu milk scandal provides an ideal context for exploring the 
mechanism of social risk amplification and for identifying the role of various social 
interactions in the amplification process. However, as it is a powdered milk product, it will 
only be consumed by parents of newborns. The contaminant in Sanlu case was melamine (a 
type of plastics), but other milk contamination crises in China have been associated with 
biological agents. Therefore, the context for the survey is liquid milk product. And the 
contaminant is a biological agent, reflecting the most recent case (the Fonterra case). 
6.2.2 Structure 
The approach used in the survey is to ask participants to indicate what sources of information 
they will consult when facing an unexpected shock and to evaluate the relative influence 
among each possible pair of information sources. The survey is structured as shown below in 
Table 6.1. As mentioned earlier, liquid milk is the product involved in the contamination 
crisis. A fictitious company that carries out a product recall is created. A hypothetical brand 
name (i.e. ABC) is given to the company in order to avoid any brand-specific knowledge of 
participants that may distort their responses to survey questions. 
The questions are divided into three sections – the first finding out the demographic profile 
of the respondents, the second dealing with which other agents the respondents expect to get 
information from, the third looking at the relative importance of the different types of source 
(the survey is displayed in Appendix B). For the convenience of quantitative model 
calibration, all comparisons are made relative to the same baseline, i.e. social interaction, 
except for the comparison between recall timing and recall voluntariness (which is used to 
assess the effects of recall timing and voluntariness on recreancy). For each pair of 
comparison, both forward comparison (e.g. when you form your risk perception, how much 
relative importance would you give to media communicated risk compared with other 
people’s perceptions?) and reverse comparison (e.g. when you form your risk perception, how 
much relative importance would you give to other people’s perceptions compared with media 
communicated risk?) are considered and randomly presented in the questionnaire in order to 
reduce cognitive biases that potential respondents may have. Presentation of questionnaire 
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items is also random within Section 3. 
 
Table 6.1 Structure of survey 
Section 1 
Demographics 












Own perception vs. other 
people’s perceptions 
Age 
Noticing contamination vs. 
other people’s perceptions 
Education 
Recall notice vs. other 
people’s perceptions 
Household income 
Recall timing vs. recall 
voluntariness 
Having children 
Trust in the producer vs. 
other people’s perceptions 
Media communicated risk vs. 
other people’s perceptions 
 
There is a specific mapping between individual questionnaire items and weights in the 
agent decision rules. Figure 6.1 shows this mapping between questionnaire items 
7Q  to 12Q  
and the main elements of the conceptual model. Specifically, information sources including 
own perception, other people’s perceptions, noticing contamination, and product recall notice 
correspond to elements within the ‘event discovery’ component. Media communicated risk 
indicates the ‘media’ component, and feeling of trust indicates the ‘recreancy’ component in 
the model. In Section 3 of the survey, each questionnaire item represents a comparison 
between one information source and other people’s perceptions, with the exception of 
10Q , 


























































Figure 6.1 Mapping between questionnaire items and model elements 
6.3 Sampling and administration 
The survey used a convenience sampling approach as the aim was to demonstrate the general 
approach, not model a specific population responding to a specific product crisis. But it was 
conducted in China, as product contamination crises have been particularly prominent as risk 
events in China – for example the contaminated milk scandals.  
The survey questionnaire was translated into Chinese before distribution. It was 
administered via an online survey platform - Qualtrics. And the survey link was posted onto 
community websites (i.e. Guokr.com and Douban.com), academic forums (i.e. muchong.com 
and bbs.pinggu.org), and a social media application (i.e. WeChat) to collect responses. There 
was an incentive of 10 forum coins (a normal, small payment for this kind of survey) for 
respondents on the forums, but no incentive was offered to those on the community websites 
and the social media application. The demographics of the sample are presented in Section 
6.5. Of the 321 responses, 3 were from the community websites and 19 from the social media 
application and were therefore not remunerated. 
The survey allowed respondents to progress to the next question without answering the 
present one. This was to collect as many responses to each question as possible without 
irritating respondents and without violating research ethics that apply to this study. There were 
280 complete responses and 41 incomplete responses. 
The survey was fully approved under the University’s ethics system. 
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6.4 Pilot 
The questionnaire was pre-tested to ensure validity of the content, correctness of the 
translation, understandability of the questionnaire items, and a reasonable amount of time 
taken to complete the questionnaire. The pilot test was not only an important step of finalizing 
the survey but also provided preliminary results regarding the types of information source 
people would like to turn to and the relative importance they give to the sources.  
During the pilot 41 complete responses were received. These were collected by posting the 
pilot questionnaire online, and then asking friends to complete the survey, and ask their own 
friends to do the same. It took these participants between 2 and 7 minutes to complete the 
survey based on their own estimates of duration. Feedback from the participants suggested 
that the questionnaire was basically readable and understandable. But some people appeared 
to ignore the context of the questionnaire when responding to questions on relative importance 
of information sources, so minor changes were made to the layout of the questionnaire to 
improve its clarity. Results from the pilot showed that over 85% of respondents were willing 
to obtain risk information from news media, and that around 60% would consult their friends. 
With respect to relative importance, respondents attached more weight to their own beliefs, 
noticing contamination, recall notice, media communicated risk than others’ perceptions, and 
they gave a bit greater importance to others’ perceptions than trust in the producer. For 
respondents recall timing was more important than voluntariness. 
6.5 Sample characteristics 
The purpose of this section is to assess the appropriateness of the sample in the context of a 
product recall crisis in China. Overall, 321 responses including 280 complete ones were 
received. Approximately 12% of responses were from muchong.com, 6% from WeChat, 81% 
from bbs.pinggu.org, and Guokr.com and Douban.com only provided 1 and 2 responses, 
respectively. Demographic details of the survey respondents are presented in Table 6.2. 
Slightly more men responded (54.21%) than women (45.79%). The average respondent was 
26.5 years old, with 73.52% of respondents aged between 21 and 30. 89.72% of respondents 
held at least a bachelor’s degree. Mean household income before taxes was around £11,760. 






Table 6.2 Demographic details of survey respondents 





20 or less 31(9.66%) 
21 - 30 236(73.52%) 
31 - 40 41(12.77%) 
41 - 50 10(3.12%) 
50 or more 3(0.93%) 
Education 
Grade school 11(3.43%) 
High school 12(3.74%) 
Associate degree 10(3.11%) 
Bachelor’s degree 141(43.93%) 
Master’s degree or higher 147(45.79%) 
Household 
income 
Less than £5,225 75(23.36%) 
£5,225 - £10,450 89(27.73%) 
£10,450 - £15,675 72(22.43%) 
£15,675 - £20,900 40(12.46%) 
£20,900 - £26,125 16(4.98%) 






Sum-up data of the 2010 population census of China (i.e. the 6th population census of China) 
are provided in Table 6.3. Male and female population account for 51.19% and 48.81% of the 
entire population, separately. The proportions of male and female population are quite close to 
those of the survey sample, indicating that the survey sample largely reflects the population 
structure in terms of gender. But 17.14% of the population age lies between 20 and 29, while 
73.52% of respondents fell within this range. Comparison regarding education between the 
census data and demographics of the survey sample reveals that survey respondents were 
more educated than residents in the country as a whole. Specifically, 89.72% of survey 
respondents had at least a bachelor’s degree compared to 4% among the total population. In 
addition, there is obviously a higher fertility rate (23.62%) within the population than was the 
case for survey respondents (13.71%). 
 
Table 6.3 2010 population census of China 
Item Measure Number (proportion) 
Gender 
Male 682,329,104 (51.19%) 
Female 650,481,765 (48.81%) 
Age 
0 - 9 146,414,159 (10.97%) 
10 - 19 174,797,576 (13.11%) 
20 - 29 228,426,370 (17.14%) 
30 - 39 215,164,162 (16.15%) 
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40 - 49 230,348,517 (17.38%) 
50 - 59 160,065,645 (12.01%) 
60 - 69 99,780,564 (7.48%) 
70 - 79 56,824,530 (4.26%) 
80 - 89 19,005,126 (1.42%) 
90 - 99 1,948,286 (0.15%) 
100 or more 35,934 (0.0027%) 
Education 
None 62,136,405 (5.00%) 
Grade school 357,211,733 (28.75%) 
Junior high school 518,176,222 (41.70%) 
Senior high school 186,646,865 (15.02%) 
Junior college 68,610,519 (5.52%) 
Bachelor’s degree 45,625,793 (3.67%) 
Master’s degree or higher 4,138,585 (0.33%) 
Age-specific 
fertility rate 
15 - 19 5.93‰ 
20 - 24 69.47‰ 
25 - 29 84.08‰ 
30 - 34 45.84‰ 
35 - 39 18.71‰ 
40 - 44 7.51‰ 
45 - 49 4.68‰ 
 
Table 6.4 shows China’s annual per capita income derived from the 2016 China Statistical 
Yearbook and family size from the 2010 population census of China. As data on annual 
household income of the Chinese population is unavailable, annual household income 
£7,524.6 was obtained by multiplying annual per capita income £2,508.2 by mean family size 
3. Compared with the general population, the survey sample appeared to have a higher level 
of annual household income.  
 
Table 6.4 2014 Annual per capita income and family size of China 
Item Measure Number (proportion) 
Annual per capita income Disposable personal income £2,508.2 
Family size 
1-member family 58,396,327 (14.53%) 
2-member family 97,947,686 (24.37%) 
3-member family 107,978,654 (26.86%) 
4-member family 70,598,493 (17.56%) 
5-member family 40,332,512 (10.03%) 
6-member family 16,887,554 (4.20%) 
7-member family 5,753,970 (1.43%) 
8-member family 2,235,271 (0.56%) 
9-member family 942,511 (0.23%) 
10-member family or more 861,218 (0.21%) 
 
In general, the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents were consistent with 
the China census data in terms of gender but differed in aspects of age, education, household 
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income, and fertility rate. The responses were mainly collected from community websites and 
academic forums that are popular for young and educated people, resulting in the fact that 
older and non-educated people are less likely to be included in the sample. This is an 
important qualification to bear in mind. The survey data are still used to calibrate the model, 
but this means that the model is a model of how young, well-educated people respond to a 
crisis of this kind – not a model of how the Chinese population as a whole would respond. 
6.6 Survey results 
6.6.1 Information sources 
The data on information sources show that 89.7% of the survey respondents would consult 
news media when forming risk beliefs, and that 56.4% would refer to friends’ opinions. 
Family members, as shown in Figure 6.2, is the third most popular source of information 
people would like to take advantage of. The results manifest the importance of social 
interaction and media in shaping responses to risk associated with a milk contamination crisis 
in China and justify the incorporation of these two elements in the model. In addition, 
respondents indicated a fixed number of individuals they would communicate with and a 
specific number of media outlets they would consult. However, the numbers are not used for 
calibration, because the number of neighbours each agent interacts with is a global parameter 





Figure 6.2 Proportion of respondents consulting different information sources 
6.6.2 Relative importance 
In the survey questionnaire items within Section 3 are recoded as a numeric value that is 
automatically assigned to each answer choice in Qualtrics. Recoded values are assigned in the 
order the answer choices are created. By default, the first answer choice is coded as a 1, the 
second as a 2, and so forth. Table 6.5 presents the mapping between recoded value, answer 
choice, and ratio, for each of the questionnaire items. Ratio is calculated by dividing the 
relative importance of the first information source by the relative importance of the second 
one in each pair of comparison. Because the ratio corresponding to the recoded value 11 is 
infinity, a value 10 is chosen based on the subjective preference of the modeller. 
 
Table 6.5 Mapping between recoded value, answer choice, and ratio 
Recoded 
value 

























Ratio 0 0.11 0.25 0.43 0.67 1 1.5 2.33 4 9 10 
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    The recoded value of each answer choice in reverse comparison is first transformed to its 
recoded value in forward comparison according to the following relationship: 
       Re 12 Recoded value forward comparison coded value reverse comparison       (6.1)
 
And then add up the frequencies of the same recoded value in both comparisons to obtain a 
combined frequency. Figures 6.3 to 6.8 show frequency distributions of questionnaire items 
with respect to relative importance of different pairs of information sources. It appears that 
respondents give less importance to other people’s perceptions in all of the comparisons 
between two information sources, except for the comparison between trust in the producer and 
other people’s perceptions. The low relative importance of trust largely coincides with 
Chinese people’s attitude toward food crises. Food safety problems have occurred quite 
frequently in recent years in China, which results in a great loss of consumer confidence and 
trust in food manufacturers (Yan, 2012). Dishonesty and unreliability Chinese food companies 
exhibited in food crises have made it hard for consumers to believe in what involved 
companies say and do whenever there is a product harm crisis. The level of trust people invest 
in the producer is, therefore, not an important basis for estimating risks associated with a food 
contamination incident. Another observation is that respondents put a greater emphasis on 
recall timing than recall voluntariness. There were 280 complete responses for which the 
respondents have answers for every item. The following figures show for each item the total 
number for that item (which for some items exceeded 280). 
 
 












Figure 6.6 Frequency distribution for relative importance of recall timing and voluntariness 
 
 





Figure 6.8 Frequency distribution for relative importance of media communicated risk and neighbour 
perceptions 
 
Table 6.6 provides descriptive statistics of the frequency distributions of questionnaire 
items. 7Q , 8Q , 9Q , 10Q , 11Q , and 12Q  correspond to survey questions concerning relative 
importance of two different information sources and are used to represent relevant 
questionnaire items. Mode, mean, and variance are recorded as recoded values. The mode for 
all cases is 6 (i.e. 50% vs. 50%), with an exception of 8 (i.e. 70% vs. 30%) for the comparison 
between media communication and other people’s perceptions. The mean is between 6 (which 
maps to ratio 1) and 7 (which maps to ratio 1.5) for all cases except questionnaire item 11Q  
regarding the comparison between trust in the producer and others’ perceptions (the mean is 
between 5 mapping to ratio 0.67 and 6 mapping to ratio 1). The frequency distribution of 11Q  
is skewed to the right, while for the rest the distributions are left-skewed with negative 
skewness. This indicates that people value trust in the producer less than other sources of 
information. It means, as mentioned earlier, that in the context of a Chinese milk 
contamination crisis people do not rely on their feeling of trust in the company much in 
making a decision about the risk. In addition, of all the cases only the frequency distribution 
of questionnaire item 7Q  has a kurtosis greater than 3 (the kurtosis of a standard normal 
distribution is 3). That is to say, the distribution of 7Q  is heavy-tailed and has outliers. There 
is a slightly larger proportion of respondents who attach less or equal importance to other 
people’s perceptions in the case of comparison between own perception and other people’s 
perceptions than in other cases.  
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Table 6.6 Descriptive statistics of frequency distributions of questionnaire items 
Questionnaire item Mode Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
7Q : own perception vs. other people’s perceptions 6 6.64 3.97 -0.2875 3.1804 
8Q : noticing contamination vs. other people’s 
perceptions 
6 6.65 4.70 -0.3446 2.7996 
9Q : recall notice vs. other people’s perceptions 6 6.42 5.01 -0.2170 2.5807 
10Q : recall timing vs. recall voluntariness 6 6.60 5.51 -0.1466 2.7050 
11Q : trust in the producer vs. other people’s 
perceptions 
6 5.50 5.22 0.1730 2.6628 
12Q : media communicated risk vs. other people’s 
perceptions 
8 6.90 4.46 -0.4672 2.8010 
 
Table 6.7 shows correlation coefficients between different questionnaire items. The 
correlations between different items are all weak. However, for a two-tailed test the 
correlations between 7Q  and 8Q ( 0.001p  ), between 7Q  and 12Q ( 0.001p  ), and between 
8Q  and 12Q  ( 0.003p  ) are significant at a 0.01 significance level, and there is a statistically 
significant linear relationship between 7Q  and 11Q  ( 0.02p  ) with a significance level of 
0.05. Therefore, it looks as though the respondents are making separate, individual decisions 
to develop risk judgments. And the different items do clearly ask about different constructs. 
 
Table 6.7 Correlation coefficients between questionnaire items 
Questionnaire 
item 
7Q  8Q  9Q  10Q  11Q  12Q  
7Q  1 — — — — — 
8Q  0.2410** 1 — — — — 
9Q  0.0766 0.1038 1 — — — 
10Q  -0.0328 -0.0533 -0.0907 1 — — 
11Q  0.1391* 0.0336 0.1029 -0.0285 1 — 
12Q  0.2503** 0.1767** 0.0168 0.0323 -0.0031 1 
             **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
             *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
6.7 Model calibration 
Chapter 5 shows the final decision rule for agents updating their risk beliefs without 
calibration weights. This rule is now updated with weights as follows. The symbols have the 
same meaning as in Section 5.2.1. 
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where 1w , 6w , and 7w  are the weight given to ‘event discovery’, ‘recreancy’, and 
communication from ‘media’, 1 6 7 1w w w   , 2w , 3w , 4w , and 5w  are the weight given to 
prior belief, social interaction, direct experience, and recall information within ‘event 
discovery’ component, and 2 3 4 5 1w w w w    . As in the original uncalibrated model, the 
initial conditions are that all agents have a randomly endowed prior risk belief 
   0 0,ib t I   and randomly endowed recreancy judgment    0 0,iR t I  . Also, the 
media belief  M t  prior to the crisis is set at 0. 
Pair consistency between forward comparison and reverse comparison is evaluated by 
comparing mean of mean of the two comparisons with the central recoded value 6, that is: 
     6Pair consistency mean mean forward comparison mean reverse comparison    (6.3) 
Table 6.8 shows 1) the mean of forward comparisons and of reverse comparisons, 2) the 
consistency values between the forward and reverse comparisons, 3) the mapping between 
questionnaire items and parameterized weights. Obviously, there is a good consistency 
between forward comparison and reverse comparison in each case. This indicates little 
judgment bias from respondents that can possibly be caused by the way in which the questions 
are designed – most comparisons are made relative to the same baseline.  
 
Table 6.8 Pair consistency and mapping between questionnaire items and parameterized weights 
Questionnaire 
item 
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The questionnaire items  7, 8, 9,11,12iQ i   do not indicate the weights directly. The 









Q Q Q Q Q
  








































7 8 9 11 121
Q
w
Q Q Q Q Q





7 8 9 11 121
Q
w
Q Q Q Q Q

    
. 
where 1w , 2w , 3w , 4w , 5w , 6w , and 7w  are the weight given to event discovery, prior 
belief, social interaction, direct experience, product recall, recreancy, and media 
communication, and 7Q , 8Q , 9Q , 11Q , and 12Q  represent the questionnaire items for own 
perception vs. others’ perceptions, noticing contamination vs. others’ perceptions, recall 
notice vs. others’ perceptions, trust in the producer vs. others’ perceptions, and media 
communicated risk vs. others’ perceptions, respectively. 
Here is a numerical example of how the weights for each respondent were calculated based 
on data from the survey. Take respondent 2 for example, the respondent’s answers for 
 7, 8, 9,11,12iQ i   were 60% vs. 40%, 80% vs. 20%, 70% vs. 30%, 10% vs. 90%, 20% vs. 
80%, and 90% vs. 10%, so 7 1.5Q  , 8 4Q  , 9 2.33Q  , 11 0.25Q  , and 12 9Q   based on 
Table 6.5. Then the values of  7, 8, 9,11,12iQ i   were put into the equations shown above. 
The resulting weights for the respondent were: 
1
1 1.5 4 2.33
0.4884


































1 1.5 4 2.33 0.25 9
w  





1 1.5 4 2.33 0.25 9
w  
    
. 
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The dataset obtained for each weight is fitted with a beta distribution, and these are then 
used as sampling distributions for the agents in the model, such that all agents follow the same 
updating rule but each agent adopts a unique set of parameter values sampled from these 
distributions. Beta distributions are used because they have a bounded support. This assumes 
the scale underlying the discrete response items in the questionnaire is continuous, and then 
the weights are continuous as well. With two positive shape parameters, beta distribution 
visually looks as though it could produce a sound fit to the data concerning the weights in the 
model. Table 6.9 provides the mean, variance, and shape parameters for each information 
source in the model.  
 




Mean  Variance Shape parameters 
Event discovery 1w  0.6668 0.0263 4.9717, 2.4845 
Prior belief 2w  0.2713 0.0252 1.8584, 4.9923 
Social interaction 3w  0.1867 0.0110 2.3813, 10.3749 
Direct experience 4w  0.2806 0.0312 1.5325, 3.9291 
Product recall information 5w  0.2615 0.0300 1.4213, 4.0147 
Recreancy 6w  0.1262 0.0146 0.8285, 5.7348 
Media communication 7w  0.2070 0.0214 1.3814, 5.2928 
 
The following figures, Figures 6.9 to 6.15, show for each weight the frequency distribution 
based on the questionnaire responses and the probability density function that has been fitted. 
The probability density function was done by using the  , 1, 2betapdf W SP SP  function in 
MATLAB, where W  represents an array of weights of an information source, and 1SP  and 
2SP  are shape parameters of the beta distribution of this information source. In general, a 
beta distribution appears suited to the weights of most elements in the model. Following the 




Figure 6.9 Frequency distribution and probability density function for weight of event discovery 
 
 




Figure 6.11 Frequency distribution and probability density function for weight of neighbour perceptions 
 
 




Figure 6.13 Frequency distribution and probability density function for weight of recall notice 
 
 




Figure 6.15 Frequency distribution and probability density function for weight of media communicated 
risk 
 
The goodness of fit is evaluated using one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is a 
nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that the data conform to a specified distribution. 
Table 6.10 provides the test statistic k  and p -value. The p -value is very dependent on the 
sample size, and until now no particular value has been found most desirable (Dorey, 2010; 
Hooper, 2011; Poole, 2001). Thus in this case p -value needs to be as high as possible to 




 p -value and accordingly a largest test statistic 
k  in all cases. The fit for 
recreancy (Figure 6.14) clearly looks quite a poor fit, probably because the mode lies at the 
lowest interval of  0,1  and the frequencies all fall within the left side of the interval. Because 
in equation (6.2) 1 6 7 1w w w    (where 1w , 6w , and 7w  are the weight of ‘event 
discovery’, ‘recreancy’, and perception expressed in the ‘media’), the weight of recreancy 6w  
is not sampled from the distribution but equal to 1 71 w w  . Similarly, of the four 
information sources that contribute to risk discovery, the weight of product recall information 
5w  exhibits a relatively small p -value and is therefore calculated as 2 3 41 w w w   . 
 
Table 6.10 Goodness of fit for each weight 
Statistic 1w  2w  3w  4w  5w  6w  7w  
k  0.0459 0.0541 0.0558 0.0461 0.0700 0.0810 0.0748 
p -value 0.5800 0.3720 0.3351 0.5760 0.1223 0.0479 0.0827 
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To clarify the procedure with a numerical example, suppose agent 230 is activated. Then to 
find a value for 1w , the beta distribution in Figure 6.9 is sampled. Suppose this returns a value 
of 0.3613. Similarly, suppose the other weights are sampled from their beta distributions and 
the values are 2 0.1905w  , 3 0.2136w  , 4 0.3289w  , and 7 0.4648w  . Then 
5 1 0.1905 0.2136 0.3289 0.267w       and 6 1 0.3613 0.4648 0.1739w     . 
    The questionnaire item 10Q  concerns the comparison between recall timing and 
voluntariness. The purpose of this item, as mentioned earlier, is to evaluate the effect of recall 
timing and voluntariness on recreancy. Survey data on relative importance of recall timing and 
voluntariness are first transformed into ratios. As ratios range from 0 to 10, they are 







                                                       (6.4) 
where Y  is the normalized ratio, X  is the original ratio, a  is the lower bound of original 
ratios, and b  is the upper bound of original ratios.  
Figure 6.16 demonstrates the frequency distribution and probability density function for 
relative importance of recall timing versus voluntariness. As shown in Figure 6.16, the 
frequency distribution is quite discrete. Ratios that fall in the interval  0.9,1  were dropped so 
that the normalized data are continuous and fitted into a standard beta distribution. The shape 
parameters for the distribution are 1.1275 and 6.6018. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic 
is 0.1866, and p -value is 3.0648e-08, which indicates that it is a very poor fit. However, this 
distribution is still used in the calibrated model as it makes the model straightforward to 





Figure 6.16 Frequency distribution and probability density function for relative importance of recall 
timing versus voluntariness 
 
Ratios sampled from the standard beta distribution are transformed to those from a beta 
distribution with a lower bound a  and upper bound b : 
 X Y b a a                                                    (6.5) 
For each agent i  the ratio of recreancy increment by a recall to recreancy variation by 
voluntariness of a recall, i.e. i iD E , is a number that is transformed from an observation 
sampled from the standard beta distribution. As iE  cannot be calibrated through the survey, it 
is sampled from  0, H  according to a uniform distribution. Accordingly, iD  is the product of 
iE  and the back-transformed ratio. 
6.8 Simulation results of calibrated models 
There are two sets of input parameters used in the simulation: 1) global input parameters that 
cannot be calibrated, 2) weights of each source of risk information that have been calibrated 
from the survey. Each agent i  is endowed with a threshold in risk perception iB  sampled 
from  0, S  and a variation in recreancy iE  sampled from  0, H  according to a uniform 
distribution. The input parameters and values used in the simulation of calibrated models are 
provided in Table 6.11. 
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Table 6.11 Input parameters and values used in the simulation of calibrated models 
Input parameter Value Description 
Maximum initial condition I  10-4 Defines initial risk and recreancy belief 
Number of neighbours K  4 
Number of neighbours in a perfectly mixed 
population and in initial lattice 
Rewiring probability P  0.5 Probability of reconnecting a lattice edge 
Low contamination level  lowC t  10-4 Level before and after crisis 
High contamination level  highC t  0.2 Level during the crisis 
Contamination start period startT  2000 Time when the crisis starts 
Contamination end period endT  5999 Time when the crisis ends 
Recall voluntariness  v t   0,1  Whether recall is voluntary or involuntary 
Maximum perception threshold S  1 Defines when a recall increases recreancy 
Maximum recreancy variation H  1 Maximum by which recreancy can change 
  
Figure 6.17 and Figure 6.18 show the results of a calibrated perfect mixing model in the 
context of voluntary recall and involuntary recall, respectively. Amplification of risk occurs 
irrespective of the role of media and voluntariness of recall. However, it appears that the 
objectivity of media coverage affects the degree of risk amplification inversely. The 
exogenous peaks emerge around the termination of the contamination, followed by a decline 
of risk perception after the crisis. And there are no fluctuations in the growth and decay of risk 
perception, illustrating that sampling different weights for agents does not cause much 
instability to the dynamics of social risk response. In addition, the case of involuntary recall 
exhibits a higher residue of concern than the case of voluntary recall. The reason is that after 
the crisis finishes an involuntary recall generates a higher level of recreancy that contributes to 




Figure 6.17 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated perfect mixing model with 
voluntary recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) 
 
 
Figure 6.18 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated perfect mixing model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) 
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Compared with the uncalibrated perfect mixing model (reproduced in Figure 6.19 and 
Figure 6.20), the calibrated model expresses a lower degree of risk amplification whatever the 
role the media assumes in the context of voluntary recall and a higher degree in the context of 
involuntary recall. This is mainly due to changes in the weight of recreancy. In the 
uncalibrated model ‘recreancy’ has a weight of 0.05 (Table 5.1), while in the calibrated model 
its mean weight is 0.1262 (Table 6.9). Voluntary recall leads to very low recreancy as it 
decreases an agent’s recreancy belief, and involuntary recall is associated with relatively high 
recreancy as it increases recreancy belief. Therefore, a higher weight of ‘recreancy’ in the 
calibrated model to some degree diminishes risk amplification when the producer executes a 
voluntary recall and increases risk amplification when an involuntary recall is put into force. 
The higher weight of ‘recreancy’ also contributes to the high residual risk perception in the 
calibrated model in the context of involuntary recall. These results reveal how important the 
weight of ‘recreancy’ is for producing risk amplification, indicating that the kind of 
calibration presented in this study is particularly useful. Another difference is in the standard 
deviations – they are much higher in the calibrated model. This is to be expected as in the 
calibrated model the weights are sampled independently for each agent: in the original model 
agents all have the same weights. 
 
 
Figure 6.19 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of an uncalibrated perfect mixing model with 




Figure 6.20 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of an uncalibrated perfect mixing model with 
involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) 
 
Figure 6.21 and Figure 6.22 show the trace of public risk perception in a single run of a 
calibrated small-world network model with voluntary and involuntary recall, respectively. It 
seems that there is little difference in the qualitative features of time series of risk perceptions 
and a very small difference in the magnitude of risk amplification between the calibrated 
small-world network model and perfect mixing model. This is consistent with the comparison 
between the original small-world network model and perfect mixing model in Chapter 5. The 
indication is that the difference between the small-world network model and perfect mixing 




Figure 6.21 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated small-world network model 
with voluntary recall (  2008 1a t   ,   1v t  ) 
 
 
Figure 6.22 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated small-world network model 
with involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) 
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Comparison of the calibrated small-world network model with the original model with 
constant weights for all agents (reproduced in Figure 6.23 and Figure 6.24) is similar to the 
case of perfect mixing model indeed. The calibrated small-world network model produces a 
lower degree of risk amplification in the context of voluntary recall and a higher degree in the 
context of involuntary recall. Also, there is a higher residue of concern when the recall is 
made involuntarily, and standard deviations are much higher in both voluntary and 
involuntary recalls for the calibrated small-world network model. 
 
 
Figure 6.23 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of an uncalibrated small-world network 




Figure 6.24 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of an uncalibrated small-world network 
model with involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) 
 
In summary, model calibration makes no difference to qualitative patterns of risk response, 
but it leads to a lower degree of risk amplification in the context of voluntary recall and a 
higher degree in the context of involuntary recall. Residual risk perception is also higher when 
the producer carries out the recall involuntarily. The model outcomes are relatively sensitive 
to the weights agents give to information sources. This demonstrates the importance of mixed 
weights in shaping risk perception and suggests that the calibration is essential for reducing 
the space of parameters and providing a certain level of micro-validity for the recall model. 
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7 TESTING THE MODEL 
This chapter evaluates the uncertainty in model outputs and the validity of the model and 
consists of two parts, as shown in Figure 7.1. The first part concerns the sensitivity analysis 
that shows which are the most important aspects of the model in shaping social risk 
amplification. This part addresses sensitivity analysis in three aspects – the method used for 
sensitivity analysis, the results of sensitivity analysis, and the conclusions drawn from 
sensitivity analysis. The second part deals with the issue of model validity. This part first 
gives a brief literature review on validation of agent models, and then discusses validity of the 
recall model in terms of micro-validity and macro-validity. In summary, it will be 
demonstrated and argued that model outcomes are sensitive to the initial conditions, 
contamination level, contamination duration, and recreancy variation (in the case of 
















Figure 7.1 Structure of Chapter 7 Testing the Model 
7.1 Sensitivity analysis 
7.1.1 Method of sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis plays an important role in understanding the relationship between model 
input parameters and important outputs that have some kind of theoretical or practical 
relevance. It helps assess how the uncertainty in model inputs impacts model outputs and 
helps identify the most significant parameters in the model. Trucano et al. (2006) have 
suggested that ‘sensitivity analysis is required for understanding the extent to which a model 
is complicated enough to be credible but not too complicated’. A considerable number of 
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studies have conducted sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of agent model results 
and to examine how the uncertainty in independent input variables can influence dependent 
output variables. The exercise of sensitivity analysis also aims to ensure that the model 
outputs comply with the theoretical assumptions and expectation underlying the model. In this 
case, it is of interest what parameters have the greatest influence on variations in the degree of 
social risk amplification as an outcome. Representing social risk amplification as a relatively 
complex mechanism means that the link between independent variables and the difference 
between objective and perceived risk becomes difficult to predict. Sensitivity analysis helps us 
understand how strong this link is, as an emergent property of the model. 
Sensitivity analysis is commonly performed in a qualitative way by varying the value of 
testing parameters while keeping other parameters constant (Anderson et al., 2007; Grow et al., 
2015; Jiang et al., 2016; Kimbrough and Murphy, 2013; Lee et al., 2013; Liu and Wu, 2016; 
Malik et al., 2015; Millington et al., 2014; Nagarajan et al., 2012; Okada, 2011; Stummer et 
al., 2015). For example, in an agent-based model of humanitarian assistance policies 
(Anderson et al., 2007), the authors studied the effect of all input parameters (levels of food 
and water, levels of security, medical personnel, medical resources, and sanitation) on the 
sickness rate of refugees. Each testing parameter was varied around its prior value while all 
other parameters were kept constant at their midpoints. Results show that the sickness rate 
decreases with the increase of levels of sanitation, security, medical resources, and medical 
personnel.  
Occasional studies have made sensitivity explorations in a quantitative way. Zhang and Li 
(2014) considered an agent model of the search behaviour in China’s resale housing market. 
They selected four parameters (matching efficiency, unit search cost, market tightness ratio, 
and broker commission rate) and one output (search intensity of both buyers and sellers) for 
the sensitivity analysis, and used the simple random sampling to estimate the correlation of 
each single input parameter with the output. The results show that the increase in the matching 
efficiency can reduce the search time of buyers and sellers significantly, but there is no 
evidence that the unit search cost exerts strong impact on the search time. In a more complex 
approach, Fonoberova et al. (2013) proposed a global sensitivity approach that evaluates the 
effect of a parameter while all other parameters are varied simultaneously. The measure is 
based on support-vector regression and thus takes account of the interactions between model 
parameters. The authors tested variance-based and derivative-based global sensitivity measure 
through an agent-based model of civil violence, and global sensitivity analysis was found to 
be capable of identifying the most significant and non-significant parameters in the model. 
Similarly, Kucherenko et al. (2009) also presented a derivative-based global sensitivity 
measures and provided evidence that their approach could be more efficient and more 
accurate than other sensitivity analysis techniques. 
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Sensitivity analysis in this study evaluates the main effect linking each of the model input 
parameters with defined outcome variables. More specifically, it examines the effect of one 
parameter with other parameters held constant at their default values. This simple approach 
was selected in order to make the sensitivity analysis straightforward to interpret. In principle, 
interaction effects between model parameters could be significant, and global sensitivity 
analysis could uncover variations in sensitivity over the parameter space. But these more 
complex analyses are demanding in the software for model evaluations and the amount of 
time to complete the analyses. 
The analysis was conducted based on a calibrated small-world network model. Eight 
parameters (see Table 7.1) are considered significant for defining the global uncertainty in 
model outputs. Recall voluntariness  v t  is not included as it is a binary variable, but the 
sensitivity analysis was performed in the case of both voluntary recall and involuntary recall. 
Parameters used in the sensitivity analysis are maximum initial condition I , number of 
neighbours K , rewiring probability P , low contamination level  lowC t , high contamination 
level  highC t , contamination end period endT  (contamination start period startT  is fixed at 
2000), maximum perception threshold S , and maximum recreancy variation H . In particular, 
certain starting conditions such as initial risk and recreancy belief are taken into account as 
difference was observed between results associated with a higher level of initial conditions 
and those in Chapter 5. According to the traces of risk perception in a single run in Section 
5.2.2 and Section 5.3, contamination appears to have an impact on the occurrence and degree 
of risk amplification, so parameters pertaining to contamination are all included. Simulation 
results in 5.2.2 and Section 5.3 have proven recreancy to be influential in shaping risk 
responses, thus parameters related to recreancy belief are selected for sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 7.1 Input parameters used in sensitivity analysis 
Input parameter Description 
Maximum initial condition I  Defines initial risk and recreancy belief 
Number of neighbours K  Number of neighbours in initial lattice 
Rewiring probability P  Probability of reconnecting a lattice edge 
Low contamination level  lowC t   Level before and after crisis 
High contamination level  highC t  Level during the crisis 
Contamination end period endT  Time when the crisis ends 
Maximum perception threshold S  Defines when a recall increases recreancy 
Maximum recreancy variation H  Maximum by which recreancy can change 
 
Four outcome variables provided in Table 7.2 are considered for the sensitivity analysis. 
They are mean risk amplification over crisis m , peak risk amplification p , peak delay from 
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crisis start 
c , and peak delay from recall start r . Mean risk amplification over crisis m  is 
associated with the mean degree of risk amplification during the contamination incident, and 
peak risk amplification p  involves the maximum discrepancy between public risk perception 
and the objective risk. The purpose of considering these two variables is to gain an insight into 
the relationship between input parameters and the degree of risk amplification. Peak delay 
from crisis start 
c  and peak delay from recall start r  are employed to explore how changes 
in model inputs affect the timing of risk amplification. 
 
Table 7.2 Outcome variables used in sensitivity analysis 
Outcome variable Description 
Mean risk amplification over crisis m  
Mean ratio of public risk perception to the 
objective risk during the crisis 
Peak risk amplification p  
Ratio of peak risk perception to the objective 
risk 
Peak delay from crisis start 
c  
Time delay between peak risk amplification 
and crisis start 
Peak delay from recall start 
r  
Time delay between peak risk amplification 
and recall start 
 
Mean risk amplification over crisis m  is the mean of ratio of public risk perception to the 
objective risk level during the crisis: 
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                               (7.1) 
where N , startT , endT , Z , and  highC t  denote the number of agents, crisis start period, crisis 
end period, the number of runs, and the contamination level during the crisis. Peak risk 
amplification p  is defined as the ratio between peak risk perception and the objective risk 
level: 
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where N  and Z  signify the number of agents and number of runs, and  highC t  is the 
contamination level during the crisis (fixed during the crisis). Peak delay from crisis start 
c  
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                          (7.3) 
where peakT  represents the time when peak risk perception in a single run s  arises, startT  is 
the time when the crisis starts, and N  and Z  signify the number of agents and number of 
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model runs. Similarly, peak delay from recall start 
r  is defined as the delay between the start 
of recall and peak risk amplification:
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where peakT  denotes the time when peak risk perception in a single run s  emerges,   1a tT   
indicates the time when a recall announcement is made, and N  is the number of agents, and 
Z  represents the number of times the model is replicated. 
 The approach used for sensitivity analysis in this study is one-at-a-time (OAT), which is 
the simplest and most widely used approach seen in the literature. It evaluates the effect of 
one parameter at a time with all other parameters left at base values shown in Table 6.11. 
Varying one factor at a time means that the effect observed on the output is due solely to that 
factor so makes interpretation simpler. Another important consideration is that the 
computational cost (i.e. the number of times the model has to be evaluated) is relatively low 
when dealing with thousands of simulations, which is actually the case in this study.  
Each parameter is sampled 200 times uniformly from a specified range provided in Table 
7.3. The maximum and minimum selected for each parameter are a subjective choice, but they 
are believed to encompass the reasonably likely range of each parameter. Parameters are 
sampled uniformly, first, because no particular assumption is then made about the distribution 
of input parameters. Second, this study concentrates on exploring how sensitive the model 
outputs are to the variations of model inputs rather than performing an uncertainty analysis to 
describe the distribution of possible outcomes given uncertainty about a set of inputs with 
known distributions. Some scholars have used a uniform distribution to draw samples of input 
parameters within specific spaces and obtained sensible sensitivity analysis results 
(Fonoberova et al., 2013; Nagarajan et al., 2012). 
 
Table 7.3 Sample range of input parameters 
Input parameter Range Base value 
Maximum initial condition I  [0, 1] 10-4 
Number of neighbours K  [2, 50] 4 
Rewiring probability P  [0, 1] 0.5 
Low contamination level  lowC t  [10-6, 10-3] 10-4 
High contamination level  highC t  [2×10-4, 1] 0.2 
Contamination end period endT  [3×103, 16×103] 5999 
Maximum perception threshold S  [0, 1] 1 
Maximum recreancy variation H  [0, 1] 1 
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For each sample the model is run 100 times for the duration of 20,000 periods with 1,000 
agents in a small-world network. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is calculated 
to analyse the impact of each considered parameters. In this way the model outcome variables 
are numerically compared. However, OAT ‘is predicated on assumptions of model linearity’ 
(Saltelli and Annoni, 2010), and Pearson’s correlation coefficient measures the fitness of a 
linear correlation between two variables. As a consequence, scatter plots, together with 
associated least-squares approximation, of outcome variables against individual input 
variables are plotted to visually depict the correlations.  
7.1.2 Results of sensitivity analysis 
In this section only the most interesting relationships will be explained. These are the 
relationships where 1) the effect on the outcome variable is quite large, 2) the relationship is 
non-linear, and 3) there is some implication for real world behaviour. The results are 
presented by outcome variable, and both correlation coefficients and scatter plots are given.  
First outcome variable: mean risk amplification over crisis 
Table 7.4 shows simple product moment correlations between input parameters and mean risk 
amplification over crisis m  in a calibrated small-world network model in the case of 
voluntary recall and involuntary recall. The results show that this outcome has a perfect 
positive linear relationship with maximum initial condition I  (which effectively is the 
maximum initial risk belief in the population). This is to be expected as high initial belief 
associates with high mean public risk perception over the crisis. There is a strong positive 
correlation (correlations range from 0.9 to 0.94) between this outcome and contamination end 
period endT . More agents get activated in a longer duration of contamination, so risk 
perception is amplified to a relatively higher degree. Mean risk amplification over crisis m  is 
inversely correlated with high contamination level  highC t  (level during the crisis), with 
correlations ranging from -0.44 to -0.24. This agrees with the observations from Section 5.2.2 
and Section 5.3 that during the crisis the degree of risk amplification decreases with the level 
of contamination. 
No dependence is found on maximum perception threshold S  (which defines when a recall 
increases recreancy). The correlation coefficients range from -0.15 to 0.06, and correlations 
are non-significant at the 0.05 significance level except the case where media is an objective 
leader and a recall is made voluntarily. As described in Section 5.2.1, the most likely delay of 
recall timing is 1 tick only, so the time span between the start of crisis and the announcement 
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of recall is quite short, resulting in a very minimal impact of this parameter on recreancy 
belief and risk amplification. This outcome is unrelated to maximum recreancy variation H  
(maximum by which recreancy can change) in the case of voluntary recall. Agents will 
decrease their recreancy belief if a recall is made voluntarily, but recreancy belief prior to 
recall (which is actually the initial recreancy belief) is very small, so the impact of this 
parameter is insignificant. In contrast, there is a perfect positive linear relationship when an 
involuntary recall is in force, since an involuntary recall acts to increase recreancy belief and 
subsequently risk perception. 
Mean risk amplification over crisis m  is not related to the network parameters: number of 
neighbours K  and rewiring probability P . This suggests that this output is insensitive to the 
topology of the social network. The explanations for this result are given in Chapter 8. There 
is also insensitivity to low contamination level  lowC t  (level before and after crisis). As the 
value of this parameter is very low, it indicates a very low probability of experiencing the 
contamination before and after crisis. Therefore, it can make almost no difference to mean risk 
amplification over crisis m . 
 
Table 7.4 Correlation coefficients between input parameters and mean risk amplification over crisis 
Input parameter 















Maximum initial condition I  1 1 1 1 1 1 
Number of neighbours K  0.02 -0.16 0.05 -0.07 0.03 -0.1 
Rewiring probability P  0.12 0.01 -0.18 -0.05 0.08 0.13 
Low contamination level  lowC t  0.02 0.03 0.07 0.1 0.2 -0.05 
High contamination level  highC t  -0.43 -0.14 -0.34 -0.3 -0.24 -0.44 
Contamination end period endT  0.91 0.92 0.94 0.9 0.91 0.94 
Maximum perception threshold S  -0.15 0.03 -0.09 -0.11 0.06 -0.1 
Maximum recreancy variation H  0.05 0.1 -0.12 1 1 1 
     
The following scatter plots show visually where there are non-linear relationships between 
independent variables and mean risk amplification over the crisis. Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 
display the relationships between mean risk amplification over crisis and the level of 
contamination during the crisis with both voluntary and involuntary recalls. To show risk 
amplification more clearly, a base 10 logarithmic scale is used for the Y axis that denotes 
mean risk amplification. As shown in the figures, there is a rapid decrease of mean risk 
amplification as the contamination level rises, but the rate of decrease also declines quite 
rapidly. The reason risk amplification is so high when the peak contamination is very low is 
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that low contamination is associated with a low probability of making a recall, contributing to 
continuous increase in recreancy belief and risk perception. Mean risk amplification over 
crisis drops to less than 1 when the objective risk exceeds a certain level (around 0.28). This 




Figure 7.2 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on mean risk amplification over crisis for a 




Figure 7.3 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on mean risk amplification over crisis for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall 
 
Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 depict the nonlinear relationships between mean risk 
amplification over the crisis and contamination end period. Mean risk amplification 
experiences a rapid increase with contamination end period when each agent is activated less 
than or equal to five times on average during the contamination period (contamination start 
time startT  is fixed at 2000). If each agent is activated more than five times, the rise will decay. 
This is because the longer the duration of contamination, the more likely agents are to be 
influenced by the risk issue, and the more likely that risk responses are heightened. But public 
perceptions of risk tend to become homogeneous as the duration of the contamination incident 
increases, which leads to a relatively slow increase in risk amplification. 
In reality, individuals collect risk information from a variety of sources to adjust their risk 
estimates during the crisis. Long duration of contamination enables individuals to discover 
more pieces of information. As the duration is prolonged, undetected risk information 
becomes less available, and individuals are more likely to be exposed to the same set of 
information and develop a global consensual judgment of risk. The increase of risk 
amplification will then slow down. This is a significant effect, because it suggests that an 
organization coping with a crisis, and trying to avoid strong risk amplification, needs to limit 
the duration, but that as this duration becomes larger, it experiences much less incentive to do 
so. In other words, once a crisis has gone on for a certain length of time, there is not an 
increasing incentive to resolve it. 
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Figure 7.4 Sensitivity analysis of contamination end period on mean risk amplification over crisis for a 
calibrated small-world network model with voluntary recall 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Sensitivity analysis of contamination end period on mean risk amplification over crisis for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall 
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Second outcome variable: peak risk amplification 
Table 7.5 provides the correlation coefficients between input parameters and peak risk 
amplification p . The statistics show that this outcome has a strong positive relationship with 
maximum initial condition I  (correlations range from 0.86 to 0.99) and contamination end 
period endT  (correlations range from 0.73 to 0.82). Peak risk amplification p  is very 
sensitive to maximum recreancy variation H  in the case of involuntary recall. It is 
moderately correlated with high contamination level  highC t , with correlations ranging from -
0.4 to -0.19. In addition, no association is found between this outcome and other parameters 
including number of neighbours K , rewiring probability P , low contamination level  lowC t , 
maximum perception threshold S , and maximum recreancy variation H  in the case of 
voluntary recall. 
Peak risk amplification p  is quite similar to mean risk amplification over crisis m  in 
terms of their relationships with input parameters. This is not surprising as these two variables 
are closely related. Peak risk amplification generally occurs around the time when the 
contamination ceases. Mean risk amplification over the crisis practically varies with peak risk 
amplification: if peak risk amplification is high, mean risk amplification over the crisis will be 
high, and vice versa. Therefore, the explanations for the correlations between mean risk 
amplification over crisis m  and input parameters also apply here. 
 
Table 7.5 Correlation coefficients between input parameters and peak risk amplification 
Input parameter 















Maximum initial condition I  0.86 0.88 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Number of neighbours K  -0.1 -0.02 -0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.07 
Rewiring probability P  0 0.04 -0.11 -0.04 0.17 0.07 
Low contamination level  lowC t  -0.02 0.07 0.15 -0.12 -0.16 0.12 
High contamination level  highC t  -0.26 -0.4 -0.38 -0.33 -0.19 -0.38 
Contamination end period endT  0.73 0.78 0.81 0.76 0.77 0.82 
Maximum perception threshold S  0.11 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.11 
Maximum recreancy variation H  0.06 -0.08 -0.13 1 1 1 
     
The following scatter plots present the nonlinear relationships between peak risk 
amplification and input parameters. Figure 7.6 shows the relationship between peak risk 
amplification and maximum initial condition – the upper bound defining the range of initial 
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risk perceptions at the start of the simulation – in the context of voluntary recall. Peak risk 
amplification increases slowly with the initial condition, but it then surges as the initial 
condition rises. This is because at some point, the initial risk belief is at a level which makes it 
the highest risk belief during the simulation. This is a pretty pathological condition, implying 
that people are so worried that a new contamination crisis cannot increase their worry. But it 
shows again that risk amplification is affected by a society’s status quo, and is independent of 
external effects when the initial risk belief is high enough. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Sensitivity analysis of maximum initial condition on peak risk amplification for a calibrated 
small-world network model with voluntary recall 
 
Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 illustrate the sensitivity of peak risk amplification to high 
contamination level in the context of voluntary and involuntary recall, respectively. A base 10 
logarithmic scale is used for peak risk amplification on the Y axis. The qualitative pattern of 
these two figures is similar to that of Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3 regarding mean risk 
amplification over crisis. There is a sharp decline of peak risk amplification, followed by a 
slow decrease, as high contamination level increases. Risk amplification will not occur if the 
contamination level is high enough. This suggests that in a recall event where the objective 
risk is very high it is unlikely that the risk becomes heightened. Interestingly, it has long been 
known that people over-estimate low risks in general, and under-estimate high ones (Viscusi, 
1992). The model is consistent with this – and perhaps provides an alternative explanation. 
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Figure 7.7 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak risk amplification for a calibrated 
small-world network model with voluntary recall 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak risk amplification for a calibrated 
small-world network model with involuntary recall 
 
Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 show the relationships between peak risk amplification and 
contamination end period with both voluntary and involuntary recalls. Also, the figures are 
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similar to those for mean risk amplification over crisis (Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5) in terms of 
qualitative features. Peak risk amplification increases rapidly when the duration of 
contamination is less than 4,000 periods, but it then rises quite slowly when the duration is 
longer than 4,000 periods. The length of duration affects the number of times each agent is 
activated, which contributes to the formation of risk beliefs. Another insight is that there is an 
inverse relation between the objectivity of media coverage and this outcome. Risk is 
exaggerated to a much higher level when the media simply follows public opinion. This is in 
line with the simulation results from Section 5.2.2 and Section 5.3. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Sensitivity analysis of contamination end period on peak risk amplification for a calibrated 




Figure 7.10 Sensitivity analysis of contamination end period on peak risk amplification for a calibrated 
small-world network model with involuntary recall 
Third outcome variable: peak delay from crisis start 
The correlations between model input parameters and peak delay from crisis start 
c  (crisis 
start time startT  is fixed at 2000) are given in Table 7.6. This outcome has a strong negative 
relationship with maximum initial condition I , with correlations ranging from -0.79 to -0.43. 
It is positively related to high contamination level  highC t , with correlations ranging from 
0.32 to 0.67. The reasons will be discussed later when it comes to scatter plots. There is a 
perfect positive linear correlation between this outcome and contamination end period endT . 
Because peak risk amplification generally emerges when the crisis is coming to an end, the 
longer the contamination lasts, the longer it takes to generate peak risk amplification. Peak 
delay from crisis start 
c  is positively correlated with maximum recreancy variation H  in 
the context of involuntary recall (correlations range from 0.45 to 0.58). When a producer 
issues a recall involuntarily, recreancy is increased by some increment and prolongs the 
timing of peak risk amplification. 
As evident from Table 7.6, peak delay from crisis start 
c  is insensitive to number of 
neighbours K , rewiring probability P , low contamination level  lowC t , maximum 
perception threshold S , and maximum recreancy variation H  (in the case of voluntary 
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recall). This is because, as discussed earlier, these independent variables do not contribute to 
the development of risk responses.  
 
Table 7.6 Correlation coefficients between input parameters and peak delay from crisis start 
Input parameter 















Maximum initial condition I  -0.79 -0.72 -0.6 -0.43 -0.62 -0.67 
Number of neighbours K  0 -0.1 0.01 -0.09 0 0.12 
Rewiring probability P  0.01 0.07 -0.12 0 -0.1 0.01 
Low contamination level  lowC t  -0.13 0.04 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 
High contamination level  highC t  0.67 0.52 0.32 0.53 0.62 0.36 
Contamination end period endT  0.99 1 1 0.99 1 1 
Maximum perception threshold S  -0.05 -0.01 -0.38 -0.01 -0.11 0 
Maximum recreancy variation H  0.01 0.04 0.04 0.47 0.45 0.58 
 
The following scatter plots show visually where there are non-linear relationships between 
independent variables and peak delay from crisis start. Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12 illustrate 
the relationships between maximum initial condition and peak delay from the start of crisis 
with both voluntary and involuntary recalls. This outcome appears to be a piecewise linear 
function of maximum initial risk belief that consists of three line segments. Peak delay is 
constant in both the first and the third line segments. This is to be expected. The model does 
not introduce much randomness, so changes in the initial conditions can make little difference 
to the timing of peak risk amplification. In particular, Figure 7.11 shows that when a recall is 
made voluntarily, there is a transition of the delay from a positive value in the first line 
segment to a negative value in the third line segment. This is because, as explained earlier, 
risk amplification peaks at the start of the model when the initial risk belief reaches a certain 
value. This is not true for Figure 7.12 where the peak delay is positive all the time. Peak risk 
amplification generally occurs around the end of the crisis due to the significant negative 





Figure 7.11 Sensitivity analysis of maximum initial condition on peak delay from crisis start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with voluntary recall 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Sensitivity analysis of maximum initial condition on peak delay from crisis start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall 
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Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14 show that there is a U-shaped relationship between peak delay 
from crisis start and high contamination level. There is a turning point where the time delay 
between the start time of crisis and timing of peak risk amplification is the minimum. The 
delay decreases quickly with high contamination level, but it then increases slowly as high 
contamination level rises. In the model high contamination level is associated with the 
probability of experiencing contamination, the probability of issuing a recall, and media 
communicated risk during the crisis. It may be that there is a point at which the impact of 
different amplification stations on risk perception is the most significant and to the largest 
extent shortens the time required to reach peak risk perception. And this point is effectively 
the turning point displayed in the figures. Another observation is that the objectivity of media 
coverage is positively related to the level of contamination that indicates the shortest delay 
between peak risk amplification and the start of crisis. The more objective the media reporting, 
the larger the contamination level at the turning point.  
 
 
Figure 7.13 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak delay from crisis start for a 




Figure 7.14 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak delay from crisis start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall     
Fourth outcome variable: peak delay from recall start 
Table 7.7 presents the correlations between input parameters and peak delay from recall start 
r . This outcome has a negative relationship with maximum initial condition I  (correlations 
range from -0.78 to -0.37), and a positive relationship with high contamination level  highC t  
(correlations range from 0.44 to 0.83) and maximum recreancy variation H  in the case of 
involuntary recall (correlations range from 0.54 to 0.58). It has a perfect positive linear 
relationship with contamination end period endT . Peak delay from recall start r  is insensitive 
to number of neighbours K , rewiring probability P , low contamination level  lowC t , 
maximum perception threshold S , and maximum recreancy variation H  (in the case of 
voluntary recall). 
The relationships are similar to those between independent variables and peak delay from 
crisis start 
c . In the model the recall announcement is random, leading to a fairly short time 
span between the time when the contamination is first revealed and the time when the recall is 
issued. Therefore, the difference between peak delay from recall start 
r  and peak delay from 
crisis start 
c  is very small. The explanations for the correlations between input parameters 
and peak delay from crisis start 
c  are applicable here as well. 
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Table 7.7 Correlation coefficients between input parameters and peak delay from recall start 
Input parameter 















Maximum initial condition I  -0.78 -0.66 -0.62 -0.37 -0.73 -0.66 
Number of neighbours K  0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.25 0 
Rewiring probability P  0.06 -0.1 -0.08 -0.09 0.03 -0.08 
Low contamination level  lowC t  0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.11 -0.04 
High contamination level  highC t  0.44 0.83 0.65 0.62 0.53 0.6 
Contamination end period endT  0.99 1 1 0.99 1 1 
Maximum perception threshold S  -0.05 -0.05 -0.33 -0.1 0.12 -0.07 
Maximum recreancy variation H  -0.03 0.1 0.21 0.54 0.57 0.58 
 
Figure 7.15 and Figure 7.16 show the relationships between maximum initial condition and 
peak delay from recall start. This outcome is a piecewise linear function of initial risk belief 
with three line segments. The explanations provided for the relationships between maximum 
initial condition and peak delay from crisis start (Figure 7.11 and Figure 7.12) apply here. 
 
 
Figure 7.15 Sensitivity analysis of maximum initial condition on peak delay from recall start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with voluntary recall 
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Figure 7.16 Sensitivity analysis of maximum initial condition on peak delay from recall start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall 
 
Figure 7.17 and Figure 7.18 illustrate the relationships between peak delay from recall start 
and high contamination level with both voluntary and involuntary recalls. The delay 
experiences a steep rise and then stays almost unchanged when the contamination level 
increases. In the model high contamination level represents the probability of issuing a recall 
during the crisis. The larger the contamination level, the earlier the timing of product recall. 
At the same time, the contamination level affects media communicated risk and direct 
experience. The larger the contamination level, the stronger the impact of media and direct 
experience on risk perception, the earlier the timing of peak risk perception. As a result, the 
delay of peak risk amplification from the start of recall is almost constant across most values 
of contamination level. There are some occasional cases in which both the contamination level 
and the delay are lower. A low probability of issuing a recall increases recreancy and leads to 
an extremely high degree of risk amplification in a short time, reducing the time span between 
peak risk amplification and the start of recall. 
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Figure 7.17 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak delay from recall start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with voluntary recall 
 
 
Figure 7.18 Sensitivity analysis of high contamination level on peak delay from recall start for a 
calibrated small-world network model with involuntary recall 
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7.1.3 Conclusion to sensitivity analysis 
The correlations between input parameters and outcome variables are summarised in Table 
7.8. Mean risk amplification over crisis and peak risk amplification have similar patterns of 
relationships with independent variables. They have a perfect positive linear correlation with 
both maximum initial condition and maximum recreancy variation in the context of 
involuntary recall and a curvilinear relationship with high contamination level and 
contamination end period. Peak delay from crisis start and peak delay from recall start also 
have similar dependence on input parameters. They are a piecewise linear function of 
maximum initial condition and have a curvilinear relationship with high contamination level. 
Besides, they are perfectly positively related to contamination end period and moderately 
related to maximum recreancy variation (in the context of involuntary recall). All four 
outcome variables are insensitive to the social network parameters including number of 
neighbours and rewiring probability, low contamination level, maximum risk perception 
threshold, and maximum recreancy variation (in the context of voluntary recall). As a 
consequence, maximum initial condition I , high contamination level  highC t , contamination 
end period endT , and maximum recreancy variation H  are the most significant parameters in 
the model.  
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Maximum recreancy variation 
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Some conclusions can be drawn from sensitivity analysis as a whole. First, compared with 
a voluntary recall, an involuntary recall produces a relatively higher degree of mean risk 
amplification over crisis and peak risk amplification. In the model, an involuntary recall can 
affect risk perception directly through product recall information and indirectly through 
recreancy. Both effects serve to intensify public perceptions of risk. In the real world, public 
perception of a company can be shaped by perceived corporate social responsibility (De 
Matos and Rossi, 2007; Jung, 2009; Magno, 2012; Souiden and Pons, 2009). An involuntary 
recall demonstrates that the involved company is reluctant to accept total responsibility in 
relation to the contamination, and that the company is not concerned with the health and 
safety of its consumers. Consumers’ attitudes towards the company will then deteriorate, 
causing an increase of recreancy belief in the company that contributes to exaggerated risk 
responses. 
Second, the objectivity of media coverage appears to be inversely related to model outputs. 
A media that simply follows public opinion is associated more strongly with higher mean risk 
amplification over crisis, higher peak risk amplification, and longer delay of peak risk 
amplification than one that delivers an accurate depiction of risk. When the media broadcasts 
public risk belief, it is communicating a more varied, mostly heightened risk. Moreover, risk 
communicated by such a media can spawn more enhanced ripple effects that are, in turn, 
perceived by the public and exert wider impacts on social response. The impacts will set back 
the time when risk amplification peaks and thereby increase the delay between peak risk 
amplification and the start of crisis or recall. 
7.2 Model validity 
7.2.1 Brief literature review on agent model validation 
Empirical validation has recently become a major topic of concern and a central challenge in 
agent-based modelling field. It involves examining the extent to which the output traces 
produced by a particular model is an accurate representation of the real-world system being 
modelled. Validation is essential to recognize agent-based models as a useful scientific 
method of studying the aggregate response of the system. Agent-based models generally 
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require two stages of validation before reliable conclusions can be drawn: micro, the 
validation of agent behaviour at the decision-making level, and macro, the validation of 
aggregate behaviour emerging through interactions of multiple agents (Midgley et al., 2007; 
Moss and Edmonds, 2005). Midgley et al. (2007) highlight that ‘the assurance, that is, the 
verification and validation, of agent-based models is difficult, because of the heterogeneity of 
agents, and the possibility of the emergence of new patterns of macro behaviour as a result of 
the interactions of these agents at the micro-level’. Without validation an agent-based model 
cannot be deemed representative of anything real. One of the core issues that result in lack of 
robustness in agent-based modelling is the problematic relationship between agent-based 
models and empirical data (Windrum et al., 2007).  
Micro-validation 
In general, agent models are validated at the micro-level by means of model parameterization 
and model building. Model parameterization is done by referring to data on agent behaviour, 
decision rules, and interactions. Some modellers consult literature of the same field of study 
to select parameter values and ranges for the intended purpose of their models (Amini et al., 
2012; Bulleit and Drewek, 2011). Likewise, Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) derived five 
features of formal organizational design (limits on managerial ability, vertical hierarchy, 
incentives, decomposition, and underlying pattern of decision interaction) from qualitative 
literature, and used agent-based simulation to model organizational design and search. This 
approach allows researchers to fully explore parameters that can be incorporated in the model, 
distinguishing their work from prior models that have investigated only some parameters. 
In addition, adoption of empirical and published data serves as another important approach 
for model parameterization. In an agent-based model of water distribution contamination 
events (Zechman, 2011), the author compromised reported results in a set of studies to assign 
a conservative value to the rate of consumer’s compliance with boil water orders. In another 
very different study, Zhao and Ma (2016) presented an agent-based model of the diffusion of 
AFVs (alternative fuel vehicles). Based on a survey of traditional and electric vehicles in the 
market, they estimated the economic and technological details of traditional vehicles and 
AFVs in the model. With the aid of the statistical archives maintained by the Bank of Italy, 
Arciero et al. (2009) extracted a set of summary statistics to calibrate the model for simulating 
a real-time gross settlement system. To parameterize the agent-based modelling of the 
relationship between water and public health in two villages in South Africa, Demarest et al. 
(2013) gathered empirical data from a variety of sources including a comprehensive 
household census in 2009, a willingness-to-pay survey for a ceramic filter scoping study, and 
a year-long quality monitoring of water from the water sources and households. Rand et al. 
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(2015) collected datasets from Twitter to calibrate an agent-based model of urgent diffusion 
dynamics on social networks. 
Some studies have achieved a certain level of micro-validation through model building. 
This involves structuring and translating quantitative or qualitative data into the models. The 
main methods used include observation, survey, interview, and so on. Dubois et al. (2013) put 
forward an agent-based model of a specific RPG (role playing game) named CauxOpération 
to grasp possible changes in participants’ attitudes and to understand how game settings affect 
outcomes. They asked participants of CauxOpération to fill out a questionnaire on attitude 
changes, and then determined the main interactions between participants to be modelled, i.e. 
negotiations between two individuals. Leykum et al. (2012) conducted an in-depth 
observation to explore the impacts of sensemaking and improvising behaviours on physician 
teams and patient outcomes. They found out the differences between physician teams in terms 
of sensemaking and improvising, and how the differences were associated with patient 
outcomes, and then used these observations as the basis for the agent-based model. To model 
the attractiveness of industrial estates to firms (Fonseca et al., 2015), a survey was addressed 
to municipal services to collect information about the location, the characteristics, and the 
future plan of each industrial estate, and the Integrated Business Accounts System was 
compiled to gain information about the firms. The data enabled the model to replicate the 
conditions of the territory in light of firms and industrial estates. In the process of building an 
agent-based model of artificial labour market (Chaturvedi et al., 2005), agent classes, 
attributes, and behaviour, market variables, and market performance measures were specified 
using data from the real system, i.e. military recruit market for the US Army. To construct an 
agent-based model of agricultural land-use decision-making, Millington et al. (2008) carried 
out five semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders in a Mediterranean Basin. 
Reponses obtained from the interviews were used to determine the agricultural land-use 
decision-making process of local stakeholders and the types of farmer agents (traditional agent 
and commercial agent).  
Unlike studies described above, some other studies adopted uncommon approaches, such as 
ethnography and agent operationalization, to gather empirically grounded data for agent 
model construction. For example, Ghorbani et al. (2015) used ethnography to guide the 
process of data collection. They first undertook semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions to cover all information required for model construction, and then conducted field 
observation to identify the properties of agents and physical components addressed in the 
interviews. Knoeri et al. (2014) set up an agent-based model of the Swiss recycled 
construction material market based on data obtained using agent operationalization approach, 
which, unfortunately, was not depicted in detail in the study. 
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Macro-validation 
There have been relatively few models that achieve validation at the macro-level. Chattoe-
Brown (2014) points out that ‘models that are validated and calibrated on real data remain in a 
significant minority’. A few studies have conducted a case study to demonstrate whether the 
model output has sufficient accuracy for insights from the real-world system over a specific 
domain (Dawson et al., 2011; Ferreira and Borenstein, 2011; Veit et al., 2006). This approach 
applies the agent-based model to the real-world system and evaluates the fit between 
observations from the real world and model outcome to determine the capability of the 
proposed model in capturing emergent features of the system being studied. Take Ferreira and 
Borenstein (2011) for example, they developed a normative agent-based model for supply 
chain planning and performed simulation experiments on biodiesel supply chain in Brazil. The 
results showed that the model was able to deliver all aspects related to biodiesel supply chain 
and provided insights into the raw material supply of a biodiesel plant in Brazil.  
Another approach to operationally validating the model is comparison of model output with 
expert knowledge, artificial situation, and results from literature. The model is considered 
valid if the model’s input-output relationship is reasonable from the point of view of 
individuals who are knowledgeable about the system, or model outcome is comparable to that 
from the real system or the literature. Particularly, there have been face validation in which 
the results of simulating new product diffusion were shown to experts for assessment 
(Günther et al., 2011), event validation in which agent-based emergency evacuation 
simulation with disabled individuals was compared to a physical situation with similar 
parameter settings (Christensen and Sasaki, 2008), and comparison of some outcome variables 
(i.e. congestive heart failure related hospitalization rate and mortality rate) of an agent-based 
modelling of accountable care organizations with values reported in the literature (Liu and Wu, 
2016), to determine whether the model behaves in a reasonable way. Onggo and Karatas 
(2016) proposed a verification & validation (V&V) technique called Test-Driven Simulation 
Modelling (TDSM). TDSM validates a simulation model using a number of validation cases, 
and each case is implemented as a unit test. Each unit test compares model output with 
empirical data, analytical models, or theories. The application of this technique in maritime 
search operations shows that it is especially useful in the verification and validation of agent-
based models. 
In addition, there have been a number of studies that macro-validate the models using 
quantitative measures. Particularly, sensitivity analysis is considered as an instrument to 
partially validating the model by means of exploring the sensitivity of model outcome to 
parameter uncertainties quantitatively. It usually examines the effect of one parameter while 
all other parameters are held constant at their base values. This can be seen in a number of 
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studies, such as Grow et al. (2015), Kimbrough and Murphy (2013), Liu and Wu (2016), 
Millington et al. (2014), Nagarajan et al. (2012), and Okada (2011). The drawback of this 
method is that it does not consider interactions between parameters. Global sensitivity 
analysis approach, by contrast, is able to account for such interactions and applicable for 
nonlinear models. For example, Fonoberova et al. (2013) presented variance-based and 
derivative-based global sensitivity measures and demonstrated the techniques on an agent-
based model of civil violence. Another quantitative measure is hypothesis test. Schuhmacher 
et al. (2014) used an agent-based model to simulate adolescents’ risk behaviours during 
adolescence. On the basis of findings reported in the area of adolescence development, they 
proposed different hypotheses on qualitative properties of adolescent development, and chose 
a particular method (i.e. clustering coefficient, Moran “I” spatial autocorrelation statistic, and 
agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis) for each hypothesis testing to evaluate the validity 
of the model.  
Some studies validate the agent-based models at both the micro and macro-level. 
Validation approaches employed in these studies are generally combinations of the 
approaches discussed above. For example, model construction based on relevant theories 
including mixed land-use, urban mobility, and societal tolerance, sensitivity tests of the single 
most crucial outcome to independent variables, and comparison of model outcome with 
qualitative insights from real-world cities such as Berlin and Paris (Malik et al., 2015); model 
calibration based on experimentally developed theories regarding well-being and data from 
the UN Refugee Agency, sensitivity analysis, along with comparison of simulation results 
with those of a system dynamics model on health care in a refugee camp (Anderson et al., 
2007); model building based on data from interviews, domain experts, confidential reports, 
various management systems, and industry statistics, and macro-validation attained through 
expert assessment (Sauvageau and Frayret, 2015); model calibration using micro-population 
data of Gwacheon City from Micro Data Service System in Korea, time-use data on city 
population, and geographic information data on city environment, and comparison of model 
outputs with survey data on Gwacheon (Lee et al., 2015); model parameterization through an 
empirical survey in Kanazawa City of Japan, sensitivity tests of model behaviour, together 
with comparison of simulation results with real data for Kanazawa City (Ma et al., 2013); 
model construction based on qualitative data from commercial expert review websites of 
computers and quantitative data from a questionnaire survey on netbook products, and 
sensitivity analysis (Lee et al., 2013); extraction of model elements from the literature, and 
partial comparison of dynamics of social risk responses with evidence found in the literature 
(Busby et al., 2016); model calibration by survey data from the Tourism Association of 
Isabela and data retrieved from the 2011 Galapagos National Park statistics and the Galapagos 
Tourism Monitoring Center report, and macro-validation by comparing model outcome with 
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data sets from the Galapagos National Park and the Galapagos Tourism Monitoring Center 
(Pizzitutti et al., 2014); and calibrating the model with micro data from the Beijing resale 
housing market survey, and exploring the impacts of input parameters on model outputs 
quantitatively using sensitivity analysis (Zhang and Li, 2014). These studies have achieved a 
relatively high consistency between model simulation results and corresponding real-world 
system. 
Occasional studies have performed extensive tests to validate the model. Stummer et al. 
(2015) carried out a variety of tests to inspect the validity of an agent-based model dealing 
with innovation diffusion of repeat purchase products. They checked for conceptual validity 
through well-established theory of innovation diffusion, parameterized the model using data 
from various sources including survey, expert interviews, Austrian census, previous studies, 
and OpenStreetMap, turned to an energy market expert for evaluation of diffusion rates and 
market shares, and compared simulation results with the aggregate Bass model to macro-
validate the model. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2016) examined innovation diffusion of multiple 
brands using an agent-based model. Validation of assumptions underlying the model was 
achieved through the solid grounding in theories of innovation diffusion and scale-free 
network and other established theories. Model parameterization was attained by examining 
empirical and secondary data, and agent decisions were validated by analysing individual 
behaviour data from system logs. The authors used the case of online refrigerator market in 
China to macro-validate the model. The simulation results were found the same as the real 
data in terms of the rank of the six brands’ market share and the mean of each brand’s market 
share. 
Summary of validation techniques  
Based on the brief literature review, Table 7.9 summarises the techniques indicated for agent-
based model validation. Validation techniques consist of non-statistical validation techniques 
and statistical validation techniques. According to studies already surveyed, non-statistical 
validation techniques cover a great diversity of methods including literature reference, theory 
basis, observation, interview, expert assessment, case study, qualitative comparison, data 
extraction, and so forth, while statistical validation techniques only involve sensitivity 
analysis, hypothesis test, and survey. It appears that most of the models that are partly 
validated employ non-statistical techniques, and that the rest employ statistical techniques or a 
combination of non-statistical and statistical techniques. This situation may result in part from 
‘difficulties in capturing statistics from the ABM simulation and the system being challenging 
to analyse due to nonlinear output’ (Heath et al., 2009). 
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Table 7.9 Agent model validation techniques in the literature 




Literature reference Relevant literature 
Theory basis Well-established theories 
Observation Questionnaire 
Interview Interviewee opinions 
Expert assessment Expert opinions 
Ethnography Interview, field observation 
Agent operationalization Agents 
Data extraction 
Interview, survey, statistical archives, 
population census, Twitter, domain 
experts, confidential reports, industry 
statistics, management systems 
Case study The real-world system 
Qualitative comparison 
Real data, survey data, evidence from 
literature, qualitative insights from 
reality, results of a system dynamics 
model, results of a system with 




Sensitivity analysis Model input parameters and outputs 
Hypothesis test Qualitative properties of agents 
Survey Questionnaire 
 
7.2.2 Validity of the recall model 
Validation of ABMS is a challenging task, since many parameters and technical issues are 
involved (Fagiolo et al., 2007; Sargent, 2013). In the context of risk amplification, difficulties 
arise from measuring objective risk level, collecting individual-level data on risk perceptions, 
and tracking the development of collective risk responses. Nonetheless, micro-validation and 
partial macro-validation have been performed to test the proposed model. In this section 
micro-validity is concerned with the process of model building and calibration, and macro-
validity involves comparison of model outcome with time series of risk perceptions in 
empirical studies, secondary data, and outcomes of other models seen in the literature as well 
as sensitivity analysis. 
Micro-validation 
The model was micro-validated in terms of model building and model calibration. Figure 7.19 
illustrates the general process by which micro-validation was achieved. With respect to model 
building, the formulation of conceptual model (shown as Figure 5.2) has been grounded in the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF) (Kasperson et al., 1988), theory on product 
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recall, and social network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Part of the work on which model 
elements were based is given in Table 7.10. The model incorporates two essential processes 
suggested in the literature: event discovery and recreancy, which were derived from 
theoretical and empirical studies on social risk amplification and product recall. Specifically, 
of the subcomponents within the event discovery process, direct experience and social 
interaction were drawn from the literature on risk amplification. Product recall information 
within the process of event discovery, together with recall timing and recall voluntariness that 
influence the recreancy process, was based on work concerning public response to a product 
recall event. Media communication, which has been widely studied in both fields of risk 
amplification and product recall, was integrated with the impacts of these two processes to 
shape social experience of risk. 
 
Review literature Original model Calibrated model
Model building Model calibration
Conduct survey
 
Figure 7.19 Micro-validating process of the recall model 
 
Table 7.10 Evidence for micro-validation of model elements 
Element 
Decision rule or model 
assumption 
Validating evidence Evidence type Context 
Model 
dimension 
Non-linearity in social 
amplification processes 
Burns and Slovic (2007) 
Busby et al. (2016) 
Busby and Onggo (2013) 










individual risk perceivers 
Slovic et al. (1982) 





Social networks have 
small world properties 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) 








reinforces public concern 
about risks 
Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) 
Loewenstein and Mather (1990) 









Hazardous waste and energy 
production 
Social interaction is 
strongly associated with 
risk perception 
Binder et al. (2011) 









information acts as a risk 
amplifier 
De Matos and Rossi (2007) 
Desai and Patel (2014) 





Nokia BL-5C battery recall 
2007 toy recalls 
Recreancy 
Recreancy is an 
important contribution to 
risk amplification 
Kasperson and Kasperson (1996) 
Freudenburg (2003) 
Petts and Niemeyer (2004) 
Stanciugelu (2013) 












Recall timing affects 
consumers’ attitude 








accounts for consumers’ 
recreancy perception in 
the producer 
Laufer and Coombs (2006) 
Souiden and Pons (2009) 







Mobile phone crisis 
Media 
Media serves as a critical 
amplification station 
Lewis and Tyshenko (2009) 
Renn et al. (1992) 
Yeo et al. (2014) 
Chung (2011) 
Frewer et al. (2002) 











Genetically modified foods 
Multiple 
 
Media plays multiple 
roles in risk debates 








Deep-sea disposal of an oil 
rig 
 
Selecting model elements from prior work not only provides some micro-validation, it also 
helps synthesize previous studies and gain a more comprehensive insight into the formation of 
risk perception in a product recall crisis. It goes beyond prior models that have examined only 
a subset of these elements, contributing to a more complex view of social risk amplification. 
However, elements incorporated into the model are extracted from various studies in quite 
different social contexts from that of this study (i.e. risk associated with product 
contamination). Another disadvantage is that, it is almost impossible to find clear evidence in 
the literature that can help determine the agents’ decision rules or set the values of model 
parameters, since no research has investigated these elements as distinct elements.  
Once the model had been constructed logically, based on this literature, it was partially 
calibrated by a public survey. The survey aimed to determine the information sources that 
individuals consult when forming their risk perceptions and the relative importance that they 
give to different pairs of information sources when a liquid milk contamination incident 
occurs in China. As described in Section 6.2.2, all comparisons were made relative to the 
same baseline, i.e. social interaction, except for the comparison between recall timing and 
recall voluntariness. And for each pair of comparison, both forward comparison and reverse 
comparison were used.  
The manipulation of how a question is framed, in this case how two types of information 
sources in the same question are ordered, affects what becomes a reference point (the one 
encountered first) for comparison in the decision process and is associated with an attentional 
effect that focuses respondents’ attention on the reference point (Levin et al., 1998). 
Displaying each question only in the form of forward comparison may lead to a situation in 
which respondents pay less attention to other people’s perceptions than the one compared 
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with it. Applying both forward and reverse comparisons is based on the notion that posing 
questions in different ways can encourage respondents to think about or defend their choices 
before making a final decision. Empirical findings in the literature have indicated that the 
distortion of choice caused by the framing effects can be diminished or eliminated if one 
engages in effortful thought (Smith and Levin, 1996; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). This 
means that elaboration of messages and justification of decisions can suppress the framing 
effects. In addition, as explained in Section 6.7, a test was conducted to look at the 
consistency between forward and reverse sense. The results showed that there was little 
polarization of opinions based on different ways of comparisons in each case. 
Figure 7.20 briefly summarises the process by which the model was calibrated using data 
drawn from the survey. In the first treatment of survey data, reverse comparisons were 
transformed to forward comparisons by converting recoded values of the former into those of 
the latter, such that in each case the data were responses to forward comparison. In the second 
treatment, recoded values were denoted by ratios according to Table 6.5 in Section 6.6.2. The 
weights of information sources were obtained according to the relationships between weights 
and questionnaire items shown in Section 6.7. Lastly, the dataset for each weight was fitted 
into a beta distribution, such that all agents follow the same updating rule but each agent 
adopts a unique set of parameter values. It is important to note, however, this represents only a 
partial calibration of the model, as there are model parameters such as the objective risk level, 
the threshold in risk perception, and the recreancy variation which are not examined by the 
survey. Each agent is endowed with a threshold in risk perception sampled from  0, S  and a 
variation in recreancy sampled from  0, H  according to a uniform distribution. Further 



























Figure 7.20 Model calibration process by survey data 
 
It is also important to recognise that parameters like the objective risk level are specific to 
every case being modelled. And in practice it may be hard to know what the objective risk 
level is, since expert risk assessments are often in disagreement. In the Sanlu incident 
described in Chapter 3, there were a total of around 300,000 victims, but there was no report 
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of number of new cases over time – times series of problem levels were unavailable. The 
perception threshold (if the risk perception is above this threshold but the firm has not 
announced a recall then recreancy is increased) and recreancy variation (if the firm makes a 
voluntary or an involuntary recall then recreancy is decreased or increased by a certain 
amount) may or may not be stable across different incidents. This requires empirical work to 
determine. The main point is that the attempt to calibrate the model is undertaken with a 
specific context in mind, and this exercise does not by itself reveal how the calibration will 
vary as the context varies. 
Macro-validation 
There are four bases for macro-validation: comparing model outcomes with primary empirical 
data, comparing them with secondary data, comparing them with the outcomes of other 
models in the literature, and sensitivity analysis. 
Use of primary empirical data 
The first basis of macro-validation is comparison of the model output with empirical data. 
This kind of macro-validation of the recall model is difficult, and was not achieved in this 
study, because it is very hard to collect empirical time series of public risk perception around 
a specific recall crisis unless risk responses or risk related behaviour are observable before and 
during and after the recall event. Besides, this process is also costly and time consuming. One 
weaker approach for performing macro-validity is to compare model output behaviour to 
observations of similar studies using graphical displays (Sargent, 1996). Loewenstein and 
Mather (1990) examined time series data of public concern in relation to nine different risk 
issues. Table 7.11 summarises the measures of risk perception they employed and the 
qualitative patterns of these time series, based on a modification of a similar table in Busby et 
al. (2016). Some cases display extreme fluctuations of public concern that greatly deviates 
from the level of objective risk, which are considered as a result of occurrence of panic that 
underlies the dynamic response to risks. It is also observed that public risk perception is not 
immediately fully evoked by an increase in the objective severity of underlying problems but 
gradually grows towards a peak. Of these risk issues, only drink driving displays a similar 
time series trace to the recall model: risk perception grows progressively towards an 





Table 7.11 Risk perception patterns of issues analysed by Loewenstein and Mather (1990) 
Risk issue Proxy measure of public concern Qualitative pattern of time series 
AIDS Frequency of national news 
articles 
Double peak with multiple fluctuations 
Objective incidence monotonically increasing 
Crime Percent of respondents afraid to 
walk at night by general social 
survey 
Single peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence fairly similar with 
smoother trend 
Drink driving Difference between number of 
drink driving groups founded and 
disbanded 
Single peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence fairly similar with 
smoother trend and leading by about 1 year 
Herpes Frequency of national news 
articles 
Single peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence fairly similar without 
significant peak and lagging by about 1 month 
Inflation Percent of respondents citing 
inflation as the most important 
issue by opinion poll 
Double peak with non-periodic non-monotonic 
movements 
Objective incidence fairly similar 
Unemployment Percent of respondents citing 
unemployment as the most 
important issue by opinion poll 
Multiple peaks 
Objective incidence fairly similar 
Polio Frequency of New York Times 
news articles 
Multiple peaks 
Objective incidence moving in opposite 
direction in some periods 
Teenage suicide Frequency of national news 
articles 
Single peak with extreme high amplitude 
Objective incidence similar with small 
monotonic movements  
Teenage 
illegitimacy 
Frequency of New York Times 
news articles 
Single peak with multiple small fluctuations 
Objective incidence slightly monotonic rising 
 
Generally, the action of collecting time series data on risk perception should be taken from 
the initial onset of a risk issue and in a real-time manner, so that the dynamic change in risk 
perception over a long period of time can be observed and more insight into collective 
response to risks can be obtained. Some empirical evidence of this kind is available, as shown 
in Table 7.12.  
 
Table 7.12 Comparison evidence for macro-validation 
Evidence Evidence type Data source Context Comparison 
Lau et al. (2003) Empirical Time series SARS Trend and magnitude of 
risk perception 
Ibuka et al. (2010) Empirical Time series H1N1 influenza Trend of risk perception 






Zoonotic disease Trend and magnitude of 
risk perception 
Busby et al. (2016) Model None Multiple Trend of risk perception 
Bleda and Shackley Empirical, News articles, BSE Trend of risk perception 
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(2012) model secondary 
time series 




Terrorism Trend and magnitude of 
risk perception 
Onggo et al. (2014) Model None Multiple Magnitude of media 
communication 
 
The study proposed by Lau et al. (2003) showed the evolution of risk perception alongside 
reported cases during the outbreak of SARS. Figure 7.21 is based on Lau et al.’s (2003) data 
and illustrates the proportion of newly reported cases to the Hong Kong population and the 
percentage of respondents in the surveys perceiving a high risk of being infected with SARS. 
The use of this data to help validate a simulation model can also be found in Busby and 
Onggo (2013). A comparison of simulation results of the recall model (Figure 7.22 and Figure 
7.23) with this empirical record shows some correspondence: there is a rapid growth in public 
risk perception followed by an immediate decline, with risk perception being exaggerated in 
most periods. There is also some difference between them: the trace of risk perception from 
Lau et al. (2003) closely followed the number of reported cases, while the one from the recall 
model is quite different from the contamination level. This is because real data can produce 
more realistic time series trace than the model that is established based on simplified 
assumptions. Similarly, Ibuka et al. (2010) examined the dynamics of risk perceptions of 
H1N1 influenza using a public survey carried out at the initial stage of outbreak. It was found 
that perceived risk of H1N1 infection increased over time with some fluctuations of low 
amplitude. These fluctuations are absent in the recall model, probably because relevant 





Figure 7.21 Time series of risk perception from Lau et al. (2003) 
 
 
Figure 7.22 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated small-world network model 




Figure 7.23 Trace of public risk perception in a single run of a calibrated small-world network model 
with involuntary recall (  2003 1a t   ,   0v t  ) 
 
Ideally, macro-validation of the recall model in this study would consist of data collection 
on a time series of risk amplification, data analysis, and comparison of the model output to 
empirical data. Data collection mainly involves survey design and sampling. The population 
to be sampled is consumers of the product in question. This population should be surveyed 
before and during and after a crisis, so a number of (e.g. 10 or 15) surveys will be carried out 
since the start of the crisis, and each round of survey will be completed in one day. Questions 
included in the survey should differ depending on the evolution of the crisis – questions 
regarding product recall will be added when the survey is conducted during the crisis. In 
regard to data analysis, responses for each round of survey will be averaged across questions 
and across respondents to yield an aggregate value for risk perception. Lastly, make a 
comparison to check whether the projections of the recall model are close to public 
perceptions of risk based on time series data. A critical problem is that the objective risk may 
be unobservable in reality. This indicates that what might prevent successful macro-validation 
is not being able to survey risk perceptions but being able to determine objective risk levels. 
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Use of secondary data 
Another approach to validating the model at the macro-level is to use secondary data from 
social media platforms and search engines, such as Google Trends. A number of studies have 
used Google Trends data for surveillance of epidemics and diseases such as influenza 
outbreaks (for example, Carneiro and Mylonakis, 2009; Kang et al., 2013; Seifter et al., 2010), 
or incorporated information from Google Trends to undertake forecasting such as forecasting 
of private consumption (Vosen and Schmidt, 2011) and forecasting of consumer purchases 
(Choi and Varian, 2012). But it appears that Google Trends cannot be effectively applied to 
monitor how individuals perceive risks over the course of a risk event or to validate the model. 
First, it presents few details of a risk event and may miss some critical information 
regarding the development of the crisis. Take Sanlu milk scandal for example, the Google 
Trends graph (Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3) depicts the frequency of queries on some issues and 
obviously fails to cover information regarding product recall, which is usually a concern of 
consumers as well as an important consideration of the model.  
Second, Google Trends may be not a good indicator of risk perception. It provides a time 
series index of the volume of searches on a particular risk event. This could be an indication 
of the strength of public concern, but it is unknown if it is a good measure, or can be used as a 
proxy, for risk perception.  
Third, Google Trends data is based on a sample of web searches, with the potential of non-
representative sampling bias. It only samples people who use Google to find out the risk and 
ignores those who cannot have access to Google or do not rely on Google for risk information.  
Google Trends may be a promising instrument to extract useful search data in some cases 
(for example, track disease outbreak). However, it is currently not suited to detect time series 
of public risk perceptions. 
Use of other models 
The third basis of macro-validation is comparison of the model output with the output of prior 
models (as shown in Table 7.12). Some models that essentially involve a social process 
shaping risk perception also provide a basis for comparing qualitative features of dynamic 
response to risks. They are not based on the context of product recall, but there is some 
overlap of independent and dependent variables. A system dynamics model (Busby and 
Onggo, 2013) exploring the idea of social amplification as an attribution with recreancy taken 
into account in the context of zoonotic disease outbreaks, for example, indicates that risk 
beliefs become polarised among different actors, and that a residue of concern exists after a 
crisis ends. This is very similar to the qualitative properties of the recall model in that the 
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standard deviation of the opinion distribution across the population is high during and after 
the crisis, and that public risk perception remains very high even when the contamination falls 
to its original, low level. Furthermore, in the recall model risk perception climbs progressively 
toward an exogenous peak before it decays as the crisis ceases. Similarly, a more recent agent-
based modelling of mechanism of risk amplification (Busby et al., 2016) produces a 
qualitative pattern of risk perception characterized by a continual growth, sometimes repeated, 
followed by an immediate decline. 
A social simulation model intended to analyse the dynamics of public perceptions of risk 
associated with BSE in the UK was described by Bleda and Shackley (2012). The trace of risk 
perception exhibits the similar pattern: a noticeable peak followed by low risk perception at 
the last stages of the simulation period. Burns and Slovic’s (2007) system dynamics model 
also incorporates the role of media coverage to examine how a community may respond to a 
terrorist attack over a six-month period. It provides evidence that public risk perception grows 
very quickly but drops comparatively slowly, and that it remains at a higher level than before 
the crisis. Furthermore, the recall model corresponds to the agent-based model constructed by 
Onggo et al. (2014) in terms of the role of media in the dynamics of social response to risk: a 
media that follows public opinion has a more pronounced amplifying effect on public risk 
perception than one communicating the objective risk to the public. 
Sensitivity analysis for macro-validation 
As indicated earlier, sensitivity analysis also provides a limited kind of macro-validation. In a 
situation where the system being modelled is unobservable (observational data on the system 
is inaccessible), which is in fact the case for this study, sensitivity analysis is usually applied 
to evaluate model robustness and considered as an indirect approach to macro-validating the 
model (Frey and Patil, 2002; Sargent, 2007; Sargent, 2010). Sensitivity analysis also helps to 
assess the precision of the model by looking at its performance associated with changes in 
various parameters (Fraedrich and Goldberg, 2000).  
As described in Section 7.1.2, the degree of risk amplification and the delay of peak risk 
amplification are sensitive to maximum initial condition, high contamination level, 
contamination end period, and maximum recreancy variation (in the case of involuntary 
recall). This model response seems reasonable and helps with potential future validation by 
identifying important uncertainties in the model that can be used as an aid in prioritizing 
accumulation of observational data in the validation process (Kleijnen, 1995; Trucano et al., 
2006). The sensitivity estimates show which relationships between model parameters and 
outcome variables are the most important and deserve more data collection efforts, apart from 
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the fact that it shows what needs most managerial attention because it has the potential to 
cause large uncertainties in an outcome critical to an organization. 
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8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter consists of three sections shown in Figure 8.1. The first section elaborates on 
how the proposed model is connected with SARF, both in term of elements seen in SARF and 
those not dealt with in SARF. The second section deals with the contextual specificity of the 
model. It describes the extent to which the model is contextual and how important the 
modelling of context should be in the way we think about SARF. The last section focuses on 
how the model answers the research questions. 
 







What is general What is specific
 
Figure 8.1 Structure of Chapter 8 General Discussion 
8.1 Connections with SARF 
The recall model is linked with SARF (Kasperson et al., 1988) in at least three aspects. First 
of all, the model takes risk amplification as a key outcome variable. A central focus in SARF 
is to explain the disparity often seen between expert assessment of risk and public perceptions 
of risk. This has also been a core issue facing decision makers in terms of risk communication 
(Smith and McCloskey, 1998). The purpose of risk communication has often been seen to 
overcome the misperception of risk among a public that either exaggerates the real level of 
risk, or under-estimates it. This creates a need to analyse the dynamic process of 
misinterpreting the risk. So a prime concern in the modelling is this disparity, which was 
simply captured as the gap between mean public risk perception and objective risk level at any 
one time. The principles that the gap between true risk and public perception is an objective 
quantity, and that the purpose of risk communication is to correct this, have been criticised 
(Rayner, 1988), but the gap between some objective quantity and a public belief remains the 
simplest way of stating risk amplification as an outcome.  
Second, the model incorporates a number of critical elements seen in SARF to investigate 
the underlying dynamics of how risk and risk related behaviours evolve. SARF emphasizes 
the role of various amplification stations (e.g. individuals, social groups, media, and so on) in 
conveying risk signals and in the formation of risk perception. Social processes often act to 
either intensify or downplay collective response to risks. Risk perception not only represents 
the direct consequences of a risky event but also is conceptualised as a social construction 
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(Burns et al., 1993; Renn et al., 1992). In this sense, the model explores the effects of direct 
experience, social interaction, and media on the social process of amplifying or attenuating 
risk. There has been no prediction about which of these elements is likely to be the most 
important generally, as SARF has examined their significance in the social amplification of 
risk in a wide range of contexts. Therefore, the model does not make any assumption of one 
element being more influential than another. Moreover, the model is simply a linear additive 
one, so each element has an independent effect on the adjustment of risk perception. Although 
the interactive effects that may exist between the elements are neglected, integrating them into 
a simple decision rule is a reasonable starting point for representing their contributions to risk 
amplification.  
Third, the model explains social risk amplification as a mechanism and integrates the 
product recall process that is absent in SARF into the amplification process. The core of 
SARF is the mechanism of risk amplification (Kasperson et al., 1988), which, however, has 
received little emphasis in past empirical work – as was described in the Literature Survey 
(Chapter 2). There has been quite limited modelling of risk amplification to date, as also 
detailed in the Literature Survey (Chapter 2). Another point is that little attention has been 
given to the investigation of the role of organizational misconduct in shaping the strength of 
risk responses. As well as discovering the nature of a risk, individuals also make judgments 
about the crisis response of the involved organization to revise their perceptions of risk. The 
model uses a product recall process to indicate public perceptions of organizational 
misconduct that is combined with direct experience and social communication to explore the 
mechanism of social risk amplification in the context of a product contamination crisis. 
8.1.1 Elements seen in SARF 
The model incorporates a number of key factors that have been recognized in the SARF 
literature as prominent drivers of public risk perception, such as direct experience, social 
interaction, and media.  
Direct experience 
Direct experience is simultaneously an experience of physical harm and a process by which 
individual actors learn about related risks (Kasperson, 2012). Yet, so far there have been few 
studies (for example Barnett and Breakwell, 2001) that explain direct experience as a separate 
driver of risk perception when examining its influence. In the agent model, direct experience 
is explained as a single episode that merely reflects the fact whether an activated agent has 
had the experience of consuming a contaminated product or not. Kasperson et al. (1988) have 
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pointed out that direct experience can produce an amplification effect by enabling individuals 
to learn about the nature and controllability of hazardous events. In this process people may 
change the weight given to direct experience or even the structure of the model if risk 
indicated by direct experience is much higher than their perceptions. Moreover, in the process 
individual actors create interpretations of the risk and establish their own rules of filtering and 
processing risk signals from indirect, or secondary, experience (Renn et al., 1992). Such a 
process is not considered in the agent model, because it is not expected to significantly 
influence model outcome.  
The model is developed in the context of risk associated with product contamination, so an 
agent’s direct experience is an experience of consuming contaminated products. The model 
behaviour shows that risk amplification only emerges when the contamination level is below a 
certain threshold, and that the magnitude of risk amplification decreases with the 
contamination level. The notion is that the amplifying effect of direct experience is inversely 
related to the gap between the objective risk and risk perception prior to the experience. This 
does not mean that the impact of direct experience is insignificant but that the impact cannot 
always elevate risk perception to an exaggerated level. There is no evidence of the effect in 
the SARF literature, to the author’s knowledge, and this would be worth empirical exploration. 
Results from the survey show that, among four information sources summarised as the 
‘discovery’ component of the model, direct experience with liquid milk contamination 
receives a mean weight (28.1%) relatively higher than that of prior belief (27.1%), that of 
social interaction (18.7%), and that of product recall information (26.2%). A Welch ANOVA 
(  3, 603.526 32.768F  , 0.001p  ) shows that there is a statistically significant difference 
in the mean weight between the four sources of information. A Games-Howell test ( 0.001p  ) 
reveals that social interaction has a statistically significantly lower weight than the other three 
sources. However, there are no differences between these three. Although no other evidence 
has been found on the role of direct experience in shaping risk responses, it should be noted 
that the result may vary with risk events due to contextual differences. Barnett and Breakwell 
(2001) have empirically demonstrated that the effects of experience on risk concern are 
clearly differentiated with respect to whether individuals participate in the risk activities 
voluntarily or involuntarily: experience is closely linked with stronger concern about 
involuntary risk activities, while there is no association between experience and concern about 
voluntary risk activities. This indicates a direction for further research. 
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Social interaction 
The social dynamics linking interpersonal communication and risk perception have received 
relatively little attention in research on the social amplification of risk (for example, Binder et 
al., 2011; Smith et al., 2013). This model looks at whether informal social interactions amplify 
or attenuate risk perception of product contamination and the magnitude of such effect. It 
represents the informal social interaction in the form of an influence in which the activated 
agent consults the mean risk belief of its neighbours. Social interaction serves as an 
information source that sends out risk signals to an activated agent, so each agent acts as a 
receiver when it gets activated and as a transmitter when its neighbours are activated. The use 
of a similar belief updating process can also be seen in Busby et al. (2016) and Onggo et al. 
(2014), although with a different implementation of exactly how the updating occurs. Busby 
et al. (2016) modelled social interaction as a convex function of response from the perspective 
of availability heuristic of risk perception, and Onggo et al. (2014) treated interpersonal 
communication as a narrowcast process to contrast it with broadcast from media.  
The traces of agent risk beliefs demonstrate that social interaction produces convergence on 
mean public risk perception, and that the variation in individual risk perceptions falls to a 
certain constant level during an initial settling period of the model. In the survey, only 21.5% 
of the respondents gave more importance to neighbour perceptions than their own, prior 
beliefs, 51.4% favoured their own beliefs, and the rest weighted these two sources equally, 
reflecting the inter-individual variability on this aspect. This variability is incorporated in the 
calibrated model. According to further experiments of the partial model (which merely 
considers social interaction), opinion clustering occurs when the weight of social interaction is 
large, as expected: risk perception tends to become homogeneous as the strength of inter-
communication between neighbouring agents increases.  
As described earlier, public agents in the model interact with neighbours in a small-world 
network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Findings gained from sensitivity analysis on the 
calibrated full model are that number of neighbours K  (which refers to the number of nearest 
neighbours each agent is connected to in initial regular lattice) has a very small effect on risk 
amplification, and that rewiring probability P  (which is the probability of reconnecting a 
lattice edge) has almost no impact on the degree as well as the delay of peak risk amplification. 
This indicates that the dynamics of social risk amplification are insensitive to the topology of 
the social network.  
This insensitivity is not what was expected. As an increase in the number of neighbours 
increases the number of channels conveying information and decreasing the rewiring 
probability generates more shortcuts between distant agents (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), it was 
expected that both parameters influence the flow of information across the network and social 
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risk amplification accordingly. But there are some possible reasons for this unexpected 
insensitivity. In regard to rewiring probability, the sampling approach used in the sensitivity 
analysis may explain the result. Characteristic path length  L P  (which is defined as the 
number of edges in the shortest path between two nodes, averaged over all pairs of nodes) 
drops very fast for small rewiring probabilities with an order of magnitude of -2 or less 
towards a relatively low level that prevails for larger rewiring probabilities (Barrat and Weigt, 
2000; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Figure 8.2 shows characteristic path length  L P  for the 
small-world network with 1,000 nodes and a degree of 4 neighbours used in the sensitivity 
analysis. A base 10 logarithmic scale is used for the X axis that signifies rewiring probability 
P . On the Y axis characteristic path length  L P  is the average over 500 random realizations 
of the rewiring process for each value of P  and normalized by  0L . In the sensitivity 
analysis the rewiring probability was sampled 200 times uniformly from the range  0,1 , so 
the frequency of values below 10-2 was very low. As a result, there was little difference in the 
number of shortcuts among the sampled values of rewiring probability, leading to the 
insensitivity of risk amplification to the rewiring probability. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Characteristic path length for the small-world network used in sensitivity analysis 
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With respect to number of neighbours, the insensitivity is due to the reason that an increase 
in the link degree cannot cause the local network effect to increase significantly. When the 
number of neighbours increases, agents are exposed to more opinions of other people. 
However, as agents consults mean risk belief of their neighbours, changes in the number of 
neighbours cannot make much difference to agent risk perceptions. Consequently, there is 
little dependence of social risk amplification on the connectedness of the social network. 
There has been little evidence on the effect of social network parameters on risk amplification 
in the SARF literature. For example, Busby et al. (2016) have shown that public risk 
perception is insensitive to the network parameter defining the link degree distribution.  
A recent agent-based model of the diffusion dynamics of competing products (Lee et al., 
2013) also adopted Watts and Strogatz’s (1998) small-world network. The social network was 
designed in quite a similar way to the network of public agents in the recall model: consumer 
agents make purchase decisions based on their own evaluations of product attributes and the 
average ratings of product attributes from their neighbours, with both being assigned a weight 
sampled from empirical distributions. The authors conducted sensitivity analysis with respect 
to the network parameters and obtained similar results: the degree of connectivity only had a 
marginal effect on the market shares of products, and the rewiring probability had no impact. 
The algorithm they used for social interaction is similar to the belief updating rule in the agent 
model: in Lee et al.’s (2013) model the ratings each consumer-agent gives to product 
attributes is the weighted average of their own judgment and evaluations from their 
neighbours. This may be one reason why similar results with respect to network effect are 
obtained. The authors said that the insensitivity to the number of neighbours were due to an 
effect of averaging evaluations of all neighbours as well as an exponential distribution of 
agent purchase time. The rewiring probability could not create a significant effect on the 
number of shortcuts among consumer-agents as the number of neighbours (i.e. 4) in the social 
network was small. The indication from the recall model and Lee et al.’s (2013) model is that 
the effect of social network on model outcome is not as marked as might be expected.  
In addition to the insensitivity just described, the model of a small-world network in this 
study produces only one convergence on mean public belief. The exogenous peak emerges 
around the time when the contamination level drops to its original level, with no fluctuations 
occurring anywhere else. In contrast, Busby et al.’s (2016) agent model of a scale-free 
network generates convergence on two different levels of risk belief before and after the 
change of objective risk, with risk belief fluctuating frequently. It can be seen from the 
comparison that different types of social networks display quite different patterns of risk 
perception, although these two models are based on different structures and assumptions. 
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Media 
As explained in the Literature Survey (Chapter 2), news media can play multiple, sometimes 
controversial, roles in the debate about risks: they may explicitly amplify a risk, or attenuate a 
risk, or depict a risk in an unbiased way. In the agent model the media has a different 
mechanism of shaping risk perception from social interaction: it directly broadcasts risk 
messages to the entire population as one information source, whereas social interaction 
contributes to the amplifying process through one-to-many agent communication. 
In the recall model, in order to explore how the magnitude of risk amplification differs in 
terms of the role that the media is playing, media communication is operationalized in terms 
of three different possible roles (Onggo et al., 2014): an objective leader communicating the 
objective risk, a mixed leader-follower broadcasting the mean of public risk perception and 
the objective risk, and a public follower broadcasting public risk perception. The level of 
public concern does not necessarily accord with the intensity of media coverage. Lay persons 
are increasingly active in engaging in risk debates and in questioning the accuracy and 
reliability of media portrayal of risks (Chung, 2011; Petts et al., 2000). Based on these notions, 
in the model each agent assigns a different weight to media expressed risk that was sampled 
from a beta distribution that the survey data was fitted with. 
The model exhibits the same qualitative pattern of risk perception with different levels of 
risk amplification across the three different roles of media, both in the course of a crisis and 
after its resolution. A media that follows public opinion generates a relatively higher degree of 
risk amplification than one reporting the objective risk, with a mixed strategy being in 
between. In contrast, Onggo et al.’s (2014) model demonstrated almost no difference in risk 
amplification produced by three media roles during an outbreak and significant differences 
after the outbreak with a follower role intensifying risk to the largest extent. They modelled a 
situation in which individuals invest little trust in the media and give a much lower weight to 
media communicated risk than social interaction. Consequently, decision makers have to 
examine the role of media in risk communication when media is a primary source of 
information for the general public. In other words, a company having to make a decision 
about a product recall needs to decide which model of the media seems most realistic in order 
to predict the effect that reporting the recall in the media will have. 
The questionnaire survey showed that respondents were attaching more importance to 
media coverage (a mean weight of 20.7%) than neighbour perceptions (a mean weight of 
11.6%) – a statistically significant difference with  362.198 9.647t df    and 0.001p  . 
The public appears more sensitive to media portrayal of risk than their social network. 
Combined with the insight from the model just described, the survey result suggests that the 
role that the media plays matters in the context of a milk contamination crisis. These results 
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from the model and survey offer an indication of the effect of media communication on the 
formation of risk perception for risk managers. It is clear that attention needs to be 
concentrated on how the media depicts risks or risk events in order to make informed 
decisions, and that better communication strategies may be needed particularly when the 
media is a strong follower of public opinion. 
The model does not consider the possibility that the media plays more than one role during 
the crisis. The media may switch its positions by changing the way in which it describes the 
risk. Take the Chinese milk scandal for example: before the scandal was extensively exposed, 
the media objectively reported the number of victims from melamine contaminated milk 
powder. However, as the scandal broke, news media were ordered by the central government 
to follow the official line and avoid negative reporting (Li, 2008). This added a further 
dimension of complexity to the contamination issue, yet it is ignored in the model. And 
evidently, the role of government in the process of interpreting such risk debates is also an 
important direction to be examined. This point is addressed in the Conclusion (Chapter 9), 
where possible future work is discussed.  
8.1.2 Elements absent in SARF 
SARF is not specifically a theory about product-related risk so does not make reference to 
actions like product recall. Modelling SARF in a particular kind of context, like product crises, 
therefore necessarily requires the addition of elements that represent a recall process. The 
process of recall is often a key element in responses to product-related crises (Choi and Chung, 
2013; Magno, 2012) and in raising public concern (for example, Choi and Lin, 2009b; Desai 
and Patel, 2014; Feng et al., 2010). 
The proposed model takes product recall as an amplification station that influences risk 
perception in two aspects: the direct effect through product recall information (De Matos and 
Rossi, 2007; Laufer and Jung, 2010; Umehara and Ohta, 2011) and the indirect effect through 
recreancy (Bunniran et al., 2009; Souiden and Pons, 2009). Product recall information 
combines with prior beliefs, social interaction, and direct experience to represent the ‘event 
discovery’ component of the model as a whole. The model associates recreancy with both a 
delay in making a product recall, and in being forced to make an involuntary recall. 
Simulation of the partial model shows the expected result: an involuntary recall is more 
influential in heightening risk perception and in creating amplifying ripples of public concern 
than a voluntary recall, which indicates that the public is more sensitive to an involuntary 
recall. This effect seems to be diminished by the mechanism of the model, however. As the 
media effect is added to the belief updating process, risk amplification during and after the 
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crisis reduces to a relatively lower level. This is because some weight is assigned to media 
coverage, which decreases the relative importance of product recall.  
Sensitivity analysis has demonstrated that both the degree and the delay of peak risk 
amplification are sensitive to recall voluntariness and insensitive to recall timing. This leads to 
the conclusion that the public put a greater emphasis on recall voluntariness than recall timing. 
It differs from the survey result indicating that respondents weighted recall timing more 
heavily, with recall timing to voluntariness ratio being 1.3. This distinction lies in the reason 
that in the model there is quite a short time span between the start of the crisis and the 
randomised recall, which makes the effect of recall timing on recreancy judgments, and 
subsequently on risk perception, insignificant. In reality, the recall timing affects the extent to 
which consumers consider the involved company as acceptably responsible (Magno, 2012; 
Standop, 2006): the shorter the delay in issuing the recall, the more the perceived social 
responsibility, and the lower the perceived recreancy. Thus a prompt recall can effectively 
reduce public perceptions of risk. The result makes it clear that the amplifying effect of 
recreancy on risk amplification is not correlated with the timing of product recall and 
pronounced only when a recall is made involuntarily. Decision makers need to be more 
cautious about social reaction to risk if they recall the defective product reluctantly.  
It has to be noted that the recall process takes no account of other recall strategies such as 
denial and ‘super effort’ (Souiden and Pons, 2009; Vassilikopoulou et al., 2009b) that are also 
identified as main types of crisis response. The reason is that the recall model focuses on 
organizational decision making characterized by an influential, real recall action, while denial 
means that the company refuses to acknowledge that the product is defective, and a super 
effort (or an improvement campaign) response seems only to be relevant to the recall of 
products with minor defects that do not threaten public health and safety (Shrivastava and 
Siomkos, 1989). Also, the model does not consider the role that a company’s reputation 
(Grunwald and Hempelmann, 2010; Hammond, 2013) or brand equity (Korkofingas and Ang, 
2011) plays in determining the impact of product recall on social reaction to the crisis. This 
needs further investigation.  
The interactive influence of recreancy judgments and the media content on risk 
amplification is an important perspective unexamined in this model. Some studies (Boyd and 
Jardine, 2011; Yannopoulou et al., 2011) have suggested that media portrayal of risk events 
can affect the level of social trust in those responsible for managing risk and thereby shapes 
collective risk response. However, Frewer et al. (2002) demonstrated that trust in regulators 
was unaffected by media communicated risk of genetically modified foods. Thus the 
interaction between recreancy and media may vary from case to case, depending on the local 
and social context of the risk event in question. 
 161 
8.2 Contextual specificity 
Calibration of the recall model using empirical data from a public survey about a specific 
product crisis means that the model is not general: its structure is generic since the model is 
based on general findings in the literature, but calibrated parameter values are completely 
specific to the survey context. This section is divided into three subsections, as shown in 
Figure 8.3. The first subsection examines the generality of the model as a whole and of its 
three components: event discovery, recreancy, and media. The second subsection deals with 




What is general What is specific








Figure 8.3 Structure of Section 8.2 Contextual specificity 
8.2.1 What is general in the model 
Generality of the model as a whole 
The model is generic in the sense that its construction is inspired by the general knowledge of 
social risk amplification and product recall. It synthesizes factors that are identified as 
significant drivers of risk perception and incorporates interactions between different actors 
that are seen as influential in past empirical work. From the perspective of the overall 
structure, the model integrates the components that are primarily necessary for construction of 
risk perception in a product contamination crisis including an event discovery step, a 
recreancy assessment step, and media communication. Separating individuals’ responses into 
a risk discovery step and a recreancy judgment step is an important contribution to analysing 
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social responses to risk, since the literature does not generally distinguish between discovery 
and judgment of recreancy.  
The model structure is highly general in the sense that the mechanisms make no positive 
assumptions about a context. The decision rules attributed to the agents are not based on 
expectations about how people and organizations would react differently in different 
situations, except insofar as different weights might be attached to different elements of the 
model. Although the model was developed with a Chinese milk products contamination 
scandal in mind, there was no conscious attempt to capture in the model structure aspects that 
distinguished this scandal from others. 
However, the model is not general at all in the sense that the mechanisms assume a very 
specific model in which risk perception is a linear additive function of event discovery, 
recreancy, and media coverage, with arithmetic mean of neighbour beliefs taken as the 
measure of social interaction. It makes sense to use such simple structures in the absence of 
knowledge that an alternative would be more appropriate. But if it were known in any 
particular case that it would be more realistic to use alternatives (for example the updating 
rules suggested by Busby et al. (2016)), the model becomes inapplicable. 
Generality of risk discovery 
In the event discovery process, people are exposed to information that makes them aware of 
the danger and enables them to find out the seriousness of the risk. This is a process of 
forming estimates of risk through personal discovery, which varies from individual to 
individual. It is natural to incorporate prior belief, interpersonal communication, and direct 
experience in this process, as they are common sources from which individuals learn about the 
risk and vary from individual to individual. The justification for including product recall 
information is that it provides a signal that a danger concerning the product truly exists or that 
the risk is more severe than previously believed, although the model assumes that the content 
of this communication is same to all individuals – the recall message just indicates that there 
is a product recall. Whereas in actual recall events people interpret and perceive recall 
messages differently, depending on their perceptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
the level of blame they attribute to the company, and whether or not they have consumed the 
product in question (De Matos and Rossi, 2007). Hence in a more realistic model of product 
recall, recall information would not be a binary variable. Instead, individual’s evaluation of 
recall messages would be affected by various factors, and the risk levels perceived from the 
messages would be heterogeneous. 
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Generality of media influence 
The communication of product-related crises is critically influenced by media coverage 
(Yannopoulou et al., 2011). Another source of information is expert risk assessment. However, 
the public have limited access to technical assessment of risk, leading to the fact that expert 
assessment of risk is not a normal communication channel in a society.  
The model does not distinguish among individual agents in media consumption which in 
reality will be influenced by demographic characteristics. Instead, all agents receive the same 
information circulated by the media that eventually goes into the belief updating rule. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that sometimes different media outlets convey the same 
message as they tend to repeat each other’s reports. Nor does the model deal with the 
possibility that agents more or less misinterpret media messages. Exploring individual 
heterogeneity in media consumption and interpretation is an important direction for future 
work. 
Additionally, the consideration of three different roles of media in the model should be 
applicable to analysis of many risks, as they cover most of the roles that the media can play in 
risk debates. But it is undeniable that some aspects of the roles are not represented. For 
example, the media can be a biased observer that disseminates self-serving data (Adams, 
1992). In this case, the media follows its own criteria of newsworthiness and routines of news 
gathering. For simplicity, this can be conceptualised as a situation where the media 
communicates a risk level that deviates from the objective risk. But it is a challenging task to 
identify the direction and degree of the deviation, since the character of risk signals is 
unknown.  
The media can also undertake an authority follower role that is accompanied by 
communicating risk information supporting the particular interests of the authorities. This is 
similar to the media communication of risk in relation to the Sanlu milk scandal where the 
media could not report anything negative and had to rigidly adhere to the official word. The 
literature (Boyd and Jardine, 2011) shows an example of government being an open 
information source for media reporting on BSE in Canada. The media did not dramatize the 
risk of BSE but provided accurate descriptions of health and economic consequences facing 
Canadians. Both cases reflect the significance of media-government engagement in the 
analysis of risk experience. On the contrary, the media can play its role as a watchdog (Petts et 
al., 2000) to monitor the conduct of government officials and to guarantee the transparency 
required for public access to information. The risk information propagating from the media to 
the public is more objective and communicative. The media uses a neutral tone to report 
government’s action, and modelling this media role will be associated with the introduction of 
 164 
public perceptions of government incompetence in handling the risk, an important factor 
affecting public concern for the risk issue.  
Another significant role of media concerns the relationship between media and firms: the 
media can be a partner or an enemy of the involved organization in crisis response. Acting as 
a partner, the media exchanges information with the organization and becomes part of the 
response. Roughly, this partnership associates with two possibilities with respect to how the 
media communicates risk to the public. One is that the media broadcasts accurate, timely 
information surrounding the story and provides information about what and how people 
should do to avoid injury and reduce losses. It helps the organization effectively manage the 
crisis not only by bringing together important information but by preventing message 
distortion as well. Another possibility is that the coverage needs to be approved by the firm. 
The media conveys carefully constructed messages only and overlooks facts unfavourable for 
the firm or information probable to cause huge panic. In this case the media-organization 
partnership might downplay the risk and / or maintain the credibility of the organization. 
When the media serves as an enemy of the organization, it reports information incorrectly or 
deliberately dramatizes the information to attract public attention. For example, it overstates 
irresponsibility of the company in dealing with product recall such as ambiguous recall 
announcement and late recall action. Whether the relationship between the company and the 
media is cooperative or hostile, media communication will affect recreancy judgments of the 
public. The media influences public risk perception directly through the coverage and 
indirectly through recreancy.  
Figure 8.4 shows the possible media roles discussed above. Future research will benefit 
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Figure 8.4 Possible media roles for future research 
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Generality of recreancy 
Recreancy is a judgment made by a public about an organization’s misconduct. Some studies 
(Burns et al., 1993; Renn et al., 1992) have empirically shown that perceptions of managerial 
incompetence are predictive of public response to risk events and thereby significant in the 
amplification process. For the model, the idea of conceptualising recreancy as being a product 
of timing and voluntariness naturally suits product recall processes. But there are other 
features of recalls that could influence recreancy judgments, such as apology and factors such 
as compensation and product replacement offered to consumers (Smith et al., 1996). 
Examining factors likely to drive recreancy outside of recall timing and voluntariness may be 
helpful to expand the analysis of potential for recreancy in organizational risk management 
and requires further attention. 
8.2.2 What is specific in the model 
The calibrated model is highly context specific as the sampling space of the weights in the 
decision rules is completely dependent on the empirical phenomenon presented in the survey. 
In this case the survey was conducted specifically in the context of liquid milk contamination. 
The calibration generated distributions for the weights of multiple information sources that the 
public consult when forming risk perception, so that each agent follows the same algorithm 
with a different combination of parameters to modify its risk belief. That is to say, the model 
is specific to the heterogeneous respondents of the survey about liquid milk contamination. 
Further empirical work is needed to test whether the decision weights tend to vary from time 
to time, from issue to issue, from population to population. As Chattoe-Brown (2014) 
indicates, calibration will leave remaining uncertainty about exact values for average 
properties in a group, but it will certainly help eliminate extremely unrealistic parameters. 
Public risk perception time series from existing empirical studies and other models provide 
an important demonstration of the influence of social contexts on risk perceptions. The 
differences in the qualitative patterns of risk perception as well as the magnitude of risk 
amplification show how context-dependent risk amplification is. For instance, Loewenstein 
and Mather (1990) have shown that certain cases (i.e. herpes, teenage suicide and illegitimacy, 
and AIDS) exhibited sudden and substantial surges of concern, while for some cases (i.e. 
crime, inflation, unemployment, and polio) public risk perception was highly consistent with 
the objective level of risk. The authors proposed that the major contributor to the distinction 
was the degree of public familiarity with the problems, a psychological factor that varies with 
risk issues. Individuals had much less knowledge and direct observation about herpes, teenage 
suicide and illegitimacy, and AIDS than they had about crime, inflation, unemployment, and 
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polio, which were closely linked with their lives. Hence, the level of concern for the first four 
cases could be easily heightened by external influences such as interpersonal communication 
and media reporting. Burgess (2012) also suggested that unfamiliarity with a hazard was a 
significant variable stimulating social amplification of risk. Familiarity is a long-term causal 
factor (Loewenstein and Mather, 1990), so an agent’s familiarity level would vary over time 
and this would add a further element of specificity to a more comprehensive model of risk 
amplification.  
 In addition, although all the risk issues analysed by Loewenstein and Mather (1990) 
showed fluctuations in perceived risks, they took on quite different qualitative features 
regarding the number and amplitude of peaks and trend of movements. Again, this is probably 
a product of context. Non-monotonic movements can also be seen from the trajectories of 
models about multiple societal risks (Busby et al., 2016), zoonotic disease outbreaks (Busby 
and Onggo, 2013), and BSE in the UK (Bleda and Shackley, 2012). The recall model, in 
contrast, displays no fluctuations but a rapid growth followed by an immediate decay in risk 
perception. One of the reasons for this difference is also the context in which the risk issue is 
situated. In a product recall, the underlying problem is usually a fault with the product, which 
can be found and then fixed, usually with little doubt that this is the end of the issue. 
Effectively, this is what the model assumes, because the objective communication level drops 
immediately. In the case of diseases, it may not be clear when the disease outbreak has 
definitely finished. 
8.3 Response to research questions 
This section presents a summary of how the model answers the research questions raised in 
this study, i.e. RQ1: how can we formalise social amplification of risk in the context of a 
product recall event? RQ2: what can we learn from the formalisation? 
Response to RQ1: how can we formalise SARF in product recall? 
This study uses an agent-based approach to model and simulate social risk amplification in the 
way in which SARF cannot be modelled directly. The systematic description of social 
experience of risk in the original framework is very general. And there are some ambiguities 
inherent in SARF. For example, Rip (1988) argued that there is not a clear indication of risk 
experience in the framework, and that SARF centres on the information processing by 
individuals and evidently neglects the processes of social aggregation. Moreover, the 
definition of risk amplification is still vague as SARF does not explicitly specify the baseline 
risk against which amplification can be measured. These issues prevent SARF from being 
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implemented in a model in any direct way. This study shows how the ambiguities might be 
resolved, with a more specific model and an agent-based, computational implementation in an 
organizational context of a product recall event. 
RQ1 has been addressed in three main steps. The first step makes a commitment to general 
mechanisms lying behind social risk amplification: it combines broadcast and narrowcast 
information channels among a group of actors in a social network and also integrates a risk 
discovery process and a recreancy judgment process into an individual actor’s processing of 
risk information. This distinction between discovering information about a risk and making a 
judgment about an organization’s conduct seems important. The second step reviews the 
literature in a more specific domain of organizational activity (in this case, product recall) to 
develop a set of more specific candidate decision rules behind consumers’ responses to 
organizational crisis of this kind. Rules developed in the above two steps are incorporated in 
the conceptual model of a social agent developing a risk perception to a product recall. For 
example, the agents respond to the timing and voluntariness of the recall event. The third step 
conducts a survey to calibrate the weights within such rules, sampling from the distributions 
discovered in the survey. This means that the model is then tailored to a particular population 
responding to a particular risk. Figure 8.5 depicts the general procedure of formalising social 
risk amplification in the context of a product recall crisis.  
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Figure 8.5 Formalisation of social risk amplification in the context of a product recall crisis 
 
In the second step, conceptualisation of product recall is based on selective decision rules 
















Figure 8.6 Conceptualisation of product recall process 
 
Drawing on significant results of empirical studies, decision rules are based on empirical 
cause-and-effect relationships. Causes and effects are converted into condition codes and 
action codes, respectively in the rules. Figure 8.7 displays the mapping between variables and 
codes. Decision rules are categorized by the condition codes so that appropriate rules can be 
selected for models of specific contexts in which the particular dependent variables are 
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relevant. Recall message, recall timing, and recall voluntariness, which are chosen as essential 
elements of product recall, are incorporated in the two main processes: recall message is 
integrated into risk discovery, and recall timing and voluntariness are considered as a measure 
of recreancy. This procedure provides a general approach that is able to transform descriptions 
of the findings of studies in a particular area of the literature to part of a conceptual model. 
Other factors (e.g. product involvement, perceived corporate social responsibility, 
organizational reputation, and so on) have also been proven crucial for individuals’ reaction to 
product recalls but were not incorporated in the model to avoid excessive complexity. They 









Figure 8.7 Mapping between variables and codes 
 
Figure 8.8 provides a template for model calibration – the third main step. The illustrative 
case chosen to contextualise the model in this third step had to meet at least the following 
requirements:  
1) it had to be recent so people readily remember, 
2) it had to be a case where the involved company took response strategies publicly, 
3) it had to be clearly a case in which there was a strong social risk response, 












Figure 8.8 Template for model calibration 
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How to ask questions to help calibrate the weights in decision rules is also an important part 
of the response to RQ1. As discussed earlier, the design of survey questions asking people to 
evaluate the relative importance among each pair of information sources has to be based on 
the premise that there is a uniform way to measure relative importance, for example, using a 
common scale ranging from 0 to 100%. It represents an attempt to capture an individual’s 
judgment about the significance of risk information in a simple yet effective way, which can 
then be interpreted in terms of decision weights within the model. 
The model uses very simple linear updating rules for agent risk beliefs. This is the most 
economical approach, given no definite evidence that agents would update their beliefs in a 
more complex way. Both Axelrod (1997) and Macal and North (2005) have shown that 
applying simple rules to agent-based models can result in emergent and complex behaviours 
and reveal important insights on what is being studied. In addition, Axelrod (1997) pointed 
out that a very simple model does not rule out making potentially interesting extensions to the 
model subsequently. But there is scope to explore many other processes of interaction 
between agents and their social neighbours, the broadcast media, and producers dealing with 
product recalls. This would at least help reveal how sensitive the model would be to 
assumptions about the interaction process. 
Response to RQ2: what can we learn from the formalisation? 
The main findings of simulating the model are as follows. First, organizational response to a 
crisis or risk event appears to be a determinant of public perceived risks. Risk amplification 
occurs, no matter whether the company issues the recall voluntarily or involuntarily, but 
whether it is voluntary affects the degree of amplification. Thus, managers need to understand 
concerns that may emerge from organizational activities so that they can devise appropriate 
response strategies to counter potential negative effects caused by the concerns. But it has to 
be pointed out that the domination of product recall in the model may lie in the fact that recall 
information is built into the model as a binary variable (whose value is either 0 or 1). The 
reality is that the risk people perceive from recall information probably falls on a continuous 
scale. Organizational communications vary in informant content and information framing in a 
way that is much more subtle than in the model. As a result, it is difficult to speculate whether 
this finding is generalizable to other situations where the firms issue a recall but public 
response to recall is much different from that in the model or where recall processes are more 
complex than in the model. This needs future work. 
Second, the evolution of public concern is strongly related to the duration of crisis, given 
the established assumptions of the model. This underscores the pressure that companies 
responsible for the crises might face in handling public concern and taking corrective action. 
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An intensive organizational effort is primarily needed to lessen amplified risk by bringing the 
crisis to a close quickly. However, the model indicates that amplification peaks at the end of 
the crisis, and in the real world this is not always the case. For example, Ibuka et al.’s (2010) 
survey on risk perceptions of 2009 H1N1 influenza in the US showed that perceived 
probability of H1N1 infection increased over time, while the survey conducted by Lau et al. 
(2003) on risks of SARS in Hong Kong demonstrated that risk perception peaked around the 
ceasing of the first phase (when the World Health Organization issued a travel advisory 
warning for Hong Kong). The model does not take account of such specific influencing events. 
Early peak of risk perception can also be seen in model outcome by Busby and Onggo (2013).  
Third, another point regarding the time series of the model is that it appears impossible to 
completely eliminate the exaggerated perceptions of risk as the residue remains relatively high 
even after the crisis is resolved. Busby and Onggo’s (2013) system dynamics modelling of 
zoonotic disease outbreaks also produces such a residual effect. In the SARF literature, 
however, there has been no empirical work on residual concern of the public after the end of a 
crisis or risk event. It is an issue that is potentially pivotal but has not been investigated in a 
realistic context. The residue is reflected in the Sanlu case where consumers had extremely 
weak confidence in Chinese dairy products after the incident (Huang, 2014). In fact, until now 
Chinese consumers still see foreign baby formula brands as their first choice, and many local 
brands has suffered sales decline for years (He, 2016).  
Fourth, the objectivity of media coverage appears to be inversely related to risk 
amplification. A media that simply follows public opinion is much more influential in 
heightening risk than an objective one. This echoes the argument that the way the media 
manipulates coverage primarily affects its ability to generate amplification of risk (Burgess, 
2012; Yannopoulou et al., 2011). From this perspective, it is important for companies to 
realize how information disseminated by the media is framed so as to aid in managing the risk. 
More quick and effective organizational communication efforts are needed when the media is 
a strong follower of public opinion.  
Lastly, sensitivity analysis provides indications on which model parameters have the 
biggest effects on outcome variables. To be more specific, the initial conditions, 
contamination level, contamination duration, and recreancy variation (in the case of 
involuntary recall) are the parameters that risk amplification and delay in peak risk 
amplification are sensitive to. From an empirical perspective, sensitivity analysis helps 
prioritize data collection efforts and research needs. The results indicate that validation 
activities may have to particularly focus on observing the initial state of public perceptions, 
measuring the objective risk level, and seeking information manifesting public trust in the 
firm. From a practical perspective, sensitivity analysis helps identify critical control points 
where managerial actions need to be centred in the course of risk communication. The 
 172 
sensitivity of risk amplification to recreancy that arises from involuntary, delayed recalls 
shows that managers need to be especially careful about not recalling products quickly and 
proactively. 
The results of sensitivity analysis represent hypotheses rather than predictions as they are 
not based on historical data, evidence, or experience. They merely indicate the relationships 
incorporated in the model. Therefore, a useful programme of future work would be to test 
these hypotheses empirically. The focus implied by the sensitivity analysis is quite different 
from the current focus of scholarly empirical research on risk amplification. Little research 
has dealt with how the initial conditions, objective risk, and trust in the organization 
contribute to amplified risk during a risk event, with the exception of Freudenburg’s (1993; 




This chapter concludes the thesis as a whole. It first identifies contributions that this study has 
made to research on risk perception and social risk amplification particularly, and then 
presents key implications derived from the analysis of this study. It ends with a brief summary 
of the limitations of the work and the associated directions for future research. 
9.1 Intended contributions 
Given the long-standing ambiguities of SARF, for example about what defines an ‘amplified’ 
risk response, this study uses an agent-based model to reason about risk amplification from 
the standpoint of an organization attempting to influence public response. This illustrates 
issues that have been explored only to a limited extent, such as Freudenburg’s (1993) general 
idea of recreancy, and explores an important context that has received little or no attention as 
a social risk amplification problem: product risk and recall events. It intends to provide a more 
precise understanding of social risk amplification and thereby contribute to the broader field 
of risk perception research. It synthesizes factors obtained from past work on SARF and past 
product recall studies into a coherent model and explores the implications of simulating this 
model. The concrete contributions of this thesis are mainly identified in the following two 
aspects. 
First, this thesis provides a pathway to formalising social risk amplification in an 
organizational context of a recall event. Recall events, although not treated as problems of 
social risk amplification in the past, are important risk amplification events because the scale 
of the public response is important to the degree of risk that actually arises. If a public 
attenuates a product risk it will fail to respond adequately to the recall, and will consequently 
bear a higher objective risk. Recall events are also inherently interesting as risk amplification 
issues because there are two, basically opposing effects of the recall. The first is to inform the 
public of some risk they were probably not aware of before, but the second is to demonstrate 
to the public that the producer is concerned about the public’s welfare and is taking steps to 
protect it. These steps are likely to be costly to the firm. The aim in formalising our 
understanding of recall cases is to construct a process in which rules and interactions that 
determine agents’ behaviours are specified. The formalisation developed in this research is 
achieved by three main steps:  
1) developing decision rules behind social risk amplification generally, 
2) developing decision rules behind a specific crisis involving product recall, 
3) calibrating the weights for the decision rules. 
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Within these three steps are certain essential aspects: 
1) how to operationalize risk perception – an agent’s risk belief is shaped by three essential 
processes: risk discovery, recreancy, and media, 
2) how to represent organizational decision making – product recall involves a decision 
about voluntariness and timing of when to recall a product, 
3) how to represent media communication – media potentially plays different roles in 
shaping risk beliefs, 
4) how to perform calibration of certain parameter distributions – by means of a consumer 
survey asking people to evaluate relative importance of risk information. 
Overall, the modelling involves a process of progressively contextualising social risk 
amplification, integrating qualitative knowledge about decision rules and the connections 
between the rules of different decision makers with empirical data about the relative 
importance to decision makers of different information sources. Although the representation 
of risk decisions and calibration of the model are simple, the model reveals insight into the 
mechanism of risk amplification (e.g. the model produces a residue of concern after the crisis 
is terminated) and indicates critical variables (e.g. sensitivity analysis identifies recreancy as 
an influential factor of risk amplification).  
Second, this thesis gives guidance on carrying out research concerning risk amplification: it 
proposes a method of extracting critical elements from the literature as well as a way of 
calibrating an agent model using a consumer survey. The procedure of developing decision 
rules of consumers as they respond to an organizational crisis (see Chapter 5) illustrates how 
to select factors from statistical findings of studies in a specific domain and to build these 
factors into an agent-based model. This approach, in principle, applies to situations in which a 
relatively large number of empirical studies are available in a particular area. It allows 
researchers to turn from a statistical correlation between two variables to a representation of 
agents whose decision rules express these relationships. This allows us to go from a model in 
which relationships are central to a model in which interactions of agents are central. This in 
turn allows us to model not average effects and average outcomes, but the dynamics of how 
effects and outcomes evolve over time within a population.  
After this formulation of decision rules, the numerical priorities of heterogeneous agents 
still need to be determined. This comes from a calibration process. The calibration process can 
serve as a template for building a model of social risk amplification that can be made specific 
to a particular population and particular product crisis – for example the Chinese population 
buying infant milk products during a contamination event. A survey was employed as an 
instrument of calibration for a model of SARF for what is believed to be the first time, and it 
used a simple and straightforward way of gathering data to design survey questions to assess 
relative importance of risk information. The disadvantage of utilizing such a survey for 
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calibration is that it encourages modellers to include only decision rules that are accessible to 
the decision makers using them, and to leave out those decision rules about which decision 
makers do not have insight. In other words, the calibration method only examines parameters 
and relationships that people are able to judge. The recreancy variation (by which recreancy 
can change when a firm makes a voluntary or an involuntary recall), for example, was not 
calibrated by the survey, because consumers’ recreancy perceptions of a firm represents a 
psychological state with respect to their belief in misconduct of the firm and it is hard for 
consumers to quantitatively evaluate the change in such state. Other approaches are needed to 
identify decision rules when people do not have access to their own rules, involving implied 
rather than stated priorities. Nonetheless, the calibration presented in this thesis offers a new 
perspective in micro-validation of SARF models. 
9.2 Practical implications 
The model proposed in this thesis has generated some managerial implications for decision 
makers responsible for dealing with organizational crises. 
First, organizations need to be more serious about the potentially adverse impact 
engendered by their responses and communications during a recall crisis. The product recall 
strategy itself can trigger amplification of risk: it clearly indicates that there is some kind of 
failure, and possibly negligence, in the product, and that there is some level of danger in 
consuming the product. The risk that people perceive from the recall message influences the 
formation of their risk beliefs (De Matos and Rossi, 2007; Laufer and Jung, 2010; Umehara 
and Ohta, 2011). As noted, organizational misconduct not only contributes to exaggerated risk 
but produces a residue of concern after the crisis is removed. If the organization does not react 
in a responsible manner (for example, the organization issues a recall involuntarily), it may 
have far more to lose from product recall than expected – the organization not only loses its 
consumers’ trust and loyalty but suffers from low intentions of the public to purchase its 
products in the future. Magno (2012) have also suggested that consumers’ perceptions of 
organizational response in a product recall can have a long-lasting impact on their attitude 
toward the company even after the crisis. While other factors also account for the public’s 
attitude toward risk, by paying more attention to the systemic consequences of its own actions, 
when responded to by a social network of consumers, the organization can be more proactive 
in communication with the public. 
Second, managerial actions should incorporate examination of the media’s role in risk 
communication. The way in which information disseminated by the media is framed is largely 
determined by the role that the media is undertaking: media narratives of risk are supported by 
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self-serving communication (e.g. risk-related stories are based on what the media discovers or 
the media quotes reporting from other media sources) or result from interactions between the 
media and other social groups such as government, the public, and the firm. It is not always 
the case that media coverage elicits significant public concern (for example, Boyd and Jardine, 
2011; Chung, 2011; Smith et al., 2013). But knowing the role of media enables the 
organization to understand to what extent the information that the public receive from the 
media is accurate and to better estimate the effect of media coverage on public risk perception. 
In the model, risk amplification was significantly different according to whether the media led 
public opinion, followed it, or had a mixed strategy. It is important that the organization 
remains accessible to the media throughout its organizational response in order to deal 
effectively with public concern aroused by media circulated information, and to help the 
media lead rather than simply follow public opinion.  
9.3 Limitations and future work 
This study has several limitations that indicate directions for future research. Many of these 
have been discussed at length in Chapter 8, so the following is a summary of what appear to 
be the most important of these. 
First, the model does not consider the role of government and associated interactions. The 
most obvious is the interaction between media and government, which is central in risk 
debates and has received little emphasis so far (Howarth, 2013). Moreover, in the Sanlu milk 
scandal the central government controlled the flow of information to lead public opinion 
through imposing censorship on news media (Mooney, 2008). The reason why government is 
not dealt with as an actor in the proposed model is that there are some uncertainties of 
modelling media-government interaction. The interaction between media and government can 
vary depending on risk domain, social context, press freedom, and government policy. And it 
may also involve some important parameters such as public perceptions of government 
incompetence in the handling of risk and shift of media roles during the course of a risk event. 
Therefore, sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence is necessary to investigate the 
characteristic and inherent complexity of the relationship between media and government 
before representing their interaction using a model.  
Second, some social processes and related decision rules have been simplified in the model. 
In particular:  
1) Recall information is simply conceptualised as a binary variable indicating whether there 
is a recall or not. This may have magnified the contribution of product recall to risk 
amplification in the model (for example, according to simulation experiments in Chapter 5, 
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product recall information appears to dominate the exogenous peak of risk perception). In 
reality a product recall message is more complex than in the model: it presents the defect and 
declares a recall, and risk perceived from the message probably falls on a continuous scale 
which is heterogeneous across the population. 
2) Measured by recall timing and voluntariness, recreancy does not take into account other 
factors that also reflect managerial incompetence, such as compensation and product 
replacement (Smith et al., 1996). This is because the model primarily focuses on 
organizational response to a crisis (i.e. the recall itself) and ignores resolution of a crisis (i.e. 
follow-up actions). But recreancy belief is a complex construct with broad drivers 
(Freudenburg, 1993) and not stable in nature, so the lack of analysis of the effect of follow-up 
actions is a simplification. 
3) Beyond recall information and recreancy, other factors have been overlooked to explore 
the effect of product recall on public perceptions of risk, for example, an organization’s 
reputation (Hammond, 2013; Grunwald and Hempelmann, 2010) and brand equity 
(Korkofingas and Ang, 2011), and individuals’ product involvement (Choi and Chung, 2013; 
Choi and Lin, 2009a) and blame attribution (Bunniran et al., 2009; Magno, 2012). These 
factors capture individuals’ impression of the organization and their connections with the 
product rather than the organization’s response. In other words, the risk that individuals 
perceive in a recall process is influenced not only by managerial actions but by their own 
more general judgment about the organization and involvement with its products. 
Another social process that has been simplified in the model is media communication. The 
simplification is embodied in two aspects. One simplification is the social processing of media 
coverage. The model assumes that media consumption is homogeneous across individual 
agents. People generally expose themselves to news information that they trust (Tsfati and 
Cappella, 2003) or consume information that is readily accessible to them, and individual 
demographics including age, education, and income level also influence media consumption 
(Taneja et al., 2012). In a heterogeneous population of public agents, it may be less realistic to 
presume a uniform consumption of news coverage. Besides, a wide range of studies (for 
example, Bachmann et al., 2010; Harrison and Cantor, 1997; McCool et al., 2005) have 
shown that there is a link between exposure to media and the behavioural response of 
individuals. Thus the model is likely to have under-stated the variance of collective risk 
responses. Another assumption concerning media communication is that individual agents do 
not misinterpret the information transmitted by media. When it comes to perception of media 
messages, however, reception does not necessarily produce correct understanding, especially 
if the content is complex or technical as is often the case with food contamination. A future 
step needs to develop decision rules on media consumption and interpretation through 
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surveying literature in the field of media studies. This will contribute to the SARF literature in 
that little research has been undertaken to integrate such rules with SARF.  
The other simplification in relation to the media is that the model does not deal with time 
delay that may exist in the feedback between the public and the media. Burns and Slovic’s 
(2007) model has shown that information delay is one of the important contributors to social 
risk amplification. It is unclear how delay relates to the amplification process in the model 
presented in this thesis, but it deserves an attempt to explore the effect of delay in future work. 
Finally, there are limitations in macro-validation. The difficulty of empirically validating 
the agent-based model at the macro-level mostly lies in the problem of observing a time series 
showing public risk perception and expert or objective risk assessments over the course of a 
crisis. Also, the model is characterized by several parameters, and any empirical dataset has to 
be matched on each parameter in order to ensure that it is the appropriate model generating the 
output that the dataset is compared with. What is more, since the model output is trace of risk 
perception before and during and after a recall crisis, empirical evidence should also across 
these periods. Accordingly, data collection activities need to be implemented beyond the life 
cycle of the crisis. This is a significant challenge, requesting a high cost of time and effort and 
raising some fundamental methodological problems: 
1) One approach to collecting time series data about a crisis is to wait for a crisis and then 
start data collection. However, it is very hard to anticipate the occurrence of a risk event or 
have resources in place ready for this. Moreover, time series before the crisis starts will be 
missed due to the unpredictability of the crisis. 
2) Another approach is to acquire data from a source that collects this kind of time series 
continually, during times of crisis and non-crisis. But it is very hard to find any context in 
which such data is available. 
The absence of macro-validation in this study limits the grounds on which to place 
confidence in the outcomes of the recall model. Despite these limitations, modelling of this 
kind helps clarify our understanding of an important problem. And, in fact, the difficulty of 
obtaining data means that modelling may be the only realistic option we have at this stage. 
In summary, the limitations of this study suggest future investigation in several directions. 
First, it would be beneficial to incorporate the interaction between media and government into 
the model. This would involve dealing with the nature of the media-government relationship 
that essentially determines the role of media and public perceptions of government 
competence in risk communication. For example, a model of a case in China would involve 
some restriction on risk levels that the media could broadcast as well as censorship of specific 
content (for example news of contamination, or source of contamination). It might also 
involve a government actor playing a role in the recall announcement – perhaps delaying it if 
the contamination is at such a high level that there could be significant social unrest. Second, 
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a future step is needed to add complexity to some social processes in the model including 
product recall and media communication. For example, heterogeneity could be added to media 
consumption and interpretation, with different individuals receiving different amounts of risk 
information communicated by the media and misinterpreting media coverage to different 
degrees. And the recall decision by the producer could become a function of the change in 
consumption levels of its product. Third, validating the model at the macro-level is an 
important direction of further investigation. Since it is very hard to obtain time series data on 
risk perception, the next step may be to work out how to analyse social media content to 
validate a model like this. An example of prior work of this kind is Klimek et al.’s (2011) 
analysis of Twitter time series, which could be adapted to be used in a SARF study. 
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TABLE OF SYMBOLS 
Symbol Name Explanation 
Where it is 
introduced 
N  Number of agents Number of public agents Section 5.2.1.1 
i  Agent An individual public agent Section 5.2.1.1 
t  Time Model simulation time Section 5.2.1.1 
 ib t  Risk belief 
Agent i ’s belief of 







Defines initial risk and 
recreancy belief 
Section 5.2.1.1 
K  Number of neighbours 
Number of neighbours in a 
perfectly mixed population 
and in initial lattice 
Section 5.2.1.1 
j  Numerical order 
Numerical order of 
neighbours 
Section 5.2.1.1 
 njb t  Neighbour risk belief 
Neighbour j ’s belief of 
probability of experiencing 
product contamination 
Section 5.2.1.1 
 C t  Contamination level 
Objective probability of an 
agent experiencing product 
contamination 
Section 5.2.1.2 
 lowC t  
Low contamination 
level 
Level before and after 
crisis 
Section 5.2.1.2 
 highC t  
High contamination 
level 








Time when the crisis ends Section 5.2.1.2 
 ie t  Direct experience 
Whether agent i  has direct 
experience with product 
contamination or not 
Section 5.2.1.2 
 im t  Random number 
Randomises agent i ’s 






Defines when perceived 
risk changes consumer 
responses 
Section 5.2.1.3 
HI  Involvement threshold 
Defines when involvement 




HS  Sincerity threshold 
Defines when sincerity of 






Represents the effects of 
involvement and sincerity 
on consumer attitudes 
Section 5.2.1.3 
 a t  Recall announcement 
Whether a recall 
announcement is made or 
not 
Section 5.2.1.3 
 r t  Product recall 
Whether a recall is in force 
or not 
Section 5.2.1.3 
 iR t  Recreancy belief 
Agent i ’s belief that the 
producer has betrayed the 
public trust and fails to 
fulfil its obligations 
Section 5.2.1.4 
D  Recreancy increment  






Defines when a recall 
increases recreancy 
Section 5.2.1.4 
  1a tT   Recall timing 
Time when a recall 
announcement is made 
Section 5.2.1.4 
 ih t  Hearing recall 
whether agent i  has 
already heard the recall or 
not 
Section 5.2.1.4 
 v t  Recall voluntariness 
Whether recall is voluntary 
or involuntary 
Section 5.2.1.4 
E  Recreancy variation 





Weight of ‘event 
discovery’ 
Weight given to ‘event 
discovery’ in the partial 
model with recreancy 
Section 5.2.1.4 
  Weight of ‘recreancy’ 
Weight given to 
‘recreancy’ in the partial 
model with recreancy 
Section 5.2.1.4 
 M t  
Media communicated 
risk 




Weight of ‘event 
discovery’ 
Weight given to ‘event 
discovery’ in the full model 
Section 5.2.1.5 
  Weight of ‘recreancy’ 
Weight given to 
‘recreancy’ in the full 
model 
Section 5.2.1.5 
  Weight of media 
communication 
Weight given to perception 
expressed in the ‘media’ in 
the full model 
Section 5.2.1.5 
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df  Degrees of freedom 
Number of values in the 
final calculation of a t -test 
statistic 
Section 5.2.2 
p  p -value 
Probability of finding the 
observed results or results 
of greater magnitude when 
the null hypothesis is true 
Section 5.2.2 
P  Rewiring probability 
Probability of reconnecting 
a lattice edge 
Section 5.3 
7Q  Questionnaire item 7Q  
Comparison between own 
perception and other 
people’s perceptions 
Section 6.2.2 
8Q  Questionnaire item 8Q  
Comparison between 
noticing contamination and 
other people’s perceptions 
Section 6.2.2 
9Q  Questionnaire item 9Q  
Comparison between recall 






Comparison between recall 





Comparison between trust 






Comparison between media 
communicated risk and 
other people’s perceptions 
Section 6.2.2 
1w  
Weight of ‘event 
discovery’ 
Weight given to ‘event 
discovery’ 
Section 6.7 
2w  Weight of prior belief Weight given to prior belief Section 6.7 
3w  
Weight of social 
interaction 




Weight of direct 
experience 




Weight of product 
recall information 
Weight given to product 
recall information 
Section 6.7 
6w  Weight of ‘recreancy’ 











W  Weight array 
Array of weights of an 
information source 
Section 6.7 
1SP  Shape parameter 
One shape parameter of 




2SP  Shape parameter 
The other shape parameter 






Measures the distance 
between the empirical 
distribution function of 
weight of an information 
source and the cumulative 
distribution function of beta 
distribution 
Section 6.7 
X  Original ratio 
Original ratio of recall 
timing to voluntariness 
Section 6.7 
Y  Normalized ratio 
Normalized ratio of recall 
timing to voluntariness 
Section 6.7 
a  Lower bound 
Lower bound of original 
ratios 
Section 6.7 
b  Upper bound 
Upper bound of original 
ratios 
Section 6.7 
iD  Recreancy increment 
Amount by which a recall 
increases agent i ’s 
recreancy belief 
Section 6.7 
iE  Recreancy variation 
Amount by which recall 
voluntariness changes 





Maximum by which 





Defines when a recall 













Mean ratio of public risk 
perception to the objective 
risk during the crisis 
Section 7.1.1 
p  Peak risk amplification 
Ratio of peak risk 




Peak delay from crisis 
start 
Time delay between peak 




Peak delay from recall 
start 
Time delay between peak 




Z  Number of runs 




Timing of peak risk 
perception 
Time when peak risk 
perception in a single run 
arises 
Section 7.1.1 
s  Peak risk perception 







Determines whether there 
are any statistically 
significant differences 




 L P  
Characteristic path 
length 
Number of edges in the 
shortest path between two 
nodes, averaged over all 
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A Extraction of decision rules 
The table below demonstrates the decision rules of different agents (e.g. consumers, organizations, and media) extracted from empirical studies 
on product recall crises. It consists of overall seven columns: reference, context, agent, condition, action, condition code, and action code. Agent 
is the one that makes decisions. Conditions and actions are descriptions of the causes (independent variables) and effects (dependent variables) of 
agent behaviour, which are converted into condition codes and action codes, respectively. On the whole, the decision rules work in such a way 
that in <context>, for <agent>, if <condition code>, then <action code>. 
 
Reference Context Agent Condition Action Condition Code  Action Code 
Choi, J., & Chung, W. (2013). Analysis 
of the interactive relationship between 
apology and product involvement in   
crisis communication: An experimental 
study on the Toyota recall crisis. Journal 
of Business and Technical 
Communication, 27(1), 3-31. 
Toyota recall 
crisis 
Consumers Consumers are highly 
involved with the 
organization or its 
products and perceive the 
CEO’s apology speech as 
truly sincere. 
Consumers’ attitude 
toward the organization’s 
reputation is the same as it 
was before the crisis. 
Involvement > IH 
Sincerity (Apology) > SH 
Reputation t  = Reputation 1t  
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009a). 
Consumer response to crisis: Exploring 
the concept of involvement in Mattel 




Consumers Consumers are highly 
involved with the recalls. 
Consumers perceive 
increasingly high 
reputation in China over 
time. 
Involvement > IH (Perceived Reputation) t  = 
(Perceived Reputation) 1t  + c  × 
Involvement 
 208 
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009b). 
Consumer responses to Mattel product 
recalls posted on online bulletin boards: 
Exploring two types of emotion. Journal 




Consumers The more consumers are 
alerted to a crisis 
The more negative 
attitude they have toward 
organizational reputation. 
Alert > AH Reputation t   = Reputation 1t  + c  
× Alert 
Souiden, N., & Pons, F. (2009). Product 
recall crisis management: the impact on 
manufacturer’s image, consumer loyalty 
and purchase intention. Journal of 




Consumers The organization adopts 
voluntary recall and 
improvement campaigns. 
Consumers have a 
positive image of the 
manufacturer. 
Voluntary Recall = True  
Improvement Campaigns 
= True 
Image t  = Image 2t  + c  × 
Voluntary Recall × Improvement 
Campaigns 
Consumers The organization refuses 
to acknowledge the defect 
presented in the product. 
Consumers have a 
significantly negative 
image of the 
manufacturer. 
Denial = True Image t  = Image 1t  + + c  × 
Denial 
Standop, D. (2006). Product recall 
versus business as usual: a preliminary 
analysis of decision-making in potential 
product-related crises. 99th EAAE 
Seminar on ‘Trust and Risk in Business 
Networks’. February 8-10, 2006. Bonn, 
Germany. 
Bicycle recall 
in the Western 
parts of 
Germany 
Consumers Consumers believe that 
there is a deferral of the 
recall. 
Consumers perceive a bad 
image of the organization. 
Time (Taken to Issue 
Recall) > TH 
Image t  = Image 1t  + c  × Time 
(Taken to Issue Recall) 
Copeland, T., Jackson, G., & Morgan, F. 
(2004). An update on product recalls. 
Journal of Marketing Channels, 11(2-3), 
103-121. 
Product recall Consumers Consumers believe recalls 
to be less serious or the 
true nature of danger is 
not manifest. 
Consumers tend to ignore 
recalls. 
Severity (Recall) < SH (Behavioural Intention) t  = 
(Behavioural Intention) 1t  
De Matos, C. A., & Rossi, C. A. V. 
(2007). Consumer reaction to product 
recalls: factors influencing product 
judgement and behavioural intentions. 
International Journal of Consumer 
Automobile 
recall in Brazil 
Consumers Consumers perceive 
lower (higher) danger in 
the defective product. 
Consumers show more 
favourable (unfavourable) 
behavioural intentions 
toward the brand recalled. 
Perceived Risk < RH (Behavioural Intention) t  = 
(Behavioural Intention) 1t  + c  × 
Perceived Risk × Perceived 
Importance (Recall Message) × Consumers attach greater 
(smaller) importance to 
Perceived Importance 
(Recall Message) > IH 
 209 
Studies, 31(1), 109-116. the recall message. Product Judgement × Ownership 
Consumers have a 
positive (negative) 
product judgement. 
Product Judgement > JH 
Consumers (do not) have 
a car made by the brand 
recalled. 
Ownership = True 
Hammond, R. G. (2013). Sudden 
Unintended Used-Price Deceleration? 
The 2009-2010 Toyota Recalls. Journal 






Consumers The organization launches 
product recalls. 
Consumers’ responses to 
negative product-quality 
information depend on 
company reputation rather 
than product quality.  
Recall = True (Behavioural Intention) t  = 
(Behavioural Intention) 1t  + c  × 
Organizational Reputation 
Aouba, A., Harroche, A., Frenzel, L., 
Torchet, M. F., Rothschild, C., Francois, 
I., & Mamzer-Bruneel, M. F. (2015). 
Batch recall of French plasma-derived 
products due to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease risk: the psychological impact on 
haemophilic patients, changes in their 
therapeutic demands and behaviour and 
ethical considerations. Haemophilia, 21, 
27-33. 




Consumers Consumers are 
accustomed to using PdP. 
Consumers express lower 
depression and anxiety on 
PdP and fear an increased 
risk of inhibitor with 
recombinant products 
(RP), thus they will 
continue to use PdP.  
Preference (Product) = 
PdP 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  
Mothers Mothers exhibit a high 
level of parental guilt. 
Mothers suffer from high 
psychological impact and 
ask for a switch from PdP 
to recombinant products 
(RP). 
Parental Guilt > GH (Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Parental Guilt 
Choi, J., & Chung, W. (2013). Analysis 
of the interactive relationship between 
apology and product involvement in   
crisis communication: An experimental 
study on the Toyota recall crisis. Journal 
of Business and Technical 
Toyota recall 
crisis 
Consumers Consumers are highly 
involved with the 
organization or its 
products and perceive the 
CEO’s apology speech as 
truly sincere. 
Consumers are not more 
likely to purchase a 
Toyota vehicle in the 
future. 
Involvement > IH 
Sincerity (Apology) > SH 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  
 210 
Communication, 27(1), 3-31. Consumers The organization’s 
reputation is restored. 
Consumers do not tend to 
purchase its products in 
the future. 
Reputation t  = 
Reputation 1t  
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  
Consumers Consumers perceive the 
CEO’s apology as less 
sincere. 
Consumers are more 
likely to be hesitant to 
purchase its products. 
Sincerity (Apology) < SH (Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Sincerity 
(Apology) 
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009b). 
Consumer responses to Mattel product 
recalls posted on online bulletin boards: 
Exploring two types of emotion. Journal 




Consumers Consumers feel fear and 
worry in the recalls. 
Consumers do not boycott 
Mattel’s products. 
Fear > FH 
Worry > WH 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  
Freedman, S., Kearney, M., & 
Lederman, M. (2012). Product recalls, 
imperfect information, and spillover 
effects: Lessons from the consumer 
response to the 2007 toy recalls. Review 





Consumers The manufacturers launch 
product recalls. 
Consumers continue to 
purchase other types of 
toys produced by 
manufacturers involved in 
the recalls. 
Recall = True Purchase Intention (Other Types) t
= Purchase Intention (Other 
Types) 1t  
Jung, H. K. (2009). Product recalls: 
Consumer reaction and blame 




Consumers Consumers perceive 
corporate social 
responsibility as high. 
Consumers are more 
likely to purchase the 
product in the future. 
Perceived Corporate 
Social Responsibility > 
CSRH 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c × Perceived 
Corporate Social Responsibility × 
Perceived Corporate Expertise 




difference as high. 
Perceived Corporate 
Expertise Difference > 
DH 
Consumers perceive 
brand value as high. 





Consumers Consumers perceive a 
high (low) level of risk 
for the recalled product. 
Consumers’ willingness to 
buy the recalled product is 
influenced. 
Perceived Risk > RH (Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Perceived 
Risk 
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Marsh, T. L., Schroeder, T. C., & 
Mintert, J. (2004). Impacts of meat 
product recalls on consumer demand in 




Consumers Consumers have access to 
current and lagged meat 
recall information. 
Consumers reduce their 
demand for beef and pork 
due to decreased quality. 
Availability (Recall 
Information) = True 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Perceived 
Quality 
Consumers The organization launches 
current period poultry 
recalls. 
Consumers perceive a 
decrease in product 
quality and reduce poultry 
consumption significantly. 
Current Period Recall 
(Poultry) = True 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Perceived 
Quality 
Consumers Consumers receive media 
information covering 
meat recall events. 
Consumer demand does 
not change. 
Recall Portrayal 
(Consumers) = Recall 
Portrayal (Media) 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  
Souiden, N., & Pons, F. (2009). Product 
recall crisis management: the impact on 
manufacturer’s image, consumer loyalty 
and purchase intention. Journal of 




Consumers The organization refuses 
to acknowledge the defect 
presented in the product. 
Consumers are not likely 
to purchase the product. 
Denial = True (Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 1t  + c  × Denial 
Consumers The organization adopts 
voluntary recall and 
improvement campaigns. 
Consumers respond more 
actively to improvement 
campaigns than voluntary 
recall in terms of purchase 
intention. 
Voluntary Recall = True  
Improvement Campaigns 
= True 
(Purchase Intention) t  = (Purchase 
Intention) 2t  + c  × Voluntary 
Recall × Improvement Campaigns 
Choi, J., & Chung, W. (2013). Analysis 
of the interactive relationship between 
apology and product involvement in   
crisis communication: An experimental 
study on the Toyota recall crisis. Journal 
of Business and Technical 
Communication, 27(1), 3-31. 
Toyota recall 
crisis 
Consumers Consumers are highly 
involved with the 
organization or its 
products and perceive the 
CEO’s apology speech as 
truly sincere. 
The apology has more 
positive effects on 
consumers’ attitude 
toward the organization. 
Involvement > IH 
Sincerity (Apology) > SH 
Attitude t  = Attitude 1t  + c  × 
Involvement × Sincerity (Apology) 
Consumers Consumers perceive the 
CEO’s apology as less 
sincere. 
Consumers are more 
likely to retain a negative 
attitude toward the 
organization. 
Sincerity (Apology) < SH Attitude t  = Attitude 1t  + c  × 
Sincerity (Apology) 
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Germann, F., Grewal, R., Ross, Jr. W. T., 
& Srivastava, R. J. (2014). Product 
recalls and the moderating role of brand 




Consumers Consumers are highly 
committed to the product 
involved in low (high) 
severity recalls. 
Consumers express less 
(more) attitude change 
and less (more) negative 
responses than those less 
committed. 
Commitment > CH  
Severity (Recall) < SH 
Attitude t  = Attitude 1t  + c  × 
Commitment × Severity (Recall) 
Venugopal, P., Soni, A., Tiwari, R., & 
Gupta, S. (2012). Product recall: Effect 
on brand perception. International 




and Toyota car 
recall 
Consumers Consumers perceive that 
the company acts in a 
socially responsible 
manner. 
Consumers hold more 
favourable feelings for the 
company. 
Perceived Corporate 
Social Responsibility > 
CSRH 
Attitude t  = Attitude 1t  + c  × 
Perceived Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Magno, F. (2012). Managing product 
recalls: The effects of time, responsible 
vs. opportunistic recall management and 
blame on consumers’ attitudes. 
Procedia-Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 58, 1309-1315. 
Laptop recall Consumers The company is not active 
and does not start the 
recall immediately after 
the first signals of 
potential injuries. 
Consumers exhibit a 
negative brand attitude 
toward the company. 
Time (Taken to Issue 
Recall) > TH 
(Brand Attitude) t  = (Brand 
Attitude) 1t  + c  × Time (Taken to 
Issue Recall) 
Consumers Consumers perceive that 
the company has 
managed the product 
recall in an opportunistic 
(a socially responsible) 
way. 
Consumers have a 
negative (positive) post-
recall brand attitude. 
Perceived Corporate 
Social Responsibility < 
CSRH 
Brand Attitude (Post-recall) t  = 
Brand Attitude (Pre-recall) 2t  + c  
× Perceived Corporate Social 
Responsibility × Blame Attribution 
Consumers (do not) 
blame the company for 
the product crisis. 
Blame Attribution = True 
Korkofingas, C., & Ang, L. (2011). 
Product recall, brand equity, and future 
choice. Journal of Marketing 
Management, 27(9-10), 959-975. 
Mp3 player 
recall 
Consumers The organization has a 
strong brand. 
Consumers downgrade 
their evaluations of brand 
equity. 
Brand > BH (Brand Equity) t  = (Brand 
Equity) 1t  + c  × Brand × 
Perceived Severity × Perceived 
Speed (Response) 
Consumers regard the 
severity of the problem as 
high. 
Perceived Severity > SH 
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Consumers perceive a 
slow response of the 
company in handling the 
product recall crisis. 
Perceived Speed 
(Response) < SH 
Aouba, A., Harroche, A., Frenzel, L., 
Torchet, M. F., Rothschild, C., Francois, 
I., & Mamzer-Bruneel, M. F. (2015). 
Batch recall of French plasma-derived 
products due to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease risk: the psychological impact on 
haemophilic patients, changes in their 
therapeutic demands and behaviour and 
ethical considerations. Haemophilia, 21, 
27-33. 




Consumers Consumers are informed 
of the batch recall of 
plasma-derived products 
(PdP). 
A large proportion of 
consumers exhibit normal 
depression but higher 
anxiety about the risk of 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease (vCJD) infection 
and switch from PdP to 
recombinant products 
(RP). 
Recall (PdP) = True (Number of Consumers) t  = 
(Number of Consumers) 1t  + c  × 
Depression Level × Anxiety Level  
De Matos, C. A., & Rossi, C. A. V. 
(2007). Consumer reaction to product 
recalls: factors influencing product 
judgement and behavioural intentions. 
International Journal of Consumer 
Studies, 31(1), 109-116. 
Automobile 
recall in Brazil 
Consumers Consumers perceive the 
company as high (low) in 
social responsibility. 
Consumers give positive 
(negative) evaluations for 
the product. 
Perceived Corporate 
Social Responsibility > 
CSRH 
(Product Judgement) t  = (Product 
Judgement) 1t  + c  × Perceived 
Corporate Social Responsibility × 
Blame × Ownership Consumers attribute 
smaller (higher) blame to 
the company for the 
defect presented in the 
recall message. 
Blame < BH 
Consumers (do not) have 
a car made by the brand 
recalled. 
Ownership = True 
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Bunniran, S., McCaffrey, D. J., Bentley, 
J. P., & Bouldin, A. S. (2009). 
Pharmaceutical product withdrawal: 
Attributions of blame and its impact on 
trust. Research in Social and 





Consumers The organization launches 
a pharmaceutical product 
withdrawal. 
Blaming appears to be no 
different between 
consumers on a 
withdrawn product and 
those on a product in the 
same therapeutic class. 
Recall = True Blame Attribution (Consumers 
Consuming a Withdrawn Product) 
= Blame Attribution (Consumers 
Consuming a Substitute Product) 
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009a). 
Consumer response to crisis: Exploring 
the concept of involvement in Mattel 




Media Mattel issues toy recalls. Chinese manufacturers are 
portrayed by the media as 
a main culprit of the crisis 
more than twice as often 
as Mattel. 
Recall = True Probability (Main Culprit = 
Chinese Manufacturers) > 2 × 
Probability (Main Culprit = Mattel) 
Consumers Consumers are highly 
involved with the recalls. 
Consumers blame Mattel 
most frequently, followed 
by China. 
Involvement > IH Probability (Blame Attribution = 
Mattel) > Probability (Blame 
Attribution = Chinese 
Manufacturers) 
Consumers Mattel issues toy recalls. Highly involved 
consumers blame Mattel 
most frequently, while the 
media attribute blame to 
Chinese manufacturers. 
Recall = True Blame Attribution (Highly 
Involved Consumers) = Mattel 
Blame Attribution (Media) = 
Chinese Manufacturers 
Grunwald, G., & Hempelmann, B. 
(2010). Impacts of reputation for quality 
on perceptions of company responsibility 
and product-related dangers in times of 
product-recall and public complaints 
crises: Results from an empirical 
investigation. Corporate Reputation 




Consumers Consumers consider the 
organization as highly 
reputable before the 
crisis. 
Consumers are more 
likely to perceive the 
organization as 
responsible in managing 
the recall. 
Perceived Pre-crisis 
Reputation > RH 
(Perceived Responsibility) t  = 
(Perceived Responsibility) 1t  + c  
× Perceived Pre-crisis Reputation 
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009a). 
Consumer response to crisis: Exploring 
2007 Mattel 
toy recalls 
Consumers Mattel issues toy recalls. The frequency of anger 
toward Mattel among 
Recall = True Probability (Anger) t  = Probability 
(Anger) 1t  + c  × Involvement 
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the concept of involvement in Mattel 
product recalls. Public Relations Review, 
35(1), 18-22. 
highly involved 
consumers increase over 
time. 
Choi, Y., & Lin, Y. H. (2009b). 
Consumer responses to Mattel product 
recalls posted on online bulletin boards: 
Exploring two types of emotion. Journal 




Consumers Mattel announces the first 
toy recall. 
Consumers express alert 
most frequently. 
Recall (the First) = True Probability (Alert) > Probability 
(Other Emotions) 
Consumers Mattel announces the 
second, the third, and the 
fourth toy recalls. 
Consumers express anger 
most frequently. 
Recall (the Second, the 
Third, and the Fourth) = 
True 
Probability (Anger) > Probability 
(Other Emotions) 
Grunwald, G., & Hempelmann, B. 
(2010). Impacts of reputation for quality 
on perceptions of company responsibility 
and product-related dangers in times of 
product-recall and public complaints 
crises: Results from an empirical 
investigation. Corporate Reputation 




Consumers Consumers consider the 
organization as highly 
reputable before the 
crisis. 
Consumers’ perceptions 
of problem severity are 
not influenced. 
Perceived Pre-crisis 
Reputation > RH 
(Perceived Severity) t  = (Perceived 
Severity) 1t  
Feng, T., Keller, L. R., Wang, L., & 
Wang, Y. (2010). Product quality risk 
perceptions and decisions: Contaminated 
pet food and lead-painted toys. Risk 
Analysis, 30(10), 1572-1589. 
Recalls of 
contaminated 
pet food and 
lead-painted 
toys in the 
United States 
Consumers Consumers have access to 
extensive news coverage 
on product recall. 
Consumers overestimate 




Coverage > CH 
(Perceived Risk) t  = (Perceived 
Risk) 1t  + c  × Media 
Amplification 
Consumers Consumers obtain 
unpacked information on 
a recall event. 
Consumers have an 
overall higher judged 
probability of quality risk. 
Reception (Unpacked 
Information) = True 
(Perceived Risk) t  = (Perceived 
Risk) 1t  + c  × Amplification 
(Unpacked Information) 
Yannopoulou, N., Koronis, E., & Elliott, 
R. (2011). Media amplification of a 
brand crisis and its affect on brand trust. 
Journal of Marketing Management, 
Yogurt recall 
in Greece 
Consumers Consumers have 
experiences with yogurt 
recall and have 
cumulative brand trust. 
Consumers tend not to 
perceive higher risks 
associated with the 
recalled product. 
Experience (Recall) = 
True 
Brand Trust > TH 
(Perceived Risk) t  = (Perceived 
Risk) 1t  
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27(5-6), 530-546. Consumers Consumers acquire risk 
information from mass 
media. 
Consumers accept that the 
problem is ‘general’, 
‘important’, and that 
particular ‘risks’ are 
associated with the brand. 
Recall Portrayal 
(Consumers) = Recall 
Portrayal (Media) 
(Perceived Risk) t  = (Perceived 
Risk) 1t  + c  × Media 
Amplification 
Feng, T., Keller, L. R., Wang, L., & 
Wang, Y. (2010). Product quality risk 
perceptions and decisions: Contaminated 
pet food and lead-painted toys. Risk 
Analysis, 30(10), 1572-1589. 
Recalls of 
contaminated 
pet food and 
lead-painted 
toys in the 
United States 
Consumers The organization launches 
product recall. 
Consumers check 
websites most frequently 
for more information. 
Recall = True Probability (Consulting 
Websites) > Probability (Other 
Options) 
Yannopoulou, N., Koronis, E., & Elliott, 
R. (2011). Media amplification of a 
brand crisis and its affect on brand trust. 




Consumers Consumers have a low 
involvement with a low-
cost disposable product. 
Consumers do not discuss 
the incident with family, 
friends, or colleagues. 
Involvement (A Low-
cost Disposable Product) 
< IH 
Interpersonal Communication = 
None 
Consumers The organization launches 
product recall. 
Consumers interpret the 
associated risks through 
media discourse rather 
than rationally examining 
aspects of technical 
discourses. 
Recall = True Risk Interpretation (Consumers) = 
Risk Interpretation (Media) 
Media The organization launches 
product recall. 
The media construct 
images of risk and fear in 
attracting the public 
interest and exploring the 
dimensions of the crisis. 
Recall = True Communicated Risk (Media) t  = 
Communicated Risk (Media) 1t  + 
c  × Media Amplification 
Venugopal, P., Soni, A., Tiwari, R., & 
Gupta, S. (2012). Product recall: Effect 
on brand perception. International 




and Toyota car 
recall 
Consumers The organization launches 
product recall. 
Consumers view a 
government press release 
as more objective than a 
company advertisement 
describing the recall. 
Recall = True Perceived Objectivity (A 
Government Press Release) > 
Perceived Objectivity (A Company 
Advertisement) 
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Consumers The organization launches 
product recall. 
Consumers view the print 
media as more trustworthy 
and somewhat more 
objective than the sound 
medium. 
Recall = True Perceived Reliability (Print 
Media) > Perceived Reliability 
(Sound Medium) 
Bunniran, S., McCaffrey, D. J., Bentley, 
J. P., & Bouldin, A. S. (2009). 
Pharmaceutical product withdrawal: 
Attributions of blame and its impact on 
trust. Research in Social and 





Consumers The organization launches 
a pharmaceutical product 
withdrawal. 
Consumers show low trust 
for insurance companies 
and Pharma but high trust 
for pharmacists and 
physicians. 
Recall = True Trust (Individuals) > Trust 
(Organizations) 
Freedman, S., Kearney, M., & 
Lederman, M. (2012). Product recalls, 
imperfect information, and spillover 
effects: Lessons from the consumer 
response to the 2007 toy recalls. Review 





Consumers The organization launches 
product recalls. 
Consumers use the 
information contained in 
the recall announcements 
to update their 
expectations about the 
safety of other toys 
produced by the 
manufacturer. 
Recall = True Expectation (Other Products) = 
Expectation (Recalled Products) 
Muralidharan, E. (2012). Managing 
product recalls – Factors that influence 
recall restitution and time to recall. 
Ph.D. The University of Manitoba. 
Product recall Consumers Recall is due to the 
internal operations of the 
firm, and the severity of 
the recall is high. 
Affected consumers 
receive lower restitution 
from the firm. 
Cause (Internal 
Operations) = True 
Severity (Recall) > SH 
Restitution t  = c  × Cause (Internal 
Operations) × Severity (Recall) 
Organization The organization 
considers the crisis as 
severe. 
The organization issues 
product recall quickly. 
Severity (Crisis) > SH Time (Taken to Issue Recall) = c  × 
Severity (Crisis) 
Umehara, E., & Ohta, T. (2011). Game 
of risk communications – The case of a 
Japanese carmaker. IEEE Transactions 
Car recall Organization A guardian agent is 
present. 
The carmaker discloses 
recall information. 
 Presence (A Guardian 
Agent) = True 
Disclosure (Recall Information) = 
True 
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on Systems, Man and Cybernetics - Part 
A: Systems and Humans, 41(4), 651-661. 
Organization The carmaker forecasts 
that the probability that 
the user finds the fault 
information on the car 
increases to a certain 
degree. 
The carmaker discloses 
recall information. 
Probability (Finding 
Fault Information) > PH 
Disclosure (Recall Information) = 
True 
Hooker, N. H., Teratanavat, R. P., & 
Salin, V. (2005). Crisis management 
effectiveness indicators for US meat and 
poultry recalls. Food Policy, 30(1), 63-
80. 
U.S. meat and 
poultry recalls 
Organization The plants launch meat or 
poultry recalls. 
The hazard type or 
severity does not 
influence recall 
effectiveness. 
Recall (Meat or Poultry) 
= True 
Effectiveness (Recall) = c  
Organization The plants launch meat or 
poultry recalls. 
Cases at large plants do 
not have shorter durations 
than cases at smaller 
plants. 
Recall (Meat or Poultry) 
= True 
Case Duration (Large Plants) ≥ 
Case Duration (Smaller Plants) 
Organization The plants have a very 
small size. 
Recalls are more effective 
for very small plants 
compared to small plants 
both in terms of the 
recovery rate and the ratio 
of recovery rate to case 
duration. 
Size (Plants) = Very 
Small 
Recovery Rate (Very Small 
Plants) > Recovery Rate (Small 
Plants) 
Recovery Rate / Case Duration 
(Very Small Plants) > Recovery 
Rate / Case Duration (Small Plants) 
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B Survey instrument 
This instrument shows the complete questions included in the survey. The detailed account of 
the survey is covered in Chapter 6. 
SECTION I   Demographics 
 




Q2. What is your age? 
 20 or less 
 Between 21 and 30 
 Between 31 and 40 
 Between 41 and 50 
 Greater than 50 
 
Q3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 Grade school 
 High school 
 Professional degree 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 
Q4. Please estimate your total 2015 household income before taxes, combining income from 
all household members, from all sources: 
 $10,000 or less 
 $10,001 - $30,000 
 $30,001 - $50,000 
 $50,001 - $70,000 
 $70,001 - $90,000 
 $90,001 or more 
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SECTION II   Information sources 
 
We would like you to think about an incident in which your current milk supplier, i.e. ABC 
Company, has had a contamination problem. There is a broken pipe in its processing factory, 
and this has allowed bacteria to accumulate and contaminate liquid milk sold to supermarkets. 
A small number of the bacteria can cause severe poisoning leading to respiratory and muscular 
problems in adults. The bacteria can also affect the intestinal system in infants. The company 
has issued a recall for all milk products to all its customers. 
 
Q6. Which social sources of information about the             How many of these are there? 
      crisis would you consult?  
 Friends                                                                            ___________________ 
 Neighbours                                                                     ___________________ 
 Colleagues                                                                      ___________________ 
 Family members                                                             ___________________ 
 Other individuals in your Community                           ___________________ 
 News media         
(Newspapers and periodicals, Internet, TV, and radio, etc.)   ___________________                   
 Other, please specify                                                      ___________________ 
 
SECTION III   Importance of different considerations 
 
In this section we would like you to say how important different considerations are when you 
think about this issue. We are going to ask you to compare different pairs of consideration, and 
say how important they are relative to each other. 
 
Q7. When you form your risk perception, how much relative importance would you give to 
your own perception and other people’s perceptions respectively? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
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 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
 100%, 0% 
 
Q8. It is possible that you could notice contamination yourself, for example through smell, or 
appearance of the milk. When you form your risk perception, how much relative importance 
would you give to noticing contamination yourself and other people’s perceptions? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
 100%, 0% 
 
Q9. When you form your risk perception, how much relative importance would you give to 
the recall notice compared with other people’s perceptions? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
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 100%, 0% 
 
Q10. When you think about the effect of a recall on your trust in the producer, what is the 
relative importance you would give to timing (whether the recall was early or late) and 
voluntariness (whether the producer made the recall voluntarily or involuntarily)? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
 100%, 0% 
 
Q11. When you form your risk perception, what is the relative importance you would give to 
your feeling of trust in the producer and other people’s perceptions? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
 100%, 0% 
 
Q12. When you form your risk perception, how much relative importance would you give to 
media communicated risk and other people’s perceptions? 
 0%, 100% 
 10%, 90% 
 20%, 80% 
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 30%, 70% 
 40%, 60% 
 50%, 50% 
 60%, 40% 
 70%, 30% 
 80%, 20% 
 90%,10 % 
 100%, 0% 
 
 
 
